Declassified documents cited by the US National Security Archive reveal that the United States has been aware since the 1960s of "Israel's" ability to produce weapons-grade plutonium at its Dimona nuclear research center.

The US National Security Archive, established in 1985 by journalists and academics, has released a new collection of documents shedding light on "Israel's" nuclear program.

Among these documents is a December 1960 report from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), described as "the first and only known report that correctly and unambiguously states that the Israeli Dimona project would include a plutonium reprocessing plant and would be linked to a weapons program," according to the archive.

An undeclared nuclear entity

However, subsequent US intelligence remained uncertain about "Israel's" reprocessing activities until the late 1960s, when "Israel" reached the threshold of nuclear weapons capability. Around this time, a secret understanding was reportedly reached between "Israel" and the United States, acknowledging "Israel's" status as an undeclared nuclear entity.

By 1967, evidence suggested that the Dimona reprocessing plant was either complete or nearly so, and the reactor was operating at full capacity. This progress meant that "Israel" could potentially produce a nuclear weapon within "six to eight weeks," the report noted. In the following decade, according to declassified documents, the United States appeared to have adjusted to the reality of "Israel’s" nuclear weapons potential.

Dive deeper

A newly released briefing book, titled 1960 Intelligence Report Said Israeli Nuclear Site Was for Weapons, exposes shocking revelations about the US government's early awareness of "Israel's" nuclear weapons program.

The 20 declassified documents, which include intelligence reports and diplomatic exchanges, reveal that the US had serious concerns about "Israel’s" covert nuclear activities at the Dimona facility in the al-Naqab Desert.

These documents paint a striking picture of how the US monitored "Israel's" nuclear schemes from the late 1950s and 1960s, knowing all along that Dimona was more than just a research center—it was the heart of "Israel's" secret nuclear weapons development.

One of the most significant revelations, as per the book, comes from a December 1960 report by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC), which explicitly states that the Dimona project was designed for plutonium production with the goal of developing nuclear weapons.

This marked the first known US intelligence report to confirm the weapons-related purpose of the Dimona facility.

'Not a satellite of America'

A second explosive document unveils then-Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s fiery rebuttal to US questions about Dimona, where he defiantly declared that "Israel" was "not a satellite of America." Rejecting any calls for international inspections or oversight, Ben-Gurion’s response reveals "Israel’s" bold strategy of nuclear secrecy—refusing to let outside scrutiny threaten its covert weapons program. At the time, this response highlighted "Israel’s" deliberate efforts to present itself as a sheep in wolf's clothing in the external arena while pursuing its controversial nuclear program in the internal arena.
 
Documents detailing US inspections of Dimona between 1965 and 1967 highlight a growing sense of skepticism among US officials regarding Israeli assurances of "peaceful nuclear use."

Despite "Israel’s" claims, US inspectors observed inconsistencies between the information provided and what was seen at the facility. These limited inspections fueled suspicions about "Israel’s" nuclear ambitions.

A 1967 intelligence assessment delivered a bombshell revelation: "Israel" was just "six to eight weeks" away from producing a nuclear weapon. This alarming disclosure marked a seismic shift in US intelligence, moving from mere suspicion to near-certainty about "Israel’s" covert nuclear weapons capability—exposing how close the entity was to an unprecedented arms escalation.

The big picture

The documents collectively highlight "Israel’s "strategy of nuclear ambiguity, known as "amimut", which allowed it to maintain a nuclear deterrent without officially acknowledging it. This policy complicated US efforts to enforce global non-proliferation while preserving its alliance with "Israel".

In short, the declassified documents revealed that by the early 1960s, the US possessed substantial intelligence indicating "Israel's" nuclear program was geared toward weapons development, a fact that remained hidden from public view for decades. They also underscore the intricate balancing act of US foreign policy, where national security priorities and strategic alliances often clash with non-proliferation goals. 

As "Israel" continues to maintain its policy of nuclear ambiguity, the question remains: what role does "Israel", as an undeclared nuclear power, play in shaping the current landscape of regional and global nuclear politics—particularly when paired with its actions in Gaza, widely criticized as genocidal?

Should the global community be more alarmed?