Iran is recruiting active-duty Israeli soldiers for cheap
Active-duty Israeli soldiers have been caught spying for Iran, photographing Air Force bases and Iron Dome sites for sums as low as $800.
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In this photo provided by the Israeli occupation army, armed Israeli Air Force planes depart from an unknown location to attack Iran on Oct. 26, 2024. (Israeli occupation army via AP)
An espionage scandal involving active-duty Israeli soldiers accused of spying for Iran has sent shockwaves through "Israel's" military and political establishment, with new details revealing a dramatic escalation in Tehran's intelligence operations against the Israeli army.
Israeli broadcaster i24NEWS reported that Iran has succeeded in recruiting soldiers currently serving in the Israeli military to pass along highly sensitive security information, a development observers say marks a significant departure from previous cases involving ordinary civilians.
Doron Kadosh, military correspondent for Israeli Army Radio, described the emerging pattern as "extremely concerning," noting that, unlike earlier incidents in which Iran targeted what he characterized as "gullible civilians from the street," Iranian intelligence is now managing to recruit actual soldiers.
The suspects are soldiers enrolled in the Israeli Air Force's Technical School, a fully operational military base. According to investigators, the accused photographed sensitive locations inside the facility and transmitted images of Tel Aviv's Savidor Central railway station and a building in Haifa, both struck by Iranian missiles during the recent war.
Iron Dome over F-16s
Details from the investigation also revealed that one of the accused soldiers independently approached Iranian handlers offering to supply photographs and precise coordinates of F-16 fighter jets in exchange for 15,000 shekels, roughly $5,000.
The Iranian handler reportedly declined, redirecting him toward a higher-value target. "Forget the F-16s, give me the locations of the Iron Dome systems," the handler allegedly instructed, offering 5,000 shekels per identified site.
Kadosh said the operations were conducted primarily through Telegram, which he described as Iran's principal platform for recruiting and communicating with operatives inside the entity.
He also flagged a more "disturbing" phenomenon, whereby some Israelis, including several of the soldiers now under investigation, had proactively sought out contact with Iranian networks themselves, motivated by the prospect of easy income.
Trivial sums, grave consequences
The sums involved were strikingly modest. One soldier reportedly received just $5,500 in total for all the information he provided, while others were paid between $800 and $1,000 per exchange.
"It surprised me in every recent case, the incredibly small amounts the Iranians are paying," Kadosh said. "None of these people became rich from this."
Assessments cited by Kadosh from the Shin Bet and Israeli police indicate the soldiers believed they would not be caught, treating the activity as a low-risk way to supplement their military income.
Kadosh stressed that the willingness of settlers to cooperate with Iran, more than two and a half years after the events of October 7 and amid direct military confrontations between "Israel" and the Islamic Republic, constitutes what he described as "a grave breach of state security" and a betrayal of the military institution.
Cracks in the armor
The soldiers at the center of the current scandal are far from isolated cases. Since October 2023, more than 50 indictments have been filed against Israeli citizens for spying on behalf of Iran, and the Shin Bet reported a 400% increase in Iranian recruitment attempts in 2025 alone compared to the previous year, a surge Israeli security commentators now describe simply as an epidemic.
The profile of those caught spans virtually every demographic. Suspects have ranged in age from 13 to 73, encompassing ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students, Azerbaijani immigrants, Iron Dome reservists, a man who stalked a nuclear scientist, and soldiers arrested in the middle of an active war.
One suspect gathered intelligence on the fiancée of Netanyahu's son in the weeks before their scheduled wedding, passing photographs of her home to an Iranian handler for $500 per task.
Yet beyond the legal dimension lies a more uncomfortable question. The Shin Bet has spent decades studying what conditions produce willing collaborators, like economic precarity, political disillusionment, the erosion of communal bonds, and a governing class that exempts itself from obligations it imposes on others. These are now, as of 2026, a reasonable description of large parts of Israeli society.
These conditions are not external vulnerabilities that Iran manufactured, but are internal fractures that Iran has learned to read. The Shin Bet, which has long used the same playbook to turn ordinary people in adversarial societies into assets, now finds those same mechanics operating on its own terrain.