Pax Americana industry, nuclear 'madmen', and the umbrella illusion
After NATO was formed and after deploying part of its nuclear arsenal in Europe, the US became the guarantor of the security of its NATO allies, and the "US nuclear umbrella" was born.
In 1945, the United States emerged as the dominant global power, with Washington aiming to assert its authority on the world stage.
To demonstrate its military prowess, the United States inaugurated Pax Americana by designating Hiroshima, Japan, as the stage for its first act, signaling the dawn of its ruthless reign to both allies and adversaries.
The devastating atomic bombing of Hiroshima on August 6 marked the beginning of an era where defying Americans would come with severe consequences. It was a defining moment that illustrated the immense power and resolve of the United States in shaping the post-war world order.
It was the day when the first and, thus far, the only nuclear bomb was deployed, causing unimaginable devastation and resulting in the loss of nearly 70,000 innocent Japanese lives.
On August 9, 1945, Nagasaki, Japan, became the second target of a devastating nuclear attack. The United States, seeking to assert its power and send a clear message to the world, unleashed another catastrophic force, resulting in widespread destruction and the loss of approximately 40,000 lives.
The massive mushroom cloud that enveloped Nagasaki served as a chilling symbol of the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons and the immense human suffering they cause.
On May 19, 2023, 78 years later, Japan hosted a meeting for the G7 leaders and chose Hiroshima as the summit location. US President Joe Biden arrived at the meeting destination, becoming the first American to land his feet on the radiated city.
The Japanese Prime Minister aimed to initiate discussions during the summit on nuclear arms and encourage leaders to commit to a framework regarding the use of nuclear weapons. However, the final statement issued by the group primarily focused on condemning China's nuclear weapons, which was no surprise to observers.
The Western world applauded the resolute declaration, perceiving it as a deterrence against Beijing's nuclear "threat to humanity," despite the fact that China has not been involved in any military conflicts beyond its own borders, while most of the countries endorsing the statement have themselves waged numerous wars in the past decades.
It indeed appears as a tragicomedy or a surreal theatrical production. The image of the American nuclear bomber alongside the Japanese victims, accompanied by former colonizers and the colonized, warning the world from the perceived "global threats" posed by China's nuclear weapons and Russia's military force.
The irony and contradictions within this scenario were hard to overlook.
While it may be unsettling, there are elements of reality within their assertions.
In the intricate web of global affairs, a world dominated by Washington and its proxy nations finds itself facing a profound threat.
The very foundations of this order, woven through institutions tainted by notions of genocide, such as the IMF and the World Bank, and bolstered by the military might of NATO and its war coalition, stand on shaky ground.
Emerging on the horizon are the pillars of multipolarity, heralding an alternative world order.
The collective uprising of the Global South and the rise of BRICS, the SCO, and the Eurasian Economic Forum (among others), as well as Beijing's dissemination of a new economic and political paradigm, present a formidable challenge to the established norms.
The tides of change are shifting, and the winds of multipolarity are blowing, ushering in a new era where power is shared and a different vision of global governance takes shape.
Pax Americana: Sole owner of war and peace
Since the advent of the nuclear era in 1945, the nature of the conflict between the United States and its perceived adversaries has undergone significant transformations.
In the realm of Pax Americana, a grand tapestry of power, profits, and resources was woven through a blood-soaked ideology and unabashed hubris.
This hegemonic force, fueled by military might, gave birth to a multidimensional industry that reaped fortunes for the colossal corporations of the era. Within the fabric of this empire, social structures were shaped and molded, with the United States and its satellites standing as both beneficiaries and captives of this all-encompassing enterprise.
The prosperous post-World War II economy in the United States, fueled in part by the government's sales of arms to the fighting parties, spurred the emergence of a new way of life in the country. This economic success became a driving force behind the nation's quest for hegemonic expansion, aiming to secure vital resources and trade routes essential for any superpower seeking unipolar dominance.
The belief during that time was that a wealthier society could attain military superiority over adversaries with lesser industrial wealth. But this assumption later underwent a significant shift with the introduction of atomic weapons into the equation of warfare.
The destructive power and indiscriminate nature of nuclear weapons rendered the traditional metrics of military superiority based on economic wealth and industrial capabilities less relevant. The presence of atomic weapons introduced a new level of danger and mutually assured destruction, altering the dynamics of military strategy and emphasizing the importance of nuclear deterrence.
Globalization within this context was promoted by the United States - just like the notion of democracy - for decades as the highest form of the growing interconnections of world nations.
Of course, globalization is indeed a natural outcome of the progress and scientific breakthroughs that took place, with regard to communications, transportation means, and the advancement of industrialization systems.
However, while the United States pushed for adopting the concept on a global scale under the pretext of connecting countries economically and culturally, it aimed to establish market and trade integration only as a means to further extend its hegemony and economic control. (Take as an example Washington's real intentions from inviting China to join the WTO for long years.)
Following World War II, many policymakers in Washington advocated for the growth of the US nuclear arsenal. Figures like Henry Kissinger and Walt Rostow believed that a robust nuclear arsenal would be essential in maintaining American dominance and furthering its expansion in a world still reeling from the war's aftermath.
The proponents of this approach argued that possessing large and advanced nuclear weapons would serve as a deterrent factor against potential adversaries and solidify American superiority. They believed that the possession of such weapons would not only ensure national security but also provide leverage in shaping global affairs according to US interests.
This perspective was rooted in the belief that nuclear arms represented a significant shift in the balance of power, offering a unique form of brutal military might that could secure dominance in international relations. As a result, the United States pursued the development and deployment of its nuclear arsenal as a key component of its war strategy during this period.
As such, the United States' nuclear doctrine was born: it was not only about deterring potential foes, but also means to establish and enforce total hegemony over global countries, economies, and markets.
This transformation positioned the US as the sole decider of war and peace and their definitions.
The nuclear race that ensued can be attributed mostly to the example set by the United States.
As the first country to develop and use atomic weapons, the US demonstrated the immense destructive power and geopolitical leverage that these weapons could provide. Pax Americana here prompted other nations to acquire their own nuclear arsenals as a means of deterrence and self-defense.
The pursuit of nuclear weapons or hosting them from allied countries has then become a means for certain anti-hegemonic states to protect their sovereignty and territorial integrity against perceived threats from US-led Western war campaigns.
The history of military interventions and regime changes carried out by Western powers, often in pursuit of strategic interests or access to resources, has created a sense of vulnerability and the need for self-defense among these states.
The development and proliferation of nuclear weapons created a new paradigm in warfare, where the destructive power of these weapons exceeded the capacity of any state to withstand their impact. This realization led to a mutually assured destruction (MAD) scenario, in which engaging in a full-scale nuclear war would result in catastrophic consequences for all parties involved, including Americans themselves.
Nuclear 'madman'
The post-World War II era witnessed the emergence of a new paradigm in which the manufacturing of public anxiety and the creation of existential enemies played a significant role in shaping nuclear power dynamics. This approach was fueled by the desire to justify and perpetuate a massive war machine, primarily controlled by a few powerful military-industrial complexes.
By crafting and amplifying fear, political leaders and those with vested interests in the military-industrial complex sought to maintain public support for substantial defense expenditures and the expansion of military capabilities. Portraying external threats as existential enemies helped in justifying the continued development and deployment of advanced weaponry, including nuclear weapons.
During the Cold War, the United States government engaged in extensive psychological operations (psyops) aimed at influencing public opinion and shaping perceptions, both domestically and internationally. These psyops were part of a broader strategy to counter the influence of the Soviet Union and its allies.
A famous example of such psyops was the Committee on Present Danger. The committee, formed in the 1950s and comprising prominent figures from the government, military, and academia, was tasked with spreading terror among the masses of communism and Soviet expansionism.
The propaganda group employed various strategies, including media campaigns and public speeches, to generate fear and rally support for US policies and military spending.
By creating a horrified public, in which the government appears as the sole protector, the state was in full control.
But add nuclear weapons to the equation, the matters become more serious.
Throughout history, there have been instances where American decision-makers and policy planners employed psychological tactics to enhance nuclear intimidation.
One notable example is the concept of "nuclear brinkmanship", which involves deliberately escalating tensions and pushing the limits of nuclear confrontation to gain leverage in negotiations or intimidate opponents. This approach was famously employed during the Cold War, particularly by presidents John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon.
In October 1969, during the Vietnam War, Washington devised a secret plan, dubbed Operation Duck Hook, during which the US would appear to threaten Hanoi with an imminent nuclear attack.
According to Harry Robbins "Bob" Haldeman, White House Chief of Staff in Nixon's administration, the basis of the tactic was to make the US leader appear "psychologically unstable," unpredictable, and with no limits to the measures he would take.
Haldeman revealed, quoting Nixon as telling him, “They’ll believe any threat of force that Nixon makes because it’s Nixon. I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war.”
And while this was not the first time, nor the last time, that a country resorted to the "madman" approach to deter its opponents, the line separating genuine threats from bluffs remained very thin.
In 1959, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) introduced a war plan titled Atomic Weapons Requirements Study. The document was later updated in 1961 following the Berlin Crisis.
However, one significant aspect was that one of the potential targets was China, although it would not test its first nuclear weapon until 1964 nor it was in direct conflict with the US. According to the plan, 49 to 78 Chinese cities would be hit with US atomic bombs, with prospected fatalities of around 67 million and 107 million.
But plans and proposals to launch a “preventive” or “preemptive” nuclear strike against the USSR were rapidly toned down when the Soviets developed a serious retaliatory capability, including the most powerful atomic bomb produced and tested: “Tsar Bomba”.
Russia's nuclear parity with the US made Nixon believe that the nuclear umbrella was no longer sustainable.
The concept of “massive retaliation” adopted by the United States to justify its nuclear buildup became afterward an outdated strategy and was replaced by the concept of “mutually assured destruction” (MAD); a necessary doctrine to protect countries from America's war machines.
The intensification of hostilities between Russia and the United States set the stage for a high-stakes, zero-sum game in any potential armed conflict, compelling the United States to reevaluate its approach and adopt a more cautious stance. This pivotal shift in strategy ultimately laid the foundation for the Cold War.
Two-way annihilation
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, its nuclear infrastructure was dissolved, while its nuclear warheads were removed from the country and deployed in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.
One of the American nuclear scientists that participated in joint Soviet-US efforts to end Moscow's nuclear power was Professor Siegfried Hecker, who then served as a director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory.
According to Hecker, when the USSR collapsed, the nature of the nuclear threat to the US changed: it was not one of mutual annihilation anymore.
The United States later made Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine sign the Lisbon Protocol to the START agreement, committing the newly independent states to transfer the former Soviet nuclear arsenals to Russia and to join the NPT as nonnuclear-weapons states.
Meanwhile, the US funded the denuclearization process in the three countries bordering Russia with billions of dollars and ended the nuclear programs, destroying over 6,800 nuclear warheads along the way.
But the American PR campaign to turn the world into a "safer place" was later exposed.
In the subsequent years, disregarding numerous warnings from influential global figures and Moscow, the US-led NATO persisted in its expansion toward the Russian borders, violating a previous agreement between the former Soviet Union and Washington that stipulated no further countries would join the military coalition.
Last March, just over a year following the start of the war in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Moscow will be deploying some of its tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus.
Putin then explained that the measure will be similar to the United States' deployment of some of its nuclear arsenal in Europe (and Asia), further noting that Russia's action does not violate the nuclear nonproliferation agreements NPT.
Russia thus revived the "mutually assured destruction" policy and placed it back on the table for the whole world to see.
His announcement triggered a fervent response in Western countries, issuing warnings about the potential escalation. Nonetheless, the strategic move has thus far achieved its intended objectives.
Since then, the inclusion of the possibility of a Russian tactical nuclear attack in the plans of European leaders and American officials when engaging with Moscow has become a prevalent factor.
Putin stressed that the deployment of atomic in Belarus is of a deterrent nature for those oblivious in the West who assume they can inflict on Russia a strategic defeat.
While NATO's agenda remained centered around its eastern expansion, the changing circumstances led to a moderation of fervent rhetoric in the West after a year of advocating to "end Russia".
From Europe's perspective, the haunting memories of both world wars have made them acutely aware that the continent would inevitably become the epicenter of any conflict between Russia and the West. And even if it declared a neutral stance, Europe understands that it would likely become the battleground in any confrontation between Moscow and the United States.
Washington, in light of Russia's advancements in nuclear-capable hypersonic missiles and long-range naval vessels capable of launching nuclear warheads, has become increasingly cautious when considering any direct escalation with Moscow. The realization that these technologies pose a significant challenge to interception systems has compelled Washington to exercise greater restraint in its approach toward Russia.
"Nuclear weapons have been made to ensure our security in the broadest sense of the word and the existence of the Russian state, but we...have no such need [to use them]," Putin said.
"Just talking about this (the potential use of nuclear weapons) lowers the nuclear threshold. We have more than NATO countries and they want to reduce our numbers. Screw them," he added.
As did the DPRK, Russia was also was promising imperialist powers "mutual annihilation".
The nuclear umbrella of illusion
The US, through its proxy war in Ukraine, sought to amplify the bloc mentality on a larger scale, utilizing its influence and resources to hinder a potential Eurasian uprising and redirect Europe's foreign policy toward disengaging from China and Russia. This strategic maneuver aimed to consolidate American power and disrupt the growing connections between countries in Eurasia.
As part of Washington's neo-bloc strategy, political integration is closely intertwined with hyper-militarization.
This approach not only entails the presence of direct, yet limited US forces but also compels allies to substantially increase their defense spending to unprecedented levels. The objective is to create a framework where political and military cooperation aligns, solidifying American influence and promoting a sense of collective security among allies.
Following the establishment of NATO and the deployment of a portion of its nuclear arsenal in Europe, the United States assumed the role of security guarantor for its transatlantic allies, giving rise to what is commonly referred to as the "US nuclear umbrella."
While the primary declared goal was to counter the perceived Soviet threat during the Cold War, the presence of nuclear arms also played a role in exerting influence and control over its transatlantic allies.
In this scenario, the US was using its nuclear arsenal deployed in Europe as both a carrot and a stick against its allies, with all the exploitation, coercion and blackmail that comes along with this strategy.
The concept of the US nuclear umbrella created a perception of safety and protection for its allies. By positioning itself as the guarantor of their security, Washington fostered a sense of dependence and reliance on its nuclear capabilities.
This allowed the United States to justify its own retention and modernization of nuclear weapons, citing the need to maintain a credible deterrent to protect its allies. In doing so, it effectively used the nuclear umbrella as a justification to evade or delay its disarmament commitments, arguing that the security of its allies depended on its nuclear arsenal.
This approach allowed Washington to maintain a significant nuclear presence, military superiority, and influence on the global stage, while also preserving and expanding its strategic interests and exerting control over the disarmament agenda, on top of which is what is known as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NPT.
The US-led NATO's increasing control over Europe's security, particularly in the aftermath of the Ukraine conflict, has resulted in an unprecedented level of influence and dominance. Through years of fearmongering and portraying Moscow as a threat, NATO has successfully consolidated its grip on the region.
The concept of "extended deterrence" has played a crucial role in this process, as the deployment of US nuclear weapons in allied countries acts as a symbolic and tangible demonstration of American power and commitment to their defense.
By positioning itself as the ultimate authority, Washington effectively solidifies its de facto jurisdiction to the extent that its directives are regarded as virtually constitutional. This further reinforces the hegemonic control of the United States and its ability to shape the security policies and decision-making of its allies.
This blind faith in the postulations of Deterrence Theory has established what anti-nuclear advocate and international security expert, Professor Nick Ritchie, called the “regime of nuclear truth” and denominated “nuclear absolutism".
In January 2023, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol raised the possibility of developing independent nuclear weapons as a response to the DPRK's growing power. However, this proposal was met with disapproval from the White House, which expressed its opposition and implied potential consequences if South Korea were to pursue such a policy.
Despite publicly acknowledging the nuclear threat posed by DPRK to South Korea, the United States maintained its opposition to Seoul's proposal of developing its own nuclear weapons.
Paradoxically, in April, the United States agreed to deploy nuclear-armed submarines to South Korea for the first time in decades and involve Seoul in its nuclear planning operations. This contradictory stance by Washington raised questions about its true intentions and strategic objectives in the region.
Mainly, this means that South Korea is officially under US "extended deterrence" program, and therefore, the Americans are forced as per the agreement to come to its aid in the event of an attack.
The deal between Washington and Seoul was met with skepticism by the South Korean public, as reflected in polls.
There were concerns about whether the United States would truly uphold its commitments, given its history of uncertainties and wavering policies in international relations.
This skepticism highlighted the importance of trust and transparency in such agreements, as the South Korean public sought reassurances regarding the reliability and consistency of the United States as a strategic partner.
Here, an age-long question reemerged: “Would Washington risk San Francisco for Seoul in the event of nuclear war?” Of course, the question here is completed by another one: "What are the odds of completely losing what's left of the country's sovereignty and marginal decision-making ability by hosting US nuclear arms, and eventually being sold out by Washington?"
But the fear of fully entrusting in the United States is not a new phenomenon and has been a recurring theme for decades.
In the 1960s, French General Charles de Gaulle was highly skeptical of America's nuclear security guarantees, particularly after the Soviet Union developed ICBMs that can reach the US mainland.
De Gaulle's skepticism led him to ask then-US President John F. Kennedy if he would be willing to risk New York for Paris.
Eventually, the lack of confidence in American assurances was the reason behind establishing the "French nuclear deterrent force," which allowed Paris to ensure its own safety and avoid overdependence on NATO.
History says no
The 2022 US Nuclear Posture Review notes that “extended nuclear deterrence contributes to U.S. nonproliferation goals by giving Allies and partners confidence that they can resist strategic threats and remain secure without acquiring nuclear weapons of their own.”
The debate among US allies about the level of trust they can place in their American partners reached a new level of intensity with the assumption of former US President Donald Trump's "America First" policy.
This was further amplified when Trump openly questioned Washington's commitments to its NATO obligations and even suggested the possibility of withdrawing US troops from Europe.
The fears and concerns of European nations were heightened as they witnessed a more self-preserving and protectionist stance taken by Washington, raising doubts about the extent to which the United States would actually defend the continent despite its grand promises.
A recent CSIS study explored four potential future scenarios in which the United States would have to navigate a world where adversaries possess substantial nuclear arsenals. The study's findings revealed a consistent credibility challenge for the US in assuring its allies about their protection and the safeguarding of their interests.
Commenting on the Nuclear Posture Review of 2022, the Washington-based think tank said fundamental trust in the United States' ability to secure collective defense [bloc alliances] "is far from guaranteed."
"A cohesive and confident alliance network backed by credible extended deterrence [nuclear umbrella] guarantees U.S. strategic interests," the study added, stressing "that the United States will need to continue to rely on nuclear weapons for extended deterrence purposes."
One of the core suggestions of the study is that the United States, while adopting a bloc-alliance policy, should seriously consider further nuclear deployment in allied countries, especially those in close proximity to states considered by Washington as "strategic national security threats": China and Russia.
But American "extended deterrence" that extends over a set of allied countries also generates concerns regarding the rationality behind trusting a bloc's security under Washington's nuclear umbrella.
If US adversaries feel an existential threat, will decision-makers in said countries consider states hosting American nuclear weapons a factor of deterrence or military targets? Will the nuclear bloc mentality subject its members to collective punishment, regardless of the actual interests of each country separately?
This perspective sheds light on an important observation: while the United States presents itself as a guardian of allies and a promoter of global stability, its actions often involve consolidating the military capabilities of its partners and prioritizing American interests above all else.
This approach reflects one of the many forms of unipolarity, where Washington's influence and dominance shape international dynamics to a large extent.
Within this framework, nuclear umbrellas can be realized as the foundations of insecurity for their hosts rather than protection and deterrence, and their costs outweigh their benefits under a unipolar world order governed by the White House and America's industrial complex.
Historically, military alliances based on shared assistance and mutual defense have proven to be only circumstantial empty promises.
So, in short, history says that no, the United States will not risk San Francisco for Seoul, nor New York for Paris, and the US nuclear umbrella remains an illusion designed by unipolarity and employed for imperialistic drives that will be extremely marginalized in the rising multipolar world, but this is a discussion for another article.