The Israeli army joined the ongoing war, acting upon intelligence gathered as far back as 2021, as verified by the Israeli newspaper Haaretz. It emphasized that this intelligence highlighted the army's capability to dismantle tunnels in the Gaza Strip using air strikes, a strategy that wasn't implemented during the war.

On Thursday, the newspaper unveiled an investigative report shedding light on previously undisclosed details about the Israeli army's shortcomings in security and intelligence. This comprehensive investigation included interviews with security sources directly involved in simulations of the October 7 attacks, providing unprecedented insight into the extent of the army's failures.

The investigation verified that the Israeli military undertook two exercises before dismantling the electronic fence in 2016. These exercises were designed to simulate potential attacks by al-Qassam Brigades, featuring scenarios that included vehicles, bicycles, and gliders originating from Gaza.

The newspaper highlighted that the 2016 simulation exposed a critical absence of a "defensive" plan by the Israeli military to counter a comparable attack scenario. It emphasized that the training was abruptly halted after a few hours due to the revelation of a significant gap in coordination between the Southern Command and the Gaza Division. This deficiency allowed the attacking forces to advance unchecked, reaching as far north as Ashdod and south of Kiryat Gat without being stopped. 

Despite these vulnerabilities, the army leadership resisted conducting a second training session in 2019. Instead, they insisted on prioritizing the assessment of Hamas' missile capabilities, as outlined in the report.

The newspaper pointed out that the Military Intelligence Unit monitored a movement in Jabalia on the morning of October 6, and it was not dealt with appropriately, stressing that the Israeli occupation army did not realize that the fence separating the Gaza Strip “was loose and vulnerable to penetration.”