October 1973 War: When the Arabs almost made it
8 Min Read
In the first few days of the war, "Israel" was made to realize not only the fragility of its existence as an occupation alien from the region but also that its enemies are a force to be reckoned with.
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Egypt employed ingenious techniques ranging from divers that blocked the pipes that were supposed to set the Suez Canal on fire, to using high-pressure hoses to remove the earth barriers the Isralis had set on the Eastern bank of the canal (illustrated by: Mahdi Rtail, Al Mayadeen English)
The October/Tishrin War is, without a doubt, one of the landmark events that contributed to shaping West Asia's political landscape to this day, with repercussions taking their toll on the Arab people who continue their struggle against Western hegemony in the region. October liberation war was waged against the central pillar of that hegemony, which is the occupation entity by the name of "Israel".
Following the 1967 defeat (al-Naksa) that was a result of an Israeli surprise attack and the lack of Arab preparedness among other reasons, defeatism ruled the Arab general discussion and political speech. Several Arab regimes allied with the West, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan benefitted from such a defeatist narrative to justify the so-called pragmatism in their political choices that entailed abandoning the general Arab causes.
The defeatist narrative that ruled the discussions of that period went from pretending a certain cultural inferiority that the Arabs suffered from, to their lack of innovations and their so-called 'stuck in the past' general mentality. A material defeat that usually pushes nations and peoples to innovate and search for tangible reasons for such an outcome ended up demoralizing a sizeable portion of Arabs, making a lot of thinkers enter a loop of inferiority complexes and exaggerated self-blame. As mentioned earlier, such a mentality served Arab monarchies that opposed Arab nationalism and the young pan-Arab unification process at that time.
We will not be going into details regarding the military action during the October 1973 war, which the Israelis call the Yom Kippur War, but rather to illustrate briefly the impact such a war had on both the Israeli and the Arab narrative that followed the ceasing of military operations.
The Offensive
A brief look at the Israeli leadership interactions before the start of the war would reveal a significant level of arrogance, as multiple intelligence reports suggesting the Arabs would start an offensive were ignored. The sheer magnitude of the Arab defeat in 1967 convinced the Israelis of their racist biases, such as Arabs are inherently less intelligent and incapable of modern warfare.
In the first few days of the war, "Israel" was made to realize not only the fragility of its existence as an occupation entity alien from the region but also that its enemies are a force to be reckoned with. Egypt and Syria, following 1967, went to develop their military capabilities with the help of friendly countries from the eastern block, such as the Soviet Union, Eastern Germany, North Korea, and Cuba. Various reports were made to study the causes of the 1967 defeat and to learn valuable lessons that would be useful in the next liberation war.
Egypt employed ingenious techniques ranging from divers that blocked the pipes that were supposed to set the Suez Canal on fire, to using high-pressure hoses to remove the earth barriers the Isralis had set on the Eastern bank of the canal. These barriers were angled 45 to 65 degrees and were 20 meters high at most. Their main goal was to stop any amphibious assault across the canal. Still, they had minimal impact during the opening stage after the pontoon bridges were played and 2 Egyptian armies crossed the water barrier. The Egyptian forces then proceeded to set up defensive positions filled with a multilayered anti-tank complex system. This system was composed of shoulder-held AT weapons, guided missiles, and direct-fire guns of various calibers. Israeli losses during the counter-attack were horrific as they rushed, expecting a similar result to the 1967 war.
On the Syrian front, things were not significantly different. The battle to take back the Golan Heights was costly and hard, as the Israelis were entrenched in the higher ground, firing on the advancing Syrian columns from an elevated position. After the initial push, Syrians were a stone's throw from occupied Palestine, and panic ensued in the Israeli leadership's rank as talks about "the destruction of the third temple" started emerging. Some reports even reveal that threats of nuclear weapons against Arab cities were made.
Following heavy artillery barrages, Syrian tanks, and soldiers pushed hard into the dugouts and fortifications on the high ground, bypassing many of them to ensure the momentum was kept. Imagining a complete Israeli collapse in that war was not far-fetched. Syrians also made an unprecedented Helodrop on the Israeli surveillance outpost on the Jabal al-Shaikh (Hermon) mountain and took the whole team of Israeli officers prisoners. These prisoners revealed sensitive information in captivity after they were led to believe that the Arabs had won and "Israel" had collapsed.
The US to the rescue
Responding to an immediate threat to the West's prime enforcer and bully in the region, the US established one of the largest strategic airlift operations to help the Israelis by supplying 22,325 tons of tanks, APCs, shells, and even planes of the most modern type to replace the nonrecoverable losses the IOF suffered from. It is hard to believe that Israel would have launched its counter-offensive in the later period of the war if it was not for the US supplies. The US even used its spy planes to scout the area in the Sinea desert that was not covered by defenses and provided the information to the Israelis.
Henry Kissinger, the infamous Secretary of State of the United States and National Security Advisor to President Richard Nixon, recognized "Israel's" precarious position and arranged for El Al, the Israeli airliners, to pick up some supplies from a Virginia-based U.S. naval base, including ammunition, high technology products, and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles.
Nixon, however, gave the order to launch Operation Nickel Grass in trying to replace all of the Israeli lost equipment. In 1991, author Seymour Hersh asserted that there was "anecdotal evidence" that Henry Kissinger had warned Anwar Sadat that the US airlift was necessary because "Israel" was on the verge of going nuclear.
Under Nickel Grass, more than just supplies were airlifted. Arab troops significantly damaged Israeli Air Force aircraft in the early stages of the conflict, shocking the Israelis with their aggressive deployment of SA-6 Gainful SAMs, a new Soviet anti-air system.
As a result, under Nickel Grass, at least 100 F-4 Phantom II jets from the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing, the 33d Tactical Fighter Wing, and the 57th Fighter Weapons Wing were dispatched to "Israel". They were transported to Israeli airports, where Israeli pilots were switched out for American pilots. The planes were refueled and sent to the front once the USAF insignia had been switched out, if necessary, and frequently took off just hours after arriving. Several aircraft that flew with USAF camouflage originated from the USAFE fleet.
The aftermath
Speaking to Israeli President Isaac Herzog on October 26, 2022, US President Joe reiterated words he had already said: “If there were not an Israel, we’d have to invent one.”
As a result of the unprecedented supplies and military equipment gifted by the US to the Israelis in the 1973 war, the occupation entity managed to survive the day, and prevent the attempt from becoming a strategic victory as Lebanon's Sayyed Nasrallah puts it. A victory against "Israel" does not only mean the liberation of Palestine and the restoration of Arab-occupied lands, but it would mean a change in the whole global system that is dominated by the US and the West in general.
Following the war, despite the lines of contact staying almost where they were before the war on the Syrian side, for the first time, the Arab regained self-confidence, as he saw that he could defeat the supremacist colonialists on the battlefield.
The Israelis, on the other hand, felt the fragility of their occupation of Palestine as one military defeat would bring an end to their usurping entity. This perception goes on to haunt the Israelis to this day, as they recognized with fire and iron that they were not the invincible Superman they thought they were.
