'Israel' is unlikely to launch a full-scale war on Lebanon: Carnegie
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A full-scale war between Lebanon and 'Israel' is an unlikely occurrence, especially since 'Israel' has a lot to lose against Hezbollah.
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Hezbollah fighters carry out a training exercise in Aaramta village in the Jezzine District, southern Lebanon, May, 2023. (AP)
Lebanon has been at war with 'Israel' since October 8, 2023, acting as a support front for the Palestinian people amid the ongoing daily genocidal actions imposed by the occupation forces.
Tensions have heightened between Lebanon and 'Israel' with the Israelis escalating their attacks further into Lebanese territory and threatening to send the country "back to the Stone Age." As a result, Media around the globe is speculating if there is a possibility for a full-scale war with 'Israel.'
In an article written on Diwan, a blog from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says that 'Israel' has a lot to lose should they decide to launch a full-scale invasion of Lebanon.
The American connection
The United States has been evidently explicit in its support for 'Israel,' stating that if war broke out, it would continue to side with the Israelis against Hezbollah. This support is reinforced through the US' funding of weaponry and shells.
These statements and support, however, are likely the Biden administration's deliberate effort to increase pressure on Hezbollah to be more flexible in negotiating a solution in the Blue Line area.
Moreover, the Biden Administration has strongly urged "Israel" to not go to war with Lebanon, since it would be catastrophic for both sides and potentially ignite a regional war, especially if US intervention is involved. Additionally, the United States' support for 'Israel' will immensely affect Biden's presidential campaign, diminishing the votes of Arab Americans and progressives.
'Israel's' inability to defeat Hamas
'Israel' has also been at war with the Palestinian resistance group Hamas since October 7, and has not been able to achieve any victories. Hamas is a significantly smaller group than the Lebanese resistance group Hezbollah, essentially lacking high-quality and advanced equipment and artillery. Therefore, since 'Israel' has not been able to defeat Hamas within these last eight months, the possibility of 'Israel' winning a war against Hezbollah is slim.
The prospect of a negotiated settlement
'Israel' lacks viable military options that would lead to a better outcome than a negotiated settlement. There are two approaches the occupied forces may pursue to ensure the safety of the northern settlers.
First, this involves clearing the border area of Hezbollah fighters, ultimately establishing a so-called "free-fire zone" in south Lebanon. However, this tactic has not improved Israeli security, the analysis speculates, as Hezbollah would retaliate should Israelis fire over the Blue Line. The prospect of achieving peace in northern occupied territories is unlikely without the establishment of "security zone in south Lebanon."
The second approach is the Israeli forces entering Lebanese territory to establish a new balance of power along the border. However, this presents challenges since a limited invasion would likely see Hezbollah return once the 'Israeli' forces depart, while a long-term occupation could mire Israel in a new Lebanese quagmire, which contradicts their efforts to disengage in 2000.
Return to the status quo
The most reliable outcome is for 'Israel' to agree to return to the status quo before October 7, when there was a demilitarized zone present at the Blue Line. Although this is the preferred solution for Hezbollah, Netanyahu's government would most likely not agree to an admission of defeat, the article says.
The Israeli regime essentially believes their victory must be achieved through violence. However, over the last three decades, the pressure from Hezbollah and Iran's alliance has weakened the forces of 'Israel' from taking violent action.
In the case of the ongoing war with Lebanon, 'Israel' refrains from bombing Lebanese cities and infrastructure since Hezbollah is unlikely to initiate attacks with similar outcomes in the occupied territories first.
'Israel' is aware that passing a ceasefire with Hezbollah is interconnected to a permanent ceasefire in Gaza, which is why the occupation forces are hesitant to call for a cessation of hostilities in Lebanon.
'Israel' is evidently faced with limited options regarding the determination of a reasonable outcome. Based on their unfavorable choices, the return to the status quo ante bellum is the most suitable solution.
