Al Mayadeen obtains nuclear draft resolution submitted against Iran
7 Min Read
The seven articles at the end of the draft reflect the Western country's aim to re-implement the agreement signed in 2015, without taking into account that it is no longer in effect after the US withdrew from it.
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The reactor building of the Bushehr nuclear power plant is seen just outside the city of Bushehr, 750 miles (1,245 kilometers) south of the capital Tehran, Iran, on August 20, 2010. (AP)
Al Mayadeen has obtained a copy of the draft resolution presented by France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States, which criticizes Iran for allegedly failing to disclose its nuclear activities.
The seven articles at the end of this draft indicate that Western countries want, through the resolution they have submitted against Iran, to re-implement the nuclear agreement signed in 2015.
However, they overlook the fact that the agreement is no longer in effect since the United States withdrew from it and the Europeans have failed to fulfill their obligations under the commitments they signed off on in 2016.
The draft's text states:
The Board of Governors commends the ongoing professional, independent, and impartial efforts of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Secretariat, including the inspectors, in implementing the Safeguards Agreement under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with Iran.
It also emphasizes the essential and independent role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verifying Iran’s compliance with its safeguards obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
The Board also emphasizes the importance of Iran’s adherence to its safeguards obligations and stresses the need for Iran to fully and promptly cooperate with the Agency to clarify and resolve the long-standing safeguards issues outlined in the Director-General’s latest report, as well as in numerous previous reports.
It notes the Director-General’s deep concern about the presence of undeclared nuclear material at several undeclared locations in Iran, “the current location(s) of which are not known to the Agency, and his assessment that nuclear material in use in Iran has not been declared as required under the Iranian Safeguards Agreement under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons."
The Board mentions Iran’s continued failure to implement amended Article 3.1, which violates the legal obligations it accepted in 2003 and cannot be unilaterally altered or suspended. Additionally, the Board highlights Iran’s failure to provide the Agency with design and preliminary design information for new and planned nuclear facilities, as stipulated under amended Article 3.1.
The Board notes the Director-General's conclusion that the physical balance of uranium involved in undeclared uranium metal production experiments conducted between 1995 and 2000 includes an unaccounted amount of nuclear material, as reported by Atoms for Peace and Development.
The text references the Board of Governors' decisions of June 19, 2020, particularly paragraph (h), as well as its decisions of June 8, 2022, and November 17, 2022. These decisions called on Iran to fully cooperate with the Agency and emphasized the essential and urgent need to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material. The Board urges Iran to act promptly to fulfill its legal obligations and take all necessary actions to resolve outstanding issues.
The text refers to the Board of Governors' recent decision on June 5, 2024, as outlined in GOV/2024/39. It notes that Iran’s continued failure to provide the necessary, full, and clear cooperation with the Agency to resolve all outstanding safeguards issues may prompt the Director-General to prepare a comprehensive and updated assessment regarding the potential presence or use of undeclared nuclear material, in relation to both past and current issues concerning Iran’s nuclear program.
The text expresses deep regret that, despite the Board's previous decisions and multiple opportunities provided by the Director-General over the past five years, Iran has failed to offer technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at several undeclared locations in Iran. Additionally, Iran has not informed the Agency of the current location(s) of contaminated nuclear material and/or equipment. Instead, Iran has maintained that it has declared all nuclear material and activities required under its Safeguards Agreement, a position that is inconsistent with the Agency’s findings.
It stresses that the Agency has not changed its assessment of the undeclared nuclear activities that took place at four undeclared sites in Iran nor of the human origin of the uranium particles.
The text emphasizes the Director-General's conclusion that Iran must provide technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin.
It also notes with deep concern the Director-General’s conclusion that these issues arise from Iran’s obligations under its Safeguards Agreement under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the need to be resolved for the Agency to be able to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.
The draft supported the Director General's ongoing efforts, including the high-level meetings between the Agency and Iran in Tehran on November 14, 2024, aimed at securing progress from Iran on resolving outstanding safeguards issues and enhancing cooperation with the Agency. It also highlights the importance of fully implementing the Joint Statement between the Agency and Iran of March 4, 2023, noting that both sides acknowledged that these engagements could pave the way for broader agreements between the parties.
It strongly endorses the Agency's continued efforts to implement the nuclear safeguards agreement with Iran.
The draft reiterates its serious concern that Iran has yet to provide the full, necessary, and clear cooperation with the Agency. It highlights that Iran has not taken the essential and urgent actions mandated by the Council in its June 2024 resolution. As a result, safeguards issues remain unresolved despite numerous interactions with the Agency since 2019, undermining the Agency's ability to verify that nuclear material, as required under Iran’s safeguards agreement and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
It reaffirms Iran’s commitment to implementing amended Article 3.1, which is a legal obligation, and to providing the Agency with all required design and preliminary information.
The text states that the draft decision emphasizes the essential and urgent need to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material, requiring Iran to fulfill its legal obligations.
To resolve all outstanding safeguards issues, the draft calls for the immediate implementation of the following steps:
- Providing technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at two undeclared sites in Iran.
- Notifying the Agency of the current location(s) of contaminated nuclear material and/or equipment.
- Providing all requested information, documents, and responses to the Agency for this purpose.
- Granting the Agency access to requested sites and materials, as well as permitting the collection of samples as deemed necessary by the Agency.
- Emphasizing that Iran’s provision of the requested information and access, followed by verification by the Agency under Iran’s Safeguards Agreement and the NPT, is crucial for the Secretariat to report these issues as resolved, thereby eliminating the need for the Council to address and take further action on them.
- Requesting the Director-General to prepare a comprehensive and updated assessment of the potential presence or use of undeclared nuclear material related to both past and ongoing issues with Iran’s nuclear program. This should include a full report on Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA and an evaluation of the Agency’s ability to verify Iran’s compliance with its safeguards obligations, particularly the non-diversion of nuclear material. Based on all available information, the assessment is to be submitted for consideration by the Board of Governors by March 2025 or no later than spring 2025.
- Deciding to keep the matter under his review.
