Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly halted a Gaza truce deal in April 2024, which could have freed at least 30 Israeli captives after far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich threatened to bring down the government. This revelation, detailed in a New York Times report, suggests Netanyahu may have intentionally prolonged the war on Gaza to bolster his political image and maintain power.

The report further revealed that three months later, Netanyahu blocked a White House-backed Israeli-Saudi normalization plan due to opposition from Police Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir. Additionally, Netanyahu informed senior Haredi lawmaker Moshe Gafni about plans for an Israeli strike on Iran just days before it occurred, to prevent Gafni from destabilizing the government over yeshiva students' military exemptions.

The Times also highlighted that prior to October 7, 2023, Netanyahu had ignored warnings from top security officials that his government's judicial overhaul was creating internal divisions, which adversaries were seeing as an opening for an assault.

Mistrust of security, growing tensions

Amid the war on Gaza, Netanyahu's growing mistrust of security officials reportedly led him to have generals search for recording devices before meetings, according to The New York Times.

The article, which accused him of undermining his own security apparatus and politicizing the war, was met with a strong denial from Netanyahu’s office. In a statement issued hours after the report, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) condemned the article as baseless and politically motivated, defending Netanyahu's leadership during the war and claiming that his strategic decisions led to "Israel's remarkable military recovery."

The PMO emphasized that Netanyahu was focused on the survival of "Israel", not on political self-preservation, and defended his handling of both the war and captive negotiations. However, shortly after its release on Friday evening, the statement was mysteriously deleted without explanation.

The NYT reported that the truce could have paved the way for a normalization deal with Saudi Arabia, which had secretly signaled its interest in accelerating peace talks with "Israel" if the war on Gaza ended. However, advancing the deal risked toppling Netanyahu’s government, which included far-right factions led by Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, who were intent on expanding settlements in Gaza and displacing Palestinians.

Netanyahu changes his mind as Smotrich enters room

Despite his reservations, Netanyahu attempted to push the truce proposal through his cabinet at the last minute. However, when Smotrich entered the room during a meeting and threatened to bring down the government if the deal was presented, Netanyahu quickly reassured him that no such plan was in motion, according to the meeting's minutes.

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The prime minister then quietly instructed his security advisors, saying, "Don’t present the plan," and the meeting shifted to other topics.

Later that month, according to the NYT, officials from former President Joe Biden's administration presented Netanyahu with polls showing that more than 50% of Israelis supported a captive agreement over continuing the war. Netanyahu reportedly responded, “Not 50 percent of my voters.”

Netanyahu's control over military conversations

The NYT reported that in the spring and summer of 2024, the Biden administration pushed for an "Israel"-Saudi Arabia normalization deal, hoping it would prompt Netanyahu to end the war on Gaza.

Initially, Netanyahu seemed open to the idea, reviving a truce offer he had shelved earlier due to pressure from far-right ministers. However, by the end of July, Netanyahu added new conditions to the truce, derailing the negotiations.

The US effort gained momentum on May 18, 2024, when National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Dammam. Despite rising Arab hostility toward "Israel", bin Salman, according to the report, was keen to finalize a normalization deal with "Israel", telling Sullivan, "Let’s finish this."

Progress was made on US-Saudi agreements, but Netanyahu's approval remained the key hurdle. He initially supported the truce in May, but the deal's lack of a permanent ceasefire guarantee caused Hamas to delay negotiations for over a month.

Secret talks and opposition from far-right ministers

In the summer of 2024, still hopeful for a Saudi normalization deal, Netanyahu authorized Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer to initiate secret talks with UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed about managing Gaza after the war. This was a significant shift, as Netanyahu had previously avoided such discussions for six months to protect his coalition. By early July, Hamas softened its stance, dropping its demand for an immediate Israeli commitment to a permanent ceasefire, creating a potential opening for a deal.

"We may have a deal," Netanyahu reportedly told Dermer. However, when far-right Minister Ben-Gvir learned of the progress, he quickly intervened, attempting to confront Netanyahu in his office, but was blocked. Instead, Ben-Gvir issued a tweet condemning the “reckless deal” and vowed to prevent the prime minister from backing down.

On July 28, a summit in Italy, attended by Mossad chief David Barnea and key mediators including CIA Director Bill Burns and Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani, aimed to finalize the agreement. But instead of moving forward, Barnea, “sheepish and apologetic,” handed over a letter from Netanyahu outlining six new demands that derailed the talks.

Fear over failing coalition

In June 2024, Netanyahu faced mounting pressure to maintain his coalition as his ultra-Orthodox partners threatened to bring down the government over the failure to pass a law codifying the exemption of yeshiva students from military service, following a High Court ruling a year prior. Two days before a key vote on an opposition bill to dissolve the Knesset and call early elections, Netanyahu met with Gafni, leader of the Degel Hatorah faction. During their meeting at IOF headquarters, Netanyahu shared classified details about "Israel's" upcoming attack on Iran’s nuclear and military sites, scheduled for June 13, after Gafni signed a confidentiality agreement.

However, United Torah Judaism chairman Yitzhak Goldknopf, who had resigned over the draft issue, was reportedly not briefed about the strike, according to his spokesperson.

The NYT reported that, to prevent politically damaging leaks, Netanyahu's aides ordered military officials to stop using a traditional recording device during meetings. Weeks after the October 7 attack, Netanyahu moved his meetings with generals to a new room without a permanent recording device, allowing only his aides to record the discussions. To ensure no one brought hidden microphones, even generals like then-IOF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi were patted down by security. Netanyahu’s mistrust of the security establishment, particularly the military, was linked to his belief that they were responsible for Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, not the political leadership.

The NYT also revealed that during a March cabinet meeting, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich called for removing the Shin Bet's legal obligation to protect "Israel's" democratic institutions, suggesting that "the people" should be responsible instead. Smotrich's spokesperson denied the accusation, claiming he was only arguing that the agency should not intervene in court cases.