An Israeli probe found that on the morning of October 7, 2023, around 250 Palestinian Resistance members launched an attack on Kibbutz Kfar Aza. For almost two hours, the Israeli army struggled to respond, overwhelmed by simultaneous attacks on multiple settlements and military bases.

The Israeli army investigation into the battle revealed serious failures in military preparation and coordination. It concluded that the Israeli army "failed in its mission to protect" the settlers due to inadequate defenses, including a lack of surveillance cameras and locked-up weapons.

The first troops didn't arrive until an hour after the Palestinian Resistance had captured the kibbutz, as per the investigation.

Even when the first troops did arrive, there was no command and control directing their movements. 

The chaos was compounded by the fact that the army’s Gaza Division, responsible for that area, was defeated by the fighters and was unable to provide soldiers with intelligence, including information on their number.

Some 24 different Israeli units were involved in battling the Resistance in Kfar Aza, and there was little coordination between them until the overnight hours between October 7 and 8.

The battle lasted several days, with Resistance fighters fortifying themselves within the settlements. The investigation also found that "clearing" the kibbutz of the fighters took nearly three days, amid significant delays in evacuating Israeli settlers.

The probe also unveiled that some Israeli settlers were killed by Israeli troops during an attempt to escape.

In short, the investigation highlighted that coordination among 24 different Israeli units was poor, and there was no clear command structure during the operation. Furthermore, the kibbutz was ill-prepared for a large-scale attack, and the military's inability to react quickly contributed to the failure in responding to the assault.

Israeli Gaza Division defeated in two hours: Military October 7 probe

In a similar vein, Israeli investigations into October 7's Operation Al Aqsa Flood have exposed critical failures within the military and intelligence apparatus of the Israeli occupation, with findings revealing a series of grave miscalculations, operational lapses, and command breakdowns.

An Israeli military investigation into #October7 has revealed severe intelligence failures, critical miscalculations, and a collapse of military command.

The probe found that "Israel" ignored warning signs, underestimated the scale of the attack, and failed to mount a timely… pic.twitter.com/qaayasemDH

— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) February 28, 2025

A report by Yedioth Ahronoth, which was published last week, concluded that Israeli military intelligence suffered from "arrogance and blindness," failing to anticipate the scale of the attack. The investigation found that Hamas initially planned to launch the offensive during Passover in 2023 but postponed it to enhance preparedness.

'Severe underestimation'

In the months leading up to the attack, the Israeli occupation forces' (IOF) Southern Command assessed that the worst-case scenario would involve the infiltration of around 70 armed fighters through two points along the Gaza border. However, reality far exceeded expectations as around 5,000 Hamas fighters breached Israeli defenses.

The military's misjudgment was compounded by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's directive three months before the attack, instructing the IOF to prioritize threats from Iran, Hezbollah, and the West Bank while maintaining calm in Gaza. This shift in focus left Israeli forces unprepared for the unprecedented assault.

Investigations revealed that the Gaza Division collapsed for several hours during the attack, and this reality was not fully grasped in real time, leading to delays in decision-making at the Southern Command and General Staff levels. The chain of command suffered a "fundamental blow," preventing a swift operational response.

Multifaceted attack

The Palestinian Resistance exploited this disarray, launching attacks through land, air, and sea.

On the ground, around 5,500 Palestinian fighters entered occupied Palestinian territory in three waves, breaking through 114 crossing points and advancing via 59 attack routes toward southern and central Israeli settlements.

On the naval level, seven boats carrying some 50 fighters attempted to penetrate "Israel’s" coastal defenses. In the air, Hamas deployed 63 aircraft, including 57 drones and six motorized paragliders, catching the Israeli Air Force off guard. 

One of the most surprising aspects of the attack was Hamas' use of powered paragliders to transport fighters into occupied Palestinian territory, a capability that the Israeli intelligence apparatus had underestimated.

Shin Bet absent from investigations

Despite the military’s ongoing internal probes, the Israeli domestic security agency, the Shin Bet, is yet to disclose the findings of its own investigation into the intelligence failures.

Recent reports indicate that there had been minimal cooperation by the Shin Bet with the IOF's investigations, which raised further concerns about accountability and the accuracy of the probes, as well as any details that might be missing due to the Shin Bet withholding critical information.

Deafening blow

The Resistance's operation dealt a severe blow to the Israeli occupation forces within the first few hours, as the Gaza Division was effectively defeated within two hours. Additionally, most mid-level commanders, including battalion and company leaders, were killed in the early stages.

On top of the staggering losses, the commanders of three brigades were also eliminated, making for a total of 157 Israeli soldiers killed in the first three hours.

Israeli newspaper Walla reported that Hamas targeted the air bases of the Israeli Air Force with heavy rocket fire, disrupting takeoffs, which subsequently caused further confusion in terms of the military response.

A separate investigation by Maariv described the Israeli occupation forces' military performance on October 7 as "a historic and unprecedented failure." A senior Israeli military official admitted, "The investigations into the events of October 7 do not provide satisfactory explanations."

Maariv commented on the report saying the Israeli Gaza Division was defeated in the first two hours of the war by Hamas.

'Blindness, arrogance'

Yedioth Ahronoth's military analyst Ron Ben-Yishai said earlier in February that Israeli air defenses had shown "absolute blindness, arrogance, and an underestimation of the enemy," after October 7.

In a recent op-ed, Ben-Yishai cited an investigation revealing that the Israeli Security Ministry in Kirya did not recognize where the attack was coming from, rather believing "Israel" was experiencing a multi-front operation. Therefore, most warplanes were sent to the occupied north to protect sensitive sites. 

The occupied south, on the other hand, was exposed after the security officials failed to assess the situation, thereby instructing warplanes not to attack settlements and sites, he added. 

Furthermore, the investigation, which includes over a thousand pages of findings, indicated that the air defenses "were at full efficiency during the first few minutes of the attack."

According to Ben-Yishai, the preceding political dispute, in which reserve pilots were involved, did not impact the Air Force's activity. "The failure stemmed from a different place," he stated. 

"The primary failure that prevented the Air Force from fully deploying its capabilities in the early hours of the attack was the flawed assessment of the threat by the Military Intelligence Directorate (Aman) and the internal security agency [Shin Bet], as well as the Air Force’s inadequate preparedness for the required state of alert," according to Ben-Yishai.