Trump might defy policy to reach nuclear deal with Iran: R. Statecraft

By Al Mayadeen English
Source: Responsible Statecraft
27 Jan 2025 14:35
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A report by Responsible Statecraft digests the challenges facing a US-Iran political and nuclear agreement, providing insight into possible solutions.

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President Donald Trump gestures as he boards Air Force One en route to Florida at Harry Reid International Airport in Las Vegas, on Saturday, January 25, 2025. (AP)

President Donald Trump has signaled an unexpected shift in the conventional US policy regarding Iran, revealing that the only issue his administration would face with the Islamic Republic is its development of a nuclear weapon.

Speaking on Fox News’ Hannity show on January 23, Trump did not address Iran's regional policies, its defiance of the Israeli occupation, or the possibility of enforcing a regime change. Rather, his only focus was preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

In this regard, a Responsible Statecraft report, written by Eldar Mamedov, recalled previous statements by Iranian officials, confirming that the nation does not seek nuclear weapons, adding that this could facilitate a political agreement between Washington and Tehran.

Tehran has also gestured its willingness to re-engage with the West, particularly following the election of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and his government coming to power. However, despite the mutual political willingness, the path to a deal remains highly complex and is vastly different from 2015, when the JCPOA curtailed Iran’s nuclear program.

Is a nuclear deal possible?

Following Trump’s 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA, his imposition of sanctions, and the EU's failure to abide by the terms of the deal, Iran significantly advanced its program, including enriching uranium to 60%—a step away from weapon-grade levels (90%)—and deploying advanced centrifuges. Nuclear expert Kelsey Davenport notes that Iran could now produce enough material for five to six nuclear bombs in just two weeks, according to Mamedov.

The situation is further complicated by the limited access the IAEA has had to Iran since 2021, heightening concerns about unmonitored nuclear material potentially being moved to covert sites, as well as shifts in Iran’s nuclear rhetoric that suggest a potential rethinking of its doctrine.

While Tehran officially maintains it is not pursuing nuclear weapons, regional challenges could incentivize Iran to consider a nuclear deterrent, Mamedov explained.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s threats of a direct attack, possibly with US support and cover, could possibly motivate Iran to contemplate threshold weaponization as a defensive measure.

Mamedov writes that negotiations to achieve a potential deal would have to consider Iran's extensive nuclear program, as well as the set of motivations it has to expand its nuclear manufacturing. In this context, concessions would have to be made, addressing the regional situation and Iran and its allies' security concerns, which prompted nuclear development in the first place.

Although Iran's Leader Sayyed Ali Khamenei approved re-engagement and Pezeshkian's reformist government advocated for a more proactive approach, majorly to ease US sanctions on the Islamic Republic, some Iranian politicians still have reserves, citing the US decision to withdraw from the JCPOA. This makes the matter one of "how to engage", rather than if engagement should be initiated.

Some Iranian officials see little benefit in trading their nuclear leverage for uncertain sanctions relief. They are also bolstered by a new strategic partnership with Russia, which includes military and security cooperation, providing deterrence against potential attacks by "Israel" or the US.

The time is now!

Currently, proponents of waiting for a US initiative hold sway in Tehran at the moment. Reformists, however, argue this approach wastes time, suggesting Trump may seek a quick deal to enhance his peace-making image, especially with the Ukraine conflict dragging on. A limited framework deal, similar to Trump’s DPRK agreement, could be quickly drafted if the political decision is made, according to Mamedov.

While doubts remain about achieving a substantive follow-up deal, even a symbolic agreement—such as a handshake between Trump and an Iranian leader—could de-escalate tensions, marginalize pro-Netanyahu factions, and create room for broader negotiations addressing nuclear issues, sanctions, and regional concerns, Mamedov wrote.

Diplomatically, Iran has engaged with the EU and E3 (Britain, France, Germany) to prevent them from undermining progress by invoking UN sanctions before the October 2025 deadline. While Tehran has no illusions about the EU’s ability to restore the JCPOA without US involvement, these talks signal Iran’s seriousness about a deal and aim to avoid the E3 acting as spoilers out of fear of being excluded from future US-Iran agreements.

The most viable path forward seems to be a limited bilateral deal between the US and Iran to ease tensions, followed by multilateral negotiations with the original JCPOA signatories. With political will apparent on all sides, the opportunity to advance diplomacy is now.