What it takes to break the nuclear deal deadlock
Considering the current JCPOA revival stalemate, verifiable sanctions relief is a major point of concern.
Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian recently confirmed that Tehran is not involved in any direct talks with the U.S. to revive the Iran nuclear deal. Tehran’s retaliatory steps against illegal U.S. sanctions are also in accordance with Articles 26 and 36 of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The responsibility for the current stalemate falls flatly on the United States and its European counterparts for a host of reasons. It includes their unwarranted support for illegal sanctions on Tehran in violation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Refusal to prioritize course correction has also undermined calls for all parties to return into full compliance with the 2015 nuclear deal, a stated objective of delicate negotiations since September 2022. "Tehran is awaiting greater steps from the United States to reach an agreement on bigger issues, such as the nuclear deal," said Seyed Mohammad Marandi, the Iranian nuclear negotiating team's international media advisor during Vienna talks.
Japan’s proposal for reviving the stalled nuclear deal could signal a marked departure from recent Western indifference on sanctions and unilateral pressure tactics. Tokyo presented the proposal during Amir-Abdollahian’s August visit to the country, and it comes at a time when Iran has affirmed its support for Japan’s active facilitation of the nuclear deal issue. However, since Japan is not one of the original signatories to the deal, the proposal needs to prioritize movement from its Western partners to achieve a meaningful objective: extract credible assurances that the West will not sabotage efforts for nuclear deal progress.
Considering the current JCPOA revival stalemate, verifiable sanctions relief is a major point of concern. After all, the European Union, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (E3) show no signs of relinquishing unlawful sanctions on Iran’s peaceful nuclear program. Moreover, the E3 increasingly views such a unilateral course as its principled prerogative when the result is a heightened sense of distrust.
The greatest casualty of such a counterproductive attitude towards illegal sanctions is the fate of the nuclear deal itself. Drastic delays in progress could’ve been easily avoided if the U.S. and its European partners did not resort to excessive demands from Tehran, despite the country’s demonstrated cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Meanwhile, Tehran’s position has been crystal clear: any meaningful initiative that aligns with Iran's interests would be welcomed.
Therefore, the E3 shouldn’t pretend that punitive sanctions align with the spirit of cooperative nuclear diplomacy. These are the same countries that refused to support Washington’s move to restore sanctions in late 2020, and were chief to creating conditions – alongside Russia and China – to make up for Washington’s blatant violation of the original 2015 accord. Instead, the E3 has taken a complete “U-turn” on its sanctions position by refusing to lift them in line with the timetable set out in the 2015 nuclear deal. Targeted attacks against Iran’s peaceful nuclear program, including unfounded allegations of a so-called “breach” of Iranian nuclear commitments, won’t reverse the diplomatic costs of E3’s pro-sanctions pivot.
Make no mistake. There is no credibility behind claims that Iran is responsible for the current complications in talks. History is a valuable guide: it was the United States and its European partners – not Tehran – that rejected the final document last year after JCPOA negotiations were nearly finalized. Despite outstanding differences, Tehran has still signaled its potential to engage in negotiations regarding the draft agreement for the JCPOA.
For initial momentum to gather steam, it is imperative for original signatories – chiefly the West – to demonstrate reciprocity and create conditions that are favorable to breaking the Vienna deadlock. "[Iran] considers a decision by the #EU & 3 European countries not to abide by their commitments, in the eighth year of the #JCPOA, illegal & contrary to their obligations under the JCPOA & Resolution 2231, & a measure that creates tension & is accompanied by malicious intentions," said the Iranian Foreign Ministry in a post on X, formerly known as Twitter.
Simply scapegoating Tehran for Western shortcomings on unlawful sanctions won’t hold up.
To Tokyo’s credit, it enjoys unique diplomatic proximity to the United States and its European allies, indicating space to argue against measures that serve as irritants to the smooth and complete revival of stalled nuclear deal talks. Though initial details on its nuclear talks proposal remain scant, Japan has remained consistently engaged with Iran on deal revival prospects and bilateral talks. The late September exchange between Fumio Kishida and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi is one of many proof points that Tokyo can iterate legitimate concerns on sanctions removal, including a host of unauthorized US sanctions imposed by the Trump administration.
For a nation that is keen to push back against unilateral changes to the ‘rules-based’ status quo in its own neighborhood, a concrete stance against illegal Western sanctions can help narrow the trust deficit in stalled JCPOA talks.