How weapon firms, think tanks profit from Ukraine war: Report
Ben Freeman writes about how most of those advocating for increased weapons to Ukraine are directly employed by those benefiting.
According to Ben Freeman in an article on Responsible Statecraft, when Eliot Cohen writes a piece in The Atlantic calling for a massive Russian defeat provided with Western weapons, neither he nor The Atlantic mentions that most weapons he mentions in his Op-ed, including F-16s, and even F-35s are produced by the funders of Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Cohen's employer.
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Freeman notes that while this may appear to be a clear conflict of interest that should be stated in the article, a recent Quincy Institute brief he authored “Defense Contractor Funded Think Tanks Dominate Ukraine Debate,” demonstrates that this is not an exception; it is the standard.
The defense industry generously funds America's leading foreign policy research institutes. They've dominated the Ukraine war media market, and they seldom, if ever, mention that many of the weapons they're suggesting the US deliver to Ukraine are manufactured by their backers.
Freeman mentions that 78% of high-ranking foreign policy think tanks in the US are being funded by the Pentagon or its contractors, making any comments they have about the war a conflict of interest.
According to Freeman, the defense industry distributes even more money. He details that every single one of the top ten foreign policy think tanks is funded by the defense industry. CSIS, the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS), and The Atlantic Council, for example, all reported receiving more than a million dollars each year from the defense industry.
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These think tanks have advocated for increased militarized US responses to the war in Ukraine when compared to those who receive little to no funding from the Defense Ministry.
According to Freeman's analysis, media outlets were more than seven times more likely to quote a think-tank with defense sector sponsorship than a think tank without it. Furthermore, he highlights that the two most quoted think tanks in Ukraine war-related stories were think tanks drowning in defense-industry cash: CSIS and The Atlantic Council.
CSIS and the Atlantic Council's funding from the defense ministry is reported on their websites whereas many other think tanks do not reveal their contributors as openly. This includes the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), which was frequently referenced in media publications concerning the Ukraine war. Though AEI professors have said publicly that the organization gets financing from defense companies, the organization's sources are not listed on its website.
Similarly, media outlets were not forthcoming about the conflicts of interest of the experts they cited. In reality, none of the media mentions examined in the brief were accompanied by disclosures of defense industry sponsorship of think tanks that, at times, recommended policies that benefited their donors financially.
Freeman believes that these facts call for a time of reform. He believes that Congress should require think tanks to reveal their donors, especially due to their influence and special interests.
He also believes media outlets should be truthful regarding any conflicts of interest with sources regarding US foreign policy. According to the brief, “By not providing this information media outlets are deceiving their readers, listeners, or viewers.”
He concludes by pointing to the expanding body of data demonstrating how think-tank financing affects think-tank work, expressing that the absolute least media outlets should do is warn their readers when a source may be biased, especially when commenting on war and peace issues.