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Analysis: Is West Asia on the Brink of War or a Strategic Standoff?

  • By Ali Jezzini
  • Source: Al Mayadeen English
  • 18 Feb 2026 02:58
  • 1 Shares
14 Min Read

Tensions in West Asia rise as US-Israeli deployments expand, with scenarios ranging from status quo to limited strikes or full war. What will happen?

  • x
  • Analysis
    What the model presents is simply an attempt to outline the options available to the various players; it does not imply inevitability. Ultimately, such models cannot measure many critical variables, most importantly, the resilience of the Iranian people, their cohesion, and their capacity to endure sacrifice (Illustrated by Mahdi Rteil to Al Mayadeen English)

The following analysis examines the evolving military posture in West Asia amid rising tensions between the United States, the Israeli occupation, and Iran. Building on a previous assessment, it shifts focus from detailed force positioning to the broader strategic picture, exploring what current deployments signify and outlining the most probable scenarios in the coming days.

Through a combination of force analysis, escalation pathways, and a game-theory framework, the article evaluates possible outcomes ranging from continued status quo to limited strikes or full-scale war, while considering the political, economic, and strategic constraints shaping each actor’s decisions.

Force disposition update

Up to this moment, there has been no large-scale evacuation of bases in the Gulf. There remains a significant deployment of refueling aircraft, large drones, electronic warfare platforms, and signals intelligence assets. At Muwaffaq al-Salti Air Base, the number of aircraft has increased as follows:

  • 24xF-15E: Most likely interceptors or offensive in later stages
  • 30xF-35A: Stealth aircraft for ground attacks and especially the destruction of air defenses
  • 6xEA-18G: Electronic warfare aircraft.
  • 12xA-10C: Ground attack aircraft that will use their slow speed and 30mm cannon to intercept attacking drones.
  • 36xF-16: Same as F-15s.
  • 12xF-22s: Air superiority fighter for deep penetration and leading sorties.

We are in the middle of a 48 hour period where the U.S. is moving the following assets into the Middle East and people still think they need to wait for a Ford CSG to strike Iran.

18xF-35A
36xF16
12xF-22
2xE-3
Up to 18xF-15E

— Oliver Alexander (@OAlexanderDK) February 17, 2026

Additionally, several extra Patriot batteries have been deployed across Gulf states to defend against Iranian short-range ballistic missiles. An image has circulated showing a Patriot battery at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. The surrounding Gulf states will most likely play a role in intercepting Iranian drones targeting American bases.

الجيش الأمريكي ينشر منظومات دفاع جوي في قواعده العسكرية في قطر

منظومات THAAD pic.twitter.com/lqtKZ9Y3VL

— Hanzala (@Hanzpal2) January 27, 2026

The US aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln remains in the Arabian Sea, sailing no closer than 500–600 km from Iranian coasts, and at times increasing that distance to 800–1,000 km. Such distances do not allow offensive operations from the carrier without aerial refueling, except through air-launched long-range munitions such as the JASSM and similar long-range munitions.

As for the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford, there is no confirmed information. It is rumored to have begun sailing toward West Asia and would require approximately a week to reach the Mediterranean. Most likely, it would position itself for air defense operations through its destroyers and missile strikes if it remains west of the occupied Palestinian coasts.

Carrier USS Gerald R. Ford Sailing in the Atlantic, Headed for Strait of Gibraltar, USNI Newshttps://t.co/zZex6v4PnZ pic.twitter.com/vAbuqUQz6V

— USNI News (@USNINews) February 17, 2026

Numerous shipments of unidentified equipment from Russia and China have arrived in Iran. While some were confirmed to be upgraded Mi-28NME helicopters, which would be important for intercepting suicide drones and rapid intervention in the event of a landing, it is likely that most shipments relate to radar systems, electronic warfare, or air defense capabilities in general, rather than fully integrated systems.

Mi-28 test flight over Tehran https://t.co/Lr5oPcc0Nu pic.twitter.com/cMrO3lW0XQ

— Hamid | حمید🟩☫🟥 (@hmdmosavi) February 3, 2026

An air engagement occurred recently when American forces shot down a drone that the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps identified as a Shahed-129, which was reportedly pursuing the Abraham Lincoln carrier group in the Arabian Sea. Notably, the drone was flying roughly 700 km from Iranian coasts, beyond the line-of-sight guidance limits of approximately 200 km. This suggests it was either connected to a chain of relay drones or equipped with satellite communications enabling operations at that range.

🚨📍 Position of the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), spotted on Sentinel-2 imagery today.

This is from February 15th 2026, 06h30 UTC (or just 6 hours ago!) pic.twitter.com/fKPkE8YeQR

— MenchOsint (@MenchOsint) February 15, 2026

It is important to note that the key element currently lacking in Iran’s targeting strategy is ISR, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, particularly at extended ranges. The persistent publication of Chinese civilian satellite imagery may indicate possible future Chinese support in this domain, support that China could plausibly deny. In practice, such assistance would be more valuable than any individual weapons system that will most likely require training.

A game theory model

If we apply a game theory model, which was constructed using the previously mentioned data and the risks and payoffs every party expects, or tries to avoid, the results are as follows:

  • Option A is a continuation of the status quo, including US presence and pressure.
  • Option B is limited strikes with escalation potential.
  • Option C is a full-scale war.

Payoffs are between -10 as a minimum and +10 as a maximum.

The model accounts for Israeli sensitivity to time constraints and concerns that the strategic window may not recur (Trump’s exceptionalism, US strategic pivot eastward, diminishing public support, etc.). The results suggest the United States prefers Option A, though Israelis lose slightly under this scenario.

Option B slightly benefits the Israeli regime and less so the United States, excluding considerations of regime change. I modeled two regime-change probabilities: 10% under limited strikes and 50% if decision-makers believed the odds were high. The overall calculations did not change significantly, except for Iran, which, in reality, prefers open war over that particular scenario.

Original Strategic Equilibrium Summary

Option  US Israeli regime Iran
A +2.8 -0.5 +2.5
B +1 +0.45 -4
C -7 -8 -4

Adjusted to 50% possibilty of regime change to simulate high US-Israeli hopes, Israeli expectations if B

Option US Israeli regime Iran
A +2.8 -0.5 +2.5
B (P regime change=50%) +1.38 +1.75 -5.95
C -7 -8 -4

 

Possible battle scenarios

During the writing of the article previously published on January 23, amid a limited American presence and rumors of a January 14 possible strike, US aircraft numbers were insufficient except for launches from outside Iranian airspace during heightened Iranian alert.

At that time, large-scale air defenses and electronic intelligence assets were not fully deployed. The previous assessment then was that the probability of a strike was moderate, and that an Iranian response targeting Muwaffaq al-Salti base in Jordan appeared to align with possible American preferences, treating the base as a “punching bag” for a limited exchange while shielding the Israeli regime from consequences.

Iran’s message was clear: any strike would mean full war. That message altered the American position and caused Trump to reconsider.

Currently, forces are still not on the scale of the Gulf War or the invasion of Iraq, when 5 US aircraft carrier groups participated, nor the 1991 Gulf War, where 6 participated, but the present posture enables scenarios A and B, and could lead to C despite the US trying to avoid it.

Trump undoubtedly prefers to extract concessions without war, yet he is unlikely to secure concessions regarding the total halt of Iran's nuclear program. The more probable scenario appears to involve a campaign lasting several days or weeks, structured around successive stages/goals depending on outcomes of the previous stage:

  1. Destroying Iranian air defenses to ensure operational freedom.
  2. Disrupting ballistic missile launches, reducing launch capacity as much as possible, and intercepting most missiles, particularly those targeting vulnerable areas within the occupied territories.
  3. Activating intelligence cells to destroy related equipment.
  4. Conduct assassination or sabotage operations similar to prior disruptions during internet shutdowns.
  5. Work toward regime change in Iran or impose destabilizing conditions similar to Lebanon’s, leading to internal fragmentation and loss of legitimacy.

All these steps are extremely difficult and uncertain. They could produce disastrous outcomes if Iran remains resilient, preserves launch capability, exhausts air defenses, or succeeds in destroying air defense radar systems, particularly in the Gulf, where strong intelligence could make such actions feasible.

The scenario is still unclear, and there are three main possibilities if the strike occurs:

1- An Israeli initial attack, as happened in the previous 12-day war. The United States hopes in this case that Iran will not strike Gulf and Jordanian airports, as these airports carry out intelligence duties, refueling, and serve as launch points for aircraft that will intercept Iranian drones without their hangars and runways being exposed to danger and without the risk of rising oil prices or destabilizing these countries. It is highly unlikely that the Iranians would do that, because it would resemble fighting with one hand tied behind your back.

If “Israel” achieves good results, the United States intervenes and works through the steps mentioned previously with minimal costs. If it fails and is struck, America intervenes by threatening to use its forces to obtain a ceasefire, as it did previously, playing the role of mediator and saying that we are only protecting oil. This scenario is likely if the strike occurs because it is the least damaging to America and its allies, but the most harmful to Iran if successful.

2- A comprehensive joint American-Israeli operation from the start, and this would lead to a comprehensive Iranian response across the region if early success in destroying Iranian forces is not achieved, especially since the arsenal designated for dealing with American forces in the Gulf is completely different from that designated for the Israelis in terms of missiles, munitions, operations, and intelligence.

It is highly unlikely that such a scenario would not be read by the Iranians as a full regime-change war, leading ultimately to what was stated in outcome C. It is a very dangerous outcome for the Americans more than the Israelis themselves, and looking at Trump’s precedents in dealing with major risks, he appears to try to avoid high-risk actions. He may see this as “Israel’s” battle; "let it attack while we defend," which strengthens the first scenario.

3- The salami-slicing strategy, meaning continuously tightening the siege on the Iranians and beginning to confiscate Iranian oil ships, as was done with Venezuela, given that 80% of Iranian oil exports go to China. This scenario was presented to Trump previously, according to the Wall Street Journal, and he rejected it earlier because of the countermeasures the Iranians could take that would raise oil prices. Here, oil is a sensitive issue because any prolonged rise toward $90–100 per barrel threatens America with economic recession, a disastrous scenario ahead of the midterms.

This strategy could be accompanied by threats of brute force in case of an Iranian response, or promises, for example, that some settlement could be reached in case of no Iranian response, relying on what the US might perceive as divisions within the Iranian elite. This is what the Biden administration did during the first year after the al-Aqsa Flood with the Iranians, as in Lebanon, and the result overall was clear. In light of that, the Iranians continue to show that this scenario would lead to retaliation, even if it causes a comprehensive war.

Up to this moment, the Iranians are sending messages that all roads lead either to an agreement or to outcome C, full war, where everyone loses, with major differences in losses as shown in the model. We may disagree on the numbers, so the matter is not one of madness or merely a martyrdom mentality as some Western analysts describe it, but rather rational calculation.

Limits of war modeling and the illusion of strategic certainty

What the model presents is simply an attempt to outline the options available to the various players; it does not imply inevitability. Ultimately, such models cannot measure many critical variables, most importantly, the resilience of the Iranian people, their cohesion, and their capacity to endure sacrifice. If numerical models were fully reliable, US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara would not have resigned during the Vietnam War. Coming from Ford with a data-driven mindset, he left the administration in humiliation after his calculations failed to account for the Vietnamese willingness to sacrifice for their freedom and independence.

I believe that a significant portion of Israeli confidence does not stem solely from intelligence networks inside Iran or from access to specific knowledge. Iranian losses would certainly occur and are almost inevitable. However, this confidence may also reflect excessive self-assurance, a sense of grandiosity after recent achievements, and even a religious conviction that this could be the decisive war after which they will dominate West Asia, coupled with a genuine fear that the current opportunity may not present itself again.

The Americans, in contrast, appear far less prudent. I believe they genuinely assume that a substantial bloc of Iranians would align with their strikes and are waiting for them eagerly. This tendency is common among major powers, not just individuals, to indulge in wishful thinking. Such assumptions often lead to catastrophic miscalculations, with leaders overrelying on projections of their own expectations and underestimating an adversary’s willingness and ability to endure hardship, at the expense of material realities and adequate preparation.

The probability of war is not certain, but it now exceeds fifty percent. Military positioning is nearing completion, particularly with the withdrawal of the Boeing RC-135 air defense reconnaissance aircraft from Qatar to Crete and the deployment of E-3 AWACS aircraft to the region.

In any case, under these variables and in the event of a major blow to the United States, the regional viability of “Israel” would be called into question amid potential American retrenchment. Only God knows how such a war would unfold if it occurs. Personally, I believe the best scenario would not see war break out. The resistance axis requires several years to rebuild what it has lost, and during that period, and this is not merely my assessment, the United States will likely be compelled to reduce its presence in the region. That is why “Israel” is working toward reducing its dependence on America, aiming in the future, in cooperation with local allies such as India, Ethiopia, and European states, to dominate the region independently.

Conclusion 

In conclusion, the current moment represents a highly unstable strategic intersection rather than an inevitable march toward war. The military positioning underway expands the range of possibilities without guaranteeing any specific outcome.

While limited confrontation may appear manageable on paper, the margins for miscalculation are thin, and escalation dynamics are difficult to control once activated, since Iran might prefer a total war if it reads the current goals of US and Israeli attacks as regime change, a goal that US and Israeli officials spared no opportunity declare as a main goal of any military actions.

Each actor is weighing time, deterrence credibility, domestic constraints, and regional balance differently, creating asymmetry in risk tolerance and strategic preference. Ultimately, endurance, political cohesion, and the ability to absorb sustained costs will matter more than opening strikes or technological advantages.

Whether events move toward negotiation or confrontation will depend not only on military capability, but on judgment, restraint, and the accuracy, or inaccuracy, of each side’s assumptions about the other.

  • United States
  • West Asia
  • Nuclear Talks
  • Israel
  • Gulf
  • Iran

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