Table of Contents

• West Asia casts a shadow over NATO military-industrial complexes
• Price list for NATO's Israeli maritime protection campaign
• Germany's Navy ridicules itself
• No SM-2 batches produced since 2018
• Large-scale confrontation might see selective engagement
• Another blunder: Denmark's unreported defensive failure gets chief sacked
• Germany's "Embarrassment" vs Yemen's Victory
• Yemen's support to Palestine uncovers deep crises in NATO's Naval power

The Red Sea has witnessed several developments that brought to light the West’s fading power, as its enemies simultaneously and continuously develop precision weapons and naval capabilities.

Although ongoing escort, air defense, and aerial attack operations in the Red Sea are viewed as uncostly, in terms of human capital, and training routines that will raise the preparedness of NATO forces in the region, they have also unveiled a quite unpleasant reality for Western navies. On the flip side, the aerial attacks of Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF) on Israeli-linked ships, which were later expanded to include US-UK-affiliated ships in the Red Sea, add to an extended bill that NATO countries pay for securing the Israeli genocide of the Palestinian people. 

The weapons used in these operations are similar to Iranian-designed drones, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles and have been described as "cheap" yet effective weapons by US CENTCOM commanders. These precision-guided munitions have been distributed among factions of the Axis of Resistance, via direct armament or technology sharing. When used effectively, the weapons have proved a challenge for Western forces.

West Asia casts a shadow over NATO military-industrial complexes

Some weapons could have been transferred with the blueprints for the production of their main components and eventual assembly at their final destination, bringing costs down and production levels up. For Ansar Allah in Yemen, the YAF locally produces and assembles a wide array of anti-ship weapons, as well as missiles and drones that have been appropriated for attacking seaborne targets; currently being put to use to tighten a naval blockade on "Israel" through the Red Sea.

On the other hand, the deterioration of Western naval hegemony pushed the US and its allies to embark on a poorly planned campaign to protect Israeli shipping routes, forcing them to deal with these relatively low-cost weapons in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, where the YAF has achieved direct hits on multiple non-military vessels and threatened near hits on advanced US Navy vessels. In Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, US military bases have also suffered from low-cost ballistic, cruise, and drone attacks, which precisely hit their targets in multiple incidents.

When countering these attacks, Western forces have utilized sophisticated surface-to-air missiles, which are estimated to cost millions of dollars in taxpayer money. In the Red Sea, the US-led Western alliance has relied on NATO-standard interceptors, each developed to counter specific inbound aerial objects.

According to The Responsible Statecraft and news circulating on Western media outlets regarding the mishaps of air defense units, the Western coalition has utilized a layered anti-air model, consisting of RIM-116 (RAM), RIM-66 (SM-2), RIM-174 (SM-6), RIM-162 (ESSM), and RIM-161 (SM-3) interceptors. Although each interceptor has been developed to counter specific weaponry, they all share extremely high price tags. 

Price list for NATO's Israeli maritime protection campaign

Below is a list of the cost of a single interceptor, excluding operational and battery costs, as of 2022:

• RIM-116 (RAM): $905,000
• RIM-66 (SM-2): $2,100,000
• RIM-174 (SM-6): $3,901,818
• RIM-162 (ESSM): $2,031,875
• RIM 161 (SM-3) Block IB: $9,698,617
• RIM-161 (SM-3) Block IIA: $27,915,625

The price list is retrieved from the US Department of Defense and military-industrial complexes' official documents. 

Germany's Navy ridicules itself

Keeping the aforementioned price tags in mind, a fluke that came as a result of a failed surface-to-air missile interception attempt by the German Navy's Hessen frigate exposed deep-lying issues for the US-led naval alliance in the Red Sea.

What should have been a strike on a low-cost Yemeni drone turned into a dangerous blunder in which the German Navy misidentified a drone, launched a dual attack on an allied asset, failed to hit the aircraft, and suffered malfunctions that led to the destruction of two interceptors midflight. 

The attack underlines several glaring issues, including the under-preparedness of the German air defense crew, inadequate storage or production of interceptors, and poor communication between NATO allied forces at Sea. Some military-focused outlets have attempted to shift the blame on outdated German comms; however, further investigation of the incident reveals an issue of operational cost that could tip the scale towards NATO's enemies.

The German Navy's mishap would cost the country around $4.2 million, as the Hessen launched two SM-2s at a US MQ-9 Reaper drone that it failed to identify. 

Read more: Big round of applause to Germany: fires at US drone twice, fails twice

No SM-2 batches produced since 2018

The cost of the failed operation should not be the only consideration here, as the last time Raethon sold a batch of its SM-2 Block IIIA interceptors was in a deal with Denmark in 2018. The deal was worth $152 million for 46 SM-2 Block IIIA interceptors and corresponding equipment for a couple of vertical launch systems. Now, the company has stopped producing the system and the interceptors for lack of international orders and plans to resume production in 2035. 

However, conflict in Ukraine, the war on Gaza, and tensions in East Asia may prompt reconsideration, especially as the genocide of Palestinian people drags on while their allies in Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq tie their operations to the status of the aggression on Gaza itself. 

Large-scale confrontation might see selective engagement

Raytheon's lack of major orders since 2018 highlights potential Western shortages in air defense systems and interceptors should a larger-scale confrontation erupt in the region. This vulnerability is not isolated to SM-2 interceptors; it could compromise a broad spectrum of standard NATO-developed surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), including prominent platforms like the Patriot system, THAAD, "Israel's" Iron Dome, and various other anti-ballistic and cruise missile defense systems.

Large-scale engagement will most likely see the Collective West prioritize assets and selectively down low-cost but deadly targets.

One Yemeni strike was capable of sinking a bulk carrier in the Red Sea, while an attack on a secret US outpost on the Jordanian-Syrian border injured and killed more than a hundred US service members. 

In a war of attrition, the Axis of Resistance will have the cost advantage of pumping out munition that targets multi-million systems.

Another blunder: Denmark's unreported defensive failure gets chief sacked

More recently, Denmark sacked its defense chief Flemming Lentfer after major faults were discovered in air defense systems on a frigate that it sent to the Red Sea at an earlier time. Lentfer was axed on Wednesday night after failing to report to the Danish Defense Minister, Troels Lund Poulsen, that the Iver Huitfeldt vessel had experienced a 30 minutes-long malfunction in one of its missile and radar systems, during a drone attack in the Red Sea. The malfunction led Danish authorities to recall the frigate from its mission, marking the gravity of the faults.

"I have lost trust in the chief of defense," said Poulsen, who, in a staggering breakdown of command, learned of the incident from a specialized military news outlet rather than his own subordinates.

"We are facing a historic and necessary strengthening of Denmark’s defense forces. This places great demands on our organization and on the military advice at a political level," he said. 

Danish news website Olfi was the one to break the news to the Minister of Defense, explaining that the frigate was commanded by Commander Sune Lund, who complained about an issue with the ship's active radar and C-Flex combat management system. 

Unexplained outages to the systems were severe enough to prevent the frigate from launching its ESSM interceptors. The Danish frigate's 76 mm guns were also reported to be defective on several occasions during deployment to the Red Sea. Other reports revealed different aspects of the commander's message, in which he stated that these issues were reported "years" ago, but that little had been done to address them.

Read more: How Yemen's Red Sea operations axed Danish defense chief

Germany's "Embarrassment" vs Yemen's Victory

Back to Germany's blunder in the Red Sea, which was described by German media outlet BILD as an "Embarrassment to our (the German) Navy in the Red Sea", the YAF had just marked another milestone by downing a US-operated MQ-9 Reaper Drone over Hodeidah a few days prior to the incident. 

Although both forces attempted to target MQ-9-type drones using their own SAMs, the Yemeni Armed Forces were able to destroy the highly prized American drone with a "locally produced" air defense system while the Germans failed. The German Navy said that they mistakenly targeted a drone on February 28, 2024. However, their failure to down the then-unidentified object was due to unnamed technical malfunctions that led to the detonation of the two SM-2 missiles midflight, rather than active efforts to avert the disaster.

Interestingly, Sanaa had only unveiled two air defense systems capable of achieving such a hit. One of which is seemingly a copy of the Iranian-developed compact air-defense missile, dubbed Saqer-2. The missile can be easily transported and launched to down close-range targets, flying at relatively slow speeds. The Saqer-2, a copycat of the Iranian 358 surface-to-air missile, blends the qualities of loitering munitions and air defense missiles. It is also capable of circling around an area until its operators locate a subsonic aerial target.

However, footage published by the YAF's Military Media indicated that the air defense system utilized in the incident was similar to traditional SAM due to the missile's speed, which reached its target in mere seconds.

#WATCH | Yemeni Armed Forces publish footage of the #Yemeni air defenses shooting down a US MQ9 drone in the skies of #Hodeidah Province with a locally-made surface-to-air missile while it was launching an attack on the region.#Yemen pic.twitter.com/CHQSZUZUp6

— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) February 19, 2024

Notably, the missile impacted the drone in a near-direct trajectory and did not pause to hover nearby or for instructions by operators. Examining the publicly revealed arsenal of the YAF, this likely indicates that the missile in use was the Bareq-1 or Bareq-2 SAM. 

The missiles resemble the Iranian Taer line of missiles, which are used on a multitude of staple air defense systems. When digging deeper into the origin of the technology, it is clear that the Taer or Bareq lines of missiles are actually reverse-engineered models of the Soviet-era 3M9, incorporating certain elements from NATO Standard Missiles.

NATO's SMs are much more developed than the YAF's interceptors, as they incorporate a wide range of technological and hardware additions, putting them in a class of their own.

These additions allow for a 360° scope for air defense teams, allowing Hessen and other vessels to fire at any surrounding target within their range at any time without having to adjust their position, while boosters on the SM-6 allow for longer-range targeting.

Yemen's support to Palestine uncovers deep crises in NATO's Naval power

The equations drawn by the YAF have been unprecedented in the history of any nation's struggle against Western imperialism. For the first time, an Arab nation has taken responsibility for launching an expansive naval campaign to support the Palestinian cause. By setting this historical precedent, Yemen has altered regional security to the favor of native people, while exposing critical faults in NATO's military and naval structures which can and will be taken advantage of by adversaries elsewhere. 

These events have not been limited to uncovering the flaws of Danish and German forces, but they have laid bare essential challenges for the far superior American and British navies. 

For the US, logistics and the high cost of operating multiple strike groups have plagued its naval groups. The UK, on the other hand, has witnessed multiple accidents and operational complications in the same period.

Despite maintaining relatively low-scale engagements, the YAF's precision attacks on military vessels have yielded valuable experience and results. This evolving scenario underscores the importance of the Axis of Resistance's strategic foresight and adaptive responses in navigating the complexities of Western provocations, in the context of modern naval warfare, signaling a paradigmatic challenge for maintaining Western military hegemony in the region.

Read more: Israeli media count Yemen as another threat to the occupation