Jumblatt: Framework deal could legitimize Israeli occupation
A newly published memorandum outlines Jumblatt's legal, political, and security objections to the US-backed agreement between Lebanon and "Israel".
-
Walid Jumblatt, the former leader of Lebanon's Progressive Socialist Party, speaks to the media after a meeting in Paris, Tuesday, Feb. 21, 2017 (AP)
The Druze Community Religious Council published the full text of the memorandum submitted by Former Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt to the council during the extraordinary session of its General Assembly, held on Tuesday, July 7, 2026.
The council adopted the substance of the memorandum and reaffirmed its contents after previously releasing a summary in the media statement issued following the session.
In the memorandum, Jumblatt warned that the Framework Agreement signed between Lebanon and "Israel" under US sponsorship reflects a dangerous shift in the approach to the Lebanese-Israeli struggle. In his view, the agreement no longer begins from the priority of ending the occupation and halting Israeli aggression. Instead, it redefines the causes of the struggle by linking them to the "presence of non-state weapons inside Lebanon, foremost among them Hezbollah's weapons."
He argued that the agreement shifts the focus of the problem from the Israeli occupation to Lebanon's internal affairs, making "Israel's withdrawal from Lebanese territory conditional upon what Israel and the United States consider Lebanon's success in disarming and dismantling military structures."
Conditional withdrawal and gradual redeployment
After reviewing the agreement's 14 provisions, Jumblatt said its most dangerous aspect is that it imposes no immediate or explicit obligation on "Israel" to withdraw from Lebanese territory, referring instead only to a "gradual redeployment" tied to verification that Lebanon has fulfilled its commitments.
According to the memorandum, this effectively transforms the occupation from a violation of international law, the 1949 Armistice Agreement, UN Security Council Resolution 1701, and the Taif Agreement into a conditional bargaining tool.
The memorandum added that this would allow "Israel" to remain on Lebanese territory on the grounds that Lebanon has not completed the disarmament of armed groups or demonstrated its ability to exercise an exclusive monopoly over force and weapons.
US role extending beyond mediation
Jumblatt also argued that the agreement grants the United States a role that goes beyond mediation to "executive guardianship", through oversight of verification procedures, coordination of military mechanisms, and linking military and economic assistance to Lebanon to political and security conditions.
He noted that, in this context, reconstruction becomes conditional on an internal security process, turning Lebanon's need for economic recovery and the rebuilding of its devastated areas into a means of exerting pressure on its sovereign decision-making.
The memorandum drew particular attention to Article 13, concerning the cessation of hostile or "obstructive" actions in international political and legal forums, describing it as one of the agreement's most dangerous provisions.
It warned that the clause could be used to restrict Lebanon's right to file complaints against "Israel," seek compensation, or pursue violations before the United Nations and other international bodies.
Jumblatt argued that, rather than safeguarding Lebanon's legal rights, the agreement opens the door to a broad Israeli interpretation that could classify any Lebanese action against Israeli attacks as hostile or inconsistent with the spirit of the agreement.
'Pilot zones' could lead to the division of southern Lebanon
The memorandum also warned of the dangers of the provision in Article 3 concerning the establishment of model or "pilot zones", arguing that such a proposal could effectively divide southern Lebanon into phases and security zones subject to verification mechanisms.
According to the memorandum, this would tie the return of residents and reconstruction efforts to field arrangements determined by joint mechanisms that Lebanon alone would not control.
It further stated that, if implemented alongside the establishment by "Israel" of crossing gates or field control points, these arrangements would entrench a new security reality on the ground, transforming withdrawal from a full Lebanese right guaranteed by UN resolutions and the Armistice Agreement into a conditional, fragmented, and open-ended process.
Armistice Agreement offers greater protection for Lebanon
Comparing the Framework Agreement with the 1949 Lebanese-Israeli Armistice Agreement, Jumblatt argued that, despite the decades that have passed since its signing, the earlier agreement provides stronger protection for Lebanon's position.
He noted that the Armistice Agreement was based on the principle of ending military operations between regular armed forces, respecting the armistice line corresponding to the international border between Lebanon and Palestine, and prohibiting hostile acts or military crossings.
It also established a joint armistice commission chaired by the United Nations rather than operating under exclusive US sponsorship, thereby giving it a clearly international character.
The memorandum emphasized that the Armistice Agreement explicitly stated that its provisions would not prejudice the rights, claims, or positions of either party in any final settlement.
Accordingly, it did not require Lebanon to relinquish its political or legal leverage, nor did it link Lebanon's internal security to "Israel's" withdrawal or make the continuation of the occupation the result of a Lebanese domestic failure.
Jumblatt argued that clear reliance on the Armistice Agreement would have enabled Lebanon to maintain a legal framework prohibiting aggression, affirming the international border, which is not mentioned in the Framework Agreement, placing violations under UN supervision, and preserving Lebanon's rights.
According to the memorandum, such a framework would also have required "Israel" to carry out an unconditional withdrawal, whereas the Framework Agreement makes no explicit reference to withdrawal and instead speaks of the repositioning of occupation forces.
Comparison with the May 17 Agreement
In comparing the current Framework Agreement with the May 17, 1983, Agreement, Jumblatt argued that the new agreement is no less dangerous and may, in some respects, be even more so.
He noted that the May 17 Agreement explicitly called for ending the state of war and for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon under a specified annex. However, it also included security and normalization arrangements, as well as restrictions on Lebanon's Arab relations, leading it to be regarded as an agreement that undermined Lebanese sovereignty and constrained the country's regional role.
By contrast, the memorandum argued that the Framework Agreement sometimes avoids direct language concerning normalization but goes even further by reshaping Lebanon's internal structure itself.
According to Jumblatt, it does not merely impose border security arrangements but also calls for dismantling a military and political structure within Lebanon while linking aid, reconstruction, and Israeli withdrawal to the outcome of that process.
As a result, the agreement becomes meddling in the very structure of the Lebanese state and its internal balance of power, rather than merely a security agreement with "Israel".
The memorandum further noted that, despite its imbalances and risks, the May 17 Agreement contained relatively reciprocal obligations, whereas the Framework Agreement places "Israel" in the position of monitoring, waiting, and verifying compliance while Lebanon alone bears the burden of domestic implementation.
Jumblatt argued that this imbalance makes the current agreement more susceptible to Israeli use, as "Israel" could invoke its terms to argue internationally that withdrawal remains contingent upon disarmament and verification of its completion.
A formula that threatens civil peace
The memorandum concluded that the danger of the Framework Agreement lies not only in its provisions but also in the philosophy on which it is based.
Rather than addressing the occupation as the central cause of the struggle, it turns the occupation into a consequence tied to Lebanon's internal situation.
It further argued that the agreement does not preserve Lebanon's right to confront violations through legal and political means, but instead places broad restrictions on its international action while failing to restore the role of the Armistice Agreement, which had provided Lebanon with legal protection under the United Nations.
Instead, according to the memorandum, it replaces the UN framework with a US-Israeli framework that opens the door to a new form of political and security guardianship.
Jumblatt warned that Lebanon could find itself facing a dangerous equation: either entering into an internal confrontation over weapons, potentially threatening civil peace, or accepting the continued occupation, displacement, and attacks under the pretext that the conditions for implementation have not yet been fulfilled.
In either case, the memorandum concluded, "Israel" would have succeeded in transforming its occupation from a clear violation of international law into a negotiable issue linked to Lebanon's internal circumstances, an outcome termed the agreement's most dangerous repercussion.
What the framework contains
The framework agreement was announced by the United States and published in full, including on the State Department's website, alongside a classified security annex. Israeli Channel 12 reported that the annex was kept out of public view at the explicit request of the Lebanese government itself.
The text notably replaces the language of withdrawal with "redeployment", a shift that removes any binding obligation for "Israel" to withdraw from the South. Lebanon's obligations, by contrast, center on the Resistance's disarmament, which is unconditional, while "Israel's" military presence is left to its own judgment of when the threat has ended.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the agreement an "achievement", while confirming the occupation would remain in southern Lebanon.
The announcement has drawn widespread rejection inside Lebanon, with protests breaking out in several areas and political and popular figures voicing categorical opposition to the deal.
Read more: What Lebanon actually signed away in its deal with 'Israel'