Why the BRI or IMEC isn't a zero-game for the Middle East
Arab countries want to maximize and diversify their economic options, this is done purely out of self-interest as opposed to an ideological commitment to alliances and blocs, which is the only way the US seems to understand world affairs.
The United States recently unrevealed with partners what it proclaimed as the “India-Middle East Economic Corridor”. Showcased as a counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the corridor aims to establish a maritime route from the Indian Subcontinent onto the Arabian Peninsula, passing through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and occupied Palestine, before crossing the Mediterranean Sea towards Greece. The US has constantly been looking for a way to try and counter Beijing in global infrastructure investment, and generally sweeps through a host of new proposals on an annual basis, such as “Blue Dot Network”, “Build Back Better”, “Partnership for Global Infrastructure”, the list goes on. None of them seem to get very far, although the latest incarnation is the closest to something mildly substantial.
The idea of an India-Middle East Economic Corridor has many challenges, not least political ones. However, even if it were to be a success, the countries who are participating in it almost certainly do not see it as a zero-sum game to counter Beijing in the way Washington does, that’s because almost all of the countries involved, save for perhaps India, already participate in the Belt and Road Initiative as it is and have warm relations with China. When it comes to building infrastructure and spurring economic development in the Middle East, for most countries this isn’t a question of “either or” but multiplying options accordingly for the best economic results. It is neither a question of ideology nor geopolitics, and in this case, the US is likely to be disappointing.
There is not a single country in the Arab world that is opposed to China. Beijing’s foreign policy towards the Middle East seeks to take a “best of both worlds” position in positioning itself as a peacemaker seeking stability, and fosters close ties with all countries and sides accordingly. This position has been very effective in promoting Saudi Arabia-Iran normalization, as well as giving the political space for Arab countries to readmit Syria to the Arab League despite American pressure. China is a positive force in the Middle East, whereas the US is a constructive one that forces states to make binary choices and routinely frames global affairs as a singular ideological battle between “good” and “evil”.
On an economic level, China is an essential partner for Arab countries for several reasons. First, for the Gulf States it represents their largest export market in terms of oil and energy demand, but more pressingly on a strategic level closer economic ties with Beijing are crucial to the structural realignment of Arab economies as the world looks to a long-term post-oil automobile future. We see from Saudi Arabia and the UAE that they are seeking to reinvent their economies through lucrative public investment funds and of course, enticing Chinese investment into their own countries accordingly. On this note, India is also an important partner due to geographic proximity, after all, India greatly contributes to the labor force of Arab countries, and an FTA was recently signed with the UAE.
In a nutshell, Arab countries want to maximize and diversify their economic options, this is done purely out of self-interest as opposed to an ideological commitment to alliances and blocs, which is the only way the US seems to understand world affairs. Therefore, when the United States proposes that Arab countries join a new corridor with India, which it depicts as an Anti-China initiative, the associates do not see it this way, but rather as an opportunity to consolidate themselves as a new nexus for intercontinental trade in the same way which the BRI endeavors to do anyway. There is a reason why Dubai frames itself as a “gateway to the world” and utilizes its own geographic position for commercial advantage. It’s a “friends to all” strategy.
But nor on the other hand, does the proposal of such a corridor particularly hurt China for that reason, given Beijing is also investing in infrastructure in the associated countries, and ironically, owns the critical port of Piraeus in Greece, as well as Gwadar Port in Pakistan which could utilize the same route. Rather, Beijing would argue that infrastructure amounts to a “win-win.” If the Arab world is more greatly integrated and becomes a thoroughfare for trade, everyone ultimately benefits. It is in conclusion the United States and its allies alone see infrastructure as a zero-sum game and competition, whereas China, as well as states in the Middle East, see it as first and foremost important for growth and prosperity.