A military confrontation with Iran remains unlikely for now, but negotiations are expected to be lengthy and complex. Whether the United States continues its talks with Iran or instructs the Israeli occupation entity to initiate a military offensive, in both scenarios, it is the entity that ultimately bears the cost. Pursuing negotiations is, in itself, an acknowledgment of Iran’s growing influence and an implicit recognition of its strength. While Trump appears content with the ongoing dialogue, Netanyahu is not. Through these talks, Iran gains legitimacy, while the Israeli occupation entity finds itself increasingly constrained, accelerating internal fragmentation due to its failure to achieve any military goal.

What’s currently preventing this disintegration is the ongoing war. If the ceasefire continued, Netanyahu’s political survival would be in jeopardy. By breaking the ceasefire, the US has effectively delayed the entity’s further disintegration and contradictions surfacing, although these realities are still present.

There remains the possibility that, should talks with Iran collapse, the US may push the Israeli occupation entity into launching an attack. However, such a move would be self-destructive as Iran would retaliate heavily and the entity would be dealt serious blows. In this scenario, Trump would be seen as limiting the entity’s role, recognizing, after 18 months, that it has become more of a regional liability than an asset, having failed to meet its objectives. 

This could be interpreted as a strategy of initiating a war to limit the entity and reshape the region’s power dynamics. Trump, by nature, seeks to influence the power balance through practical outcomes on the ground. He sees that the entity failed to defeat the Resistance in Gaza and Lebanon, while Yemen continues to strike at its core.

Trump has praised Yemen’s ability to produce advanced missiles, suggesting that he does not seek to escalate war, but rather to put closures on them. Notably, when he discusses Yemen, his focus is not on halting their attacks on the entity but on reopening the Red Sea. Despite the significant military firepower used by the US and the entity, there have been no decisive results.

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The ongoing war is the main factor holding the occupation entity together. Trump, in his typical fashion, gives it free rein to act, ready to stamp any of its achievements. But if it fails, it must bear the consequences alone. Before October 7, the entity was perceived as strong and capable of fulfilling its goals — hence why Trump supported its ambitions, including the normalization agreements and moving the US embassy to al-Quds. 

The American establishment, represented by institutions like the Pentagon and the White House, follows a long-term strategic vision. It maintains hundreds of military bases worldwide and pursues a structured political strategy across various regions. In contrast to the deep state’s approach—where a weakening "Israel" prompts the search for regional substitutes—Trump’s stance is more transactional. If there is no significant opposition, he will stamp "Israel’s" territorial gains. But if the costs outweigh the benefits, he is willing to incrementally remove support from the occupation entity.

At that point, the US may conclude that its best option is to negotiate with the dominant force in the region. This would mean ending the failing wars in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen. The key difference between Trump and the American deep state lies in their approach to adversaries: Trump is willing to negotiate with the strong, even if they are technically enemies, while the deep state is not.

In contrast to Iran's rejection of Trump’s letter in 2019, today, there are indirect talks — reflecting Iran's internal street, which is calmer and less vulnerable to being mobilized in this case. These talks, now reportedly set to take place weekly, help defuse tensions and absorb American pressure. Trump's ideal outcome is to turn Iran into a hub for US investment, yet Iran is unlikely to agree as long as the American conduct remains coercive and hegemonic, undermining the core values of the revolution.

Trump does not demand the total dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program — something Iran would never accept. He has clearly stated his opposition to Iran obtaining a nuclear bomb, but not to Iran maintaining a civilian nuclear programme. The US support for a civilian nuclear-capable Saudi Arabia can be seen as the excuse for America to allow a civilian nuclear Iran. Ultimately, Trump seeks an agreement with Iran, not necessarily over uranium enrichment levels but to secure a deal under his name. A successful negotiation would signal regional stability, fostering greater openness from Gulf states and Turkey toward Iran while reducing pressure. A return to 5% enrichment under a new JCPOA-style deal is not the same as dismantlement.

When Netanyahu speaks of applying the "Libya model" to Iran, he means total dismantlement, knowing full well that such an approach would trigger war between the US and Iran.

In summary, Iran will not dismantle its nuclear infrastructure. It may agree to reduce uranium enrichment and accept a new deal, but there are no guarantees with Washington, making the process inherently fragile. As indirect talks potentially become direct, this poses a nightmare scenario for Netanyahu and the entity. At the heart of the conflict is Iran’s revitalization of the Palestinian cause and its material support for it, while the Israeli occupation serves as the largest project for the global structure of capitalism, in feeding the interests of capitalism's monopoly over the world. Iran views the entity as a red line, and the entity’s regional role continues to diminish, as it has proven to be a failure. If any military action is taken against Iran, it will likely be initiated by the entity, and it will also be the first to fall.