Statement by the OPCW spokesperson on Ukraine

On May 7, 2024, Elisabeth Waechter, the spokesperson for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), delivered a statement touching upon the Russia-Ukraine war.

Ms. Waechter hastened to assure that the OPCW Technical Secretariat had been monitoring the situation in Ukraine since the outbreak of clashes in February 2022 in relation to allegations of the use of chemical weapons.

It was emphasized that both Russia and Ukraine put forward mutual accusations of employing prohibited substances during hostilities. Still, the information provided to the OPCW by both parties so far, as well as the data available to the Secretariat was insufficiently substantiated.

The OPCW spokesperson also noted that the situation remained unstable and extremely concerning regarding the possible re-emergence of the use of toxic chemicals as weapons.

OPCW Support to Ukraine

According to the statement, the OPCW is obliged to continue its support to Ukraine in the field of assistance and protection against chemical weapons under Article X of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The article mentioned provides for assistance and protection to States Parties under chemical weapons attack or threatened by it.

It is particularly well-known that OPCW experts visited Ukraine at the request of the country's leadership on 2 and 3 July, 2024, bringing around some 70 LCD 3.3 detectors (advanced devices alerting to gas and vapor threats and detecting at or below levels immediately dangerous to life and health). Detectors can identify the agent or chemical exposure, as well as the class, concentration, and dosage. The guest OPCW experts also trained 20 officers of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (GSChS), including first responders, firefighters and doctors in the city of Uzhgorod.

Today no one will be surprised that the EU or NATO member states help Ukraine. The majority of Western democracies oppose Russia, and no OPCW visit to Ukraine can raise any questions. However, this gesture reveals double standards that the OPCW systematically applies. This year, Russia, for the first time in the Organization’s history has no seat on the OPCW Executive Council, since three seats allocated to the Eastern European region were granted to Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania in late 2023.

US Ambassador to the OPCW, Nicole Champaign, declared at a meeting of the OPCW Executive Council in July 2024 that without Russia in the body to direct its voting coalition, decisions could pass easily.

Both statements like this, and public initiatives, i.e. delivering critical chemical weapons detection equipment to only one of the two parties to the conflict, alongside the reported lack of evidence of use of toxic weapons by Ukraine or Russia, indicate a deepening politicization of the OPCW. Yet the international organization is neither a military alliance nor an economic or political association.

On the Internet, especially on the Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking internet, there are lots and lots of news, photos, and video clips depicting alleged cases of use of chemical weapons by both the Ukrainian and Russian military. Unfortunately, in active information and psychological warfare between the two sides, it is impossible to find out which accusation is reasonable and true.

While Ukraine blames the Russian troops for the use of chloropicrin, Russia adduces proof that Kiev has employed other toxic substances. At the same time, again, in the midst of Russia’s confrontation with European countries caused by the war, the US adopted another package of sanctions against Russia on May 1, 2024. New countermeasures referred to the alleged use of chemical weapons against Ukraine, specifically chloropicrin, which is listed as Schedule 3 under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Why does the OPCW refuse then to investigate allegations directly in the country where chemical weapons were reportedly employed? There is obviously a shortage of data and facts necessary at least to have a Technical Secretariat investigation faked.

Chemical weapons still exist

All declared stocks of chemical weapons in the world were finally destroyed in July 2023, as the US eliminated its last stockpile, missing all deadline extensions. Nonetheless, in her statement, Elisabeth Waechter hit the nail on the head noting that didn’t mean chemical weapons no longer existed. Indeed, under CWC Article II paragraph 2, any chemical used to cause harm or death through its chemical action is considered a chemical weapon. The definition covers, among other things, the employment of dual-use toxic chemicals produced by the chemical industry for purposes other than those originally declared and not prohibited. A variety of such substances listed in Schedules 2 and 3 is numbered in the CWC Annex on Chemicals.

In total, the Annex contains three Schedules listing toxic chemicals that are subject to control under the CWC.

• Schedule 1 includes chemicals that have been developed, produced, stockpiled, or used as chemical weapons and pose a high risk (mustard gas, ricin, lewisite, and almost all nerve agents). According to the CWC requirements, a country is prohibited to possess over one tonne of the materials listed in Schedule 1, while production of more than 100 grams of chemicals per year must be declared to the OPCW.
• The second list (Schedule 2) embraces precursors to Schedule 1 chemicals and those which are considered to pose a significant risk to the subject and purpose of the Convention. Their manufacture is to be declared to the OPCW and there are restrictions on export to countries that are not CWC signatories.
• Schedule 3 involves substances of great importance in the production of Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 chemicals. Besides, they are largely used in the chemical industry and produced commercially in vast quantities for purposes not prohibited by the CWC. Plants which manufacture over 30 tons annually must be declared to the OPCW. A free export of the Schedule 3 chemicals to countries that are not CWC signatories is also limited.

CWC Schedule 3: Triethanolamine

Schedule 3 chemicals are of special interest. Ms.Waechter remarked accurately that chemical weapons include the employment of dual-use substances produced by the chemical industry for illegal activities. A good example is triethanolamine, which is very common in household and professional detergents, and at the same time serves as a precursor to Schedule 1 chemical warfare agent nitrogen mustard, capable of inflicting severe burns and blistering. 

The Russian Ministry of Defense has recently published papers confirming deliveries of more than 480 tons of triethanolamine to Ukraine between December 2022 and July 2024. The reports cover data from only one company named Engineering Center Reagent.

Engineering Center Reagent

AO Engineering Center Reagent is a Ukrainian company concerned with wholesale chemical products, intermediary activities in the trade of a wide range of goods, etc.

The company is headed by Ms. Zinukhova Larisa Nikitichna.

The legal address is Dnipro, St. Labor Reserves, 6.

Its physical address is Dnipro, Startovaya St., 11a.

It is of vital importance to notice that triethanolamine is listed in the CWC Annex on Chemicals and is subject to annual declaration under CWC Article 6, paragraph 8 and Verification Annex Part VIII. Still, Kiev is unlikely to have reported receiving a fairly big batch of the compound. Doubts are reinforced by the lack of publicly available proof that the product is used for non-malicious purposes. Moreover, the only tender of the importing company, Engineering Center Reagent, to supply triethanolamine dates back to July 5, 2023, which may also indicate that Ukraine is deliberately trying to conceal previous supplies of the dual-use chemical from the Organization.

As far as the above-noted tender is concerned, at least one party is well-known, and it is a buyer represented by Ukrainian chemical plant Sumykhіmprom (its director is Zakharenko Valery Vladimirovich). Unfortunately, there is no information as to who was the final recipient of all the other chemicals delivered by Engineering Center Reagent. The same story is with manufacturers from whom the company imported triethanolamine.

A thorough analysis of the Engineering Center Reagent reporting documentation published by the Russian military department brings us to a conclusion that it was the State Export Control Service of Ukraine (Derzhexportkontrol) that issued several one-time permissions for imported batches of chemicals listed in CWC Schedule 3. A report template similar to those mentioned above is to be found on the Derzhexportkontrol website.

The crucial tasks of the Service include, among others, the following:

• Implementation of state policy in the field of state control over international transfers of military, dual-use goods, etc.;
• Ensuring protection of national interests and promoting Ukraine's international authority during the exercise of state control over international transfers of goods by ensuring the fulfillment of Ukraine's international obligations related to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, and limiting transfers of conventional weapons in order to prevent their use for terrorist and other illegal purposes;
• Provision of administrative services in the field of state export control in cases stipulated by law.

It’s conceivable that the control body of Ukraine, empowered by law, may have permitted triethanolamine import without notifying the responsible international organizations.

The import reports produced by Engineering Center Reagent indicate that the person responsible for export control compliance is director Zinukhova Larisa Nikitichna. She confirmed in writing that the triethanolamine transfers were subject to international reporting.

Since every person and body involved perfectly understood their tasks and obligations, only one question which remains open: Has Ukraine notified the OPCW of the large amounts of triethanolamine listed in CWC Schedule 3, whose stockpile has been replenished in Ukraine since 2022 by an unknown supplier? Indeed, Verification Annex Part VIII statesm "The initial and annual declarations to be provided by the State Party <...> include aggregate national data for the previous calendar year on the quantities produced, imported and exported of each Schedule 3 chemical, as well as quantitative specification of import and export for each country involved." 

Interestingly, if Russia checks up on Ukraine's ongoing triethanolamine supplies, will Russia be able to use CWC Article 10? After all, each State party can receive assistance and protection if it is exposed to a threat of toxic weapon attack. It sounds rhetorical, as the OPCW is quite unlikely to supply Russia with LCD 3.3 detectors, pointing out the lack of available evidence. However, this was the very courtesy the international organization extended to Ukraine. In fact, the OPCW sided with Kiev, supporting the politicized trend set by the EU and NATO.