German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius intends to order an additional 15 F-35A jets from Lockheed Martin, a parliamentary source told Reuters, backing a report published by Der Spiegel.

Confidential budget documents prepared for parliament’s budget committee estimate the purchase would cost roughly €2.5 billion ($2.9 billion). The report comes after months in which Berlin denied plans for more aircraft and follows a significant increase in Germany’s defense budget that has opened room for new procurement decisions. 

The extra tranche, if approved by the Bundestag, would lift Germany’s planned F-35 fleet from 35 to 50 aircraft. Officials and defense planners within NATO view such increases as a hedge against shortfalls in allied inventories and as a way to ensure operational availability for both conventional and nuclear roles.

Modernization amid a changing military landscape

Germany’s reconsideration of additional F-35s should be read in the context of accelerating military modernization across Europe and a changing equipment environment. Berlin’s original contract for 35 F-35As is intended to replace the Luftwaffe's aging Panavia Tornado fleet, roughly 85 airframes, that has long provided the Bundeswehr with strike and nuclear-sharing capability. The first German F-35 deliveries are expected to begin in 2026, with operational units earmarked for Buchel air base later in the decade.

Several structural drivers have shaped Germany’s thinking. The war in Ukraine and Western arms transfers have strained NATO inventories and supply chains, while the high operational tempo has consumed spare parts and munitions, prompting capitals to seek resilient force structures. At the same time, Germany is simultaneously pushing other large procurements, including a tranche of 20 more Eurofighters approved by the budget committee in October, indicating a multi-track approach to air power its air force's modernization. The war in Ukraine, coupled with shifting US policy under President Donald Trump, has propelled European nations into an arms race of unprecedented scale in recent decades.

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Nuclear-sharing, the B61-12, the role of the F-35

A core reason the F-35 is central to Berlin’s planning is its certification to carry the US B61-12 guided gravity bomb, the modernized tactical nuclear weapon designated for NATO’s aggressive posture toward Russia, characterized by its forward deployment of troops, aircraft, and missile systems along the Alliance’s eastern flank.

The Tornado fleet will be retired, and only a fifth-generation platform certified for B61-12 release can sustain Germany’s nuclear-sharing obligations at Buchel. In this sense, the 35 ordered F-35As already fulfill the basic requirement to preserve that role; additional jets primarily strengthen readiness and redundancy.

But capacity is more than a headline number.

Aircraft availability is reduced at any time by maintenance cycles, upgrades, training sorties, and reserves. Planners therefore argue that a larger fleet, by adding 15 aircraft, raises the number of mission-capable jets in a crisis, reduces the risk that maintenance downtime undermines NATO nuclear posture, and provides surge capacity for conventional operations if needed.

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FCAS: European cooperation under strain

Germany’s potential move to expand its F-35 fleet carries political reverberations beyond Berlin. Paris has long pushed for a European Future Combat Air System (FCAS or SCAF) as a cornerstone of defense industrial autonomy. Any perceived German drift to enlarge reliance on US platforms risks aggravating Franco-German tensions over workshare, timelines, and the future of European defense industry cooperation. Reuters notes that fresh purchases could “spark fresh tensions” with France.

These dynamics intersect with several structural problems in European procurement, including partner indecision, budgetary oscillations, industrial disputes, and technical delays.

FCAS has suffered schedule slips and political friction; as a result, some European states have hedged by buying mature, off-the-shelf US systems rather than waiting for indigenous solutions. That hedging, however, increases operational dependence on US software, sustainment chains, and political control mechanisms embedded in American export arrangements, a sovereignty trade-off Berlin must weigh.

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What to watch next

Germany’s next steps will reveal whether this procurement marks a temporary measure or a strategic realignment. A cabinet decision, parliamentary debate, and Bundestag vote will determine the political trajectory of the deal, while industrial developments, including Rheinmetall’s fuselage production in Weeze and the rollout of Luftwaffe training schedules, will show how Berlin intends to integrate the F-35 into its long-term defense architecture.

Ultimately, how Germany frames this expansion, either as a stopgap until the FCAS program matures or as a deeper commitment to US-led defense cooperation, will shape both European military balance and transatlantic dynamics for years to come.

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