Newly declassified British government documents reveal that senior UK officials explicitly warned the Bush administration in early 2003 that launching a war on Iraq without a second United Nations Security Council resolution could politically destroy Prime Minister Tony Blair.

In a high-stakes meeting ahead of Blair’s visit to Camp David on January 31, 2003, David Manning,  Blair’s chief foreign policy advisor, delivered a stark message to then-US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, saying, “The US must not promote regime change in Baghdad at the price of regime change in London.”

According to a briefing note now released by the UK National Archives, Manning stressed that obtaining a second UN resolution was “politically essential for the UK and almost certainly legally essential as well.”

Blair’s domestic position on the line

In a confidential memo dated January 29 and marked “secret,  strictly personal, very sensitive,” Manning warned Blair directly that proceeding without international legal cover would be politically untenable. “A second resolution is a political necessity for you domestically. Without it, you would not secure cabinet and parliamentary support for military action,” he said, adding pointedly, “You could be forced from office if you tried.”

What did @georgegalloway tell Tony Blair weeks before the invasion of #Iraq? #USA #UK @KalimaLondon pic.twitter.com/1IsUDCzkkt

— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) June 12, 2021

While President George W. Bush had already secured congressional approval to use force, Manning underscored that the UK faced a far more fragile political landscape. Rice acknowledged the difference, but responded cryptically, “There comes a point in any poker game when you have to show your cards.”
Manning retorted that Bush could afford to wait, “You would not.”

At the time, UN weapons inspectors had still not uncovered conclusive evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and France and Russia continued to oppose authorizing military action.

Christopher Meyer, then the UK’s ambassador to Washington, described growing American impatience. In cables sent after Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address, Meyer reported that diplomatic off-ramps were narrowing rapidly. He described the president’s rhetoric as “messianic”, writing that Bush had made it “politically impossible” to reverse course unless Saddam Hussein surrendered or was removed.

In one particularly stark dispatch, Meyer wrote, “In the high-flown prose to which Bush is drawn on these set-piece occasions, he said in effect that destroying Saddam is a crusade against evil to be undertaken by God’s chosen people.”

He added, “His view of the world is Manichean. He sees his mission as ridding it of evil-doers.”

Ignored warnings, foreseen consequences

Despite diplomatic efforts, the US and UK ultimately abandoned attempts to secure a second UN resolution, citing opposition from French President Jacques Chirac. The decision cleared the path for the invasion in March 2003.

But a Ministry of Defense memo prepared in advance of Blair’s Camp David meeting had already raised red flags, warning that ousting Saddam could lead to “significant levels of internecine violence.”

That warning would prove tragically prescient. Years later, the Chilcot Inquiry concluded that Blair disregarded explicit advice about the risks of post-invasion chaos. The inquiry found that the devastating bloodshed and instability that followed the war had been clearly foreseeable and that Blair chose to proceed regardless.

Wider context

On March 20, 2003, the United States, with the full backing of the United Kingdom, initiated its infamous “shock and awe” bombing campaign on Iraq, justified by the now-debunked claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Weeks later, on May 1, Bush stood aboard an aircraft carrier and declared the mission “accomplished". In truth, the war had only just begun. No WMDs were ever found, and the only enduring legacy left by the invasion was widespread devastation, destruction that continues to define Iraq’s reality more than two decades later.

The human and financial toll of the US-led war in Iraq has been staggering. According to a 2015 audit by the UK’s Ministry of Defense, British military operations in Iraq cost $8.2 billion, with $3 billion initially allocated in 2003 to fulfill the UK’s military obligations. The United States, when factoring in operations in both Iraq and Syria, spent approximately $1.79 trillion, based on estimates from the Costs of War project. This figure includes Pentagon and State Department spending as well as veterans' healthcare. Looking ahead, the cost of caring for veterans through 2050 is expected to reach an additional $2.89 trillion.

The toll on Iraqi civilians has been catastrophic. Between 2003 and 2022, Iraq Body Count recorded 209,982 civilian killings, with 2006 standing as the bloodiest year, accounting for 29,526 of those deaths. The medical journal The Lancet offered an even more harrowing estimate, putting the number of civilian deaths at around 600,000. Iraqi national military and police forces also paid a heavy price, with 48,719 killed between March 2003 and August 2021. The war displaced nearly 4 million Iraqis between 2003 and 2016, 2 million of whom fled the country entirely, while 1.9 million remained internally displaced.

These figures do not even account for those who perished as a result of the collapse of Iraq’s healthcare system, a collapse that led to countless deaths from malnutrition, disease, and a lack of medical care. Today, the effects of the invasion remain deeply etched into Iraq’s society, institutions, and the lives of millions who continue to endure the long-term consequences of a war launched under false pretenses.

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