• An Israeli tank takes position on the Gaza Strip border in southern occupied Palestine, Wednesday, March 19, 2025 (AP)

A small and previously marginalized unit within "Israel’s" intelligence service, tasked with challenging conventional assessments of strategic threats, is being upgraded and given direct access to senior military officials, Bloomberg reported on Tuesday.

This move aims to prevent a recurrence of the intelligence failures that contributed to the Palestinian Resistance's operation on October 7, 2023.

The “Oversight Section", which currently consists of six analysts, will be expanded and placed under the leadership of a brigadier general instead of a colonel, Bloomberg cited two sources familiar with the plan as saying.

According to the report, Israeli intelligence officials believe these changes will help prevent a repeat of late 2023, when warnings from army conscripts monitoring Gaza, who had allegedly detected Hamas mobilizing for an attack, were dismissed.

At the time, Israeli leadership assumed that Hamas was contained behind fortified barriers and deterred by military superiority.

“We all saw on Oct. 7 the cost of hewing to a ‘concept’ left unchallenged,” indicated Amos Yadlin, a retired Israeli Air Force general and former head of Military Intelligence. “And that challenge must be sounded by someone senior enough to be taken seriously by those in charge. The alternative of thousands of people being killed on their watch, because questions weren’t asked in time, is far, far worse.”

The unit and its counterparts within "Israel’s" intelligence agencies, Mossad and Shin Bet, were originally established after "Israel" was caught off guard by the joint Egyptian-Syrian offensive in the 1973 war. Their work is colloquially known by the Talmudic phrase “Ipcha Mistabra” or “the reverse may be reasonable,” Bloomberg mentioned.

Read more: Israeli police, military clash over Oct 7 probe results: Israeli media

Shin Bet admits failure on Oct 7, accuses political leadership

In early March, the Shin Bet published its internal investigation into the Palestinian Resistance's Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on October 7.

Israeli media reported that most field commanders—ranging from platoon and company leaders to battalion commanders—were killed at the outset of the attack, including three brigade commanders.

The military’s investigations pointed to a complete lack of preparedness across all formations, including the collapse of intelligence from both Aman and the Shin Bet, highlighting that the Israeli military's Gaza Division "was defeated within the first two hours of the operation."

According to the Shin Bet, the main factors that led to failure were "failure to utilize agents, analyze information, and coordinate with the army."

While the Shin Bet admitted in its investigation summary, according to the Israeli Public Broadcasting Corporation, that it had failed "in its mission to prevent the attack," it placed part of the responsibility on the "political leadership".

The report held the head of the Israeli occupation, Benjamin Netanyahu, responsible for allowing the transfer of money into Gaza and avoiding the assassinations of Hamas leaders, despite Shin Bet recommendations to follow a proactive approach.

The investigation also pointed to "the lack of effectiveness in gathering human intelligence, and weak recruitment due to the restrictions imposed on the Shin Bet's work in Gaza." 

Read more: IOF brigade commander resigns over Oct 7 failures: 'I failed'