In attempting to understand what is going on in the "heart of Asia", the sheer plethora of diverse players, their endless entanglements with and against one another, their manifold political and geopolitical undertakings and interests across the local, regional and supra-regional spectrum, all of which are deeply rooted in the history, geography and social structures of Central Asia, appear so convoluted... that the circumstances in this region in general and those in Afghanistan, in particular, become incomprehensible and unfathomable for most people...

This essay will attempt to briefly address the current situation faced by the "Taliban".

The Taleban's Pyrrhic Victory...

On 15 August 2021, the Taleban took power in Kabul and proclaimed their Islamic Emârat. Ever since the world has been watching and waiting... But all of Afghanistan remains shrouded in a sea of fog. And each of those inside this dense fog sees the other as some sort of apparition while they themselves are perceived as apparitions, as well. The babble of voices heard within this smog and in the media haze only intensifies the prevailing disorientation, insecurity, apprehension, and exasperation felt by all. Standing like an elephant in this dark, foggy room amongst these apparitions, are the Taleban, who peruse their surroundings quizzically. A state of unease has apparently seized hold of them. After winning the jackpot in the lottery for power, what steps can they now take? The expressions on their faces seem to say: "What are we doing wrong? We fought hard and sacrificed so much, we won a war against a superpower, we are good Muslims, good Afghans, we want the best for all... Give us time... We are ready to discuss anything..." They do indeed appear to be sincerely open to changes and improvements. And, at the same time, they persist in reasserting their roots, their culture, and their traditions, as well as their unwavering faith and their particular version of Sharia. So, the question is: will they be willing to adopt an open-mindedness that could end up changing who they are fundamentally? 

Everyone's talking about Afghanistan and the Taleban...

Many around the world, Putin for one, say that they are waiting to see how the Taleban will conduct themselves... German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas has been quoted as saying that “No one wants to recognize the Taleban, not yet - or not at the moment". "We are in no hurry", say the Chinese. "We want an 'inclusive government' in Afghanistan", say the Iranians. And so on...

The demands and concerns of Afghanistan's direct and immediate neighbors are understandable and indeed vital, as they are and will remain the ones directly affected by any developments in Afghanistan. Moreover, it was these countries (with the exception of Pakistan) that made the most efforts to seek a peaceful solution to end the war in Afghanistan, while the West was busy carpeting the country with its "noble values" (bombs, drugs, dirty money, corruption, sanctimoniousness).

And now the West is parading its hubris with even more pompousness and audacity by stipulating its own demands instead of having the decency to keep its mouth shut.

The Taleban are evidently fond of flinging promises and assurances of their promises but are then seen revising or even contradicting their statements shortly thereafter. While Mullah Baradar assures the "international community" that they will not allow anyone to carry out terrorist activities against other states from Afghan soil and that the Taleban will not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, Taleban spokesman Shahin goes on to declare: "We will speak out for our Muslim brothers in Indian Kashmir", a clear, deliberate warning to India that the Taleban will also be "speaking out" for Pakistan. The Taleban have announced that under Sharia law women will be permitted to work anywhere, but then a senior Mawlawi asserts that women will not be participating in the government.

The "international community", the neighbors, China and Russia persist in their calling for the formation of an "inclusive" government. Now, for the sake of clarity, an "inclusive" government in Afghanistan does not mean that members of the overthrown regime would participate in the government, but only that various ethnic groups and religious minorities should be adequately represented in the government. When the Taleban presented their government on the 7th September 2021 – it comprised only men from their own ranks. For the moment, this is understandable, because, as they have consistently emphasized, it is a transitional government set up to preserve the state's legal capacity... Nevertheless, efforts are apparently still being made to form an "inclusive" government". But what does an "inclusive" government mean in Afghanistan? All previous governments in Afghanistan were in fact "inclusive" – as long as they remained under the leadership of the "Big Brother", as the Pashtuns see themselves. Thus, "inclusion" was always only a matter of appearances. All significant and decisive positions have always been occupied either by Pashtuns or by non-Pashtun advisors and yes-men. The pinnacle of this deceptive "inclusiveness" was under Ashraf Ghani, a Pashtun chauvinist, whose pathological fear of non-Pashtuns led him to sabotage the resistance forces fighting the Taleban (this was also one of the reasons behind the rapid collapse of the army and the government in August this year - more on this perhaps in the next essays).

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Even if the Taleban were willing to create a truly inclusive government, where would they find suitable candidates for the relevant posts? Many political figures of previous governments are no longer there, others simply do not trust the Taleban – the trauma from the first Taleban rule (1996-2001) runs deep among non-Pashtuns. That leaves only Karzai, Abdullah, and men and women like them... all corrupt to the bone. Even if an inclusive government were to be established, non-Pashtuns and non-Taleban would at best have an advisory role and not be among the decision-makers. In any case, this is a purely domestic Afghan problem... For foreign countries, a mere semblance of an inclusive government will suffice and lead to the recognition and legitimization of the Taleban regime on the international stage, but this would by no means imply that all will be well in Afghanistan. 

With what they already have in terms of human resources and what they might still achieve, it remains to be seen whether the Taleban will be able to cope with the enormous economic, political, and social challenges faced by the management and administration of a modern state.

They'll be damned if they do, damned if they don't...

The Taleban came into the world to establish an "Islamic Emârat" in Afghanistan with strict Sharia laws and to defend and consolidate Pashtun supremacy. Deviation from these two goals is seen as unacceptable or even treasonous by large sections of both the rank and file and will inevitably lead to conflicts within the Taleban hierarchy, amongst their members, and with other Pashtuns, which could culminate into fierce battles and even civil war. The evolution of such conflicts has been documented all too often in Afghanistan's 274-year history... The Taleban are thus faced with an enormous, critical domestic challenge. Either the proponents of change and adaptation to the times will succeed in convincing and keeping the radical sections quiet in a peaceful manner, or they will have to crack down on them with a heavy hand, even if it comes to a "purge" in the manner of the "Night of the Long Knives", which is not uncommon in the world of politics, especially in totalitarian regimes.

With regard to the future... whenever one tries to predict it, one usually ends up getting it wrong. But with all that is known from the past and what can be ascertained in the present, one can still envisage a rough scenario...

What the Taleban will most likely achieve is security, crime prevention, the eradication of corruption, a graveyard peace in the cities, and the semblance of some stability. They may thus succeed in gaining recognition, legitimacy, and support at a regional and international level and in reviving the economy to some extent with the help of foreign countries, thus buying time with the population. The newly acquired calm and stability will, however, be brittle and unsustainable. The armed Western proxy forces (Al-Qaeda, DAESH/ISIS & Co.) are already in their starting blocks waiting for the signal... Murderous attacks of all kinds could soon determine everyday life in many places. Life for women and young men, especially in the cities, will be grim. Sharia law will dominate society and interpersonal relations, i.e. the carrot and stick system. Those who can, will leave the country, those who stay will have to fight hard for survival, not only economically.

For the Taleban to undergo a change in their conduct - to adapt to a more contemporary civilization – pressure will have to come from the outside exclusively. But, in the long run, the domination of the Taleban will have to be overcome by Afghan forces at home – through peaceful pressure or by force through a broad popular uprising. The current resistance exhibited in the actions of the former Mujaheddin in Panjshir (the Northern Alliance / Warlords) is a reasonable response, but it is problematic: it is lacking in appropriate and adequate leadership. Ahmad Massoud, apart from being inexperienced, is a pupil of the West who has ended up crying for help from his Western mentors. The sudden and immediate arrival of Bernard-Henri Lévy (a Zionist and lobbyist for the arms industry) in the valleys of Panjshir and Massoud's invitation to the EU parliament, does not bode well. At present, attempts are being made at home and abroad to groom him as a charismatic leader (something he will never be). The others remaining, such as Dostam, Atta, Ismail Khan, are disreputable, corrupt failures. The leaders of this resistance are either unborn, too young, or not yet known and are biding their time somewhere... if the resistance will still exist by then.

There is, however, a danger that conditions in Afghanistan under the Taleban will deteriorate to the point where military intervention may again be necessary - a grim prospect with bleak and fatal consequences for Afghanistan, for the region, and even for the world... "Graveyard of Empires" aside.

Either way, the Taleban do not appear to have a future. It's not for them to have. They may hail from an existing reality (one with fossilized Pashtun traditions), but they are and will remain anachronistic because the reality they stem from is anachronistic too. The world cannot abide them, just as they themselves cannot abide these times and the world as they are.

Ultimately, time will tell...

A Time of Monsters...

In addition to all this, the whole world has entered a paradigm shift and is in a state of upheaval, burdened with age-old, complex problems for which there are not even tolerable solutions in sight. One needn't enumerate these problems here; they are known to all in sundry forms (be they enormous in terms of the economy, climate, health, etc.). We live in a time of monsters... and one cannot expect any good coming from monsters.

No one can say when and how this time will come to an end and whether what comes afterward will be better than now, better than before...

Afterword...

Much has been said and written about the roles of Pakistan, India, China, Russia, Iran, the Gulf, and NATO states in the region – almost always from the perspectives of the "Great Game", "Eurasia" and geopolitics. But as far as the countries in and around Central Asia are concerned, there is a long history that goes way, way back... There are many aspects that may well feature in the "Great Game" but have always been there. The "Great Game" is not the beginning of history. The countries in Central Asia and their roles in the region need to be addressed individually. This also applies to the history and practices of colonialism in the region. These are topics I would like to touch on in my coming essays.

Note: the writer prefers to spell certain names/words as they are pronounced in the Persian language - such as "Taleban" (not "Taliban") and Emârat (not Emirate).