"Israel" is facing severe issues due to a deterioration in its strategic approach over the past 50 years, says Professor Stephen M. Walt.

He points out in Foreign Policy that "Israel" is deeply divided, struggling in an unwinnable war on Gaza, and its occupation forces and economy are under significant strain as a wider war looms. 

Walt highlights that while "Israel" initially received global sympathy after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, its subsequent actions, including a brutal onslaught in Gaza and increased settler violence, have resulted in the erosion of this support.

Even US support for "Israel" is plummeting and younger Americans are outraged by Joe Biden's passive response and even complicity in the war. 

Walt states that although Benjamin Netanyahu is partially to blame, there is a much deeper issue at hand, which is the "erosion in Israel's strategic thinking over the past 50 years," as he details how these strategic choices since 1967 "have helped undermine its security."

Ben-Gurion erred by collaborating with Britain and France to invade Egypt during the 1956 Suez Crisis and "Israel's" "victory" in the 1967 war fostered a sense of arrogance that has since undermined "Israel’s" strategic judgment.

In addition, Walt believes that the "main error", as repeatedly maintained by Israeli scholars, was the decision to "retain, occupy, and gradually colonize the West Bank and Gaza, as part of a long-term effort to create a Greater Israel.”

By occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, "Israel" is now facing a fast-rising Palestinian population approximately equal to that of Israeli Jews, despite Ben-Gurion and his followers's attempts to minimize the number of Palestinians, Walt states.

He argues that "Israel" could only remain a "Jewish state" by enforcing an apartheid state that strips Palestinians of any political rights.

Another sign of "Israel's" declining strategic judgment was the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, which originally planned to dismantle the PLO and install a pro-"Israel" government in Beirut, as well as secure control over the West Bank.

The IOF subsequently occupied South Lebanon, which led to the creation of the Lebanese Resistance, Hezbollah, which, in turn, defeated "Israel" in 2000 by forcing it to withdraw from most of the occupied Lebanese territory.

The author also contends that despite the removal of the PLO in Lebanon, Palestinian resistance wasn't halted, rather it sparked the first Intifada in 1987 demonstrating that Palestinians would not surrender their homeland or accept domination. Walt also argues that Israeli officials only exacerbated the issue by depriving them of a state.

Another notable instance of "Israel’s" strategic shortsightedness is its vehement resistance to international efforts to restrict Iran's nuclear program. If it truly wanted to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, the author maintains that it should have supported the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

One significant component is the perception of arrogance and impunity that stems from US support and acquiescence to "Israel's" demands. 

If the world's most powerful country supports you regardless of what you do, the necessity to consider your actions will surely lessen, Walt notes. 

Furthermore, "Israel's" inclination to regard itself entirely as a victim and blame all resistance to its policies on antisemitism is counterproductive because it makes it difficult for Israeli officials and the general public to realize how their own actions may be causing the animosity that they confront.

The author concludes that "Israel’s vengeful and shortsighted behavior has inflicted enormous harm on innocent Palestinians for decades and continues to do so today, warning that its decline in strategic judgment must be reassessed for the sake of its own survival.