With just over two months to go until Venezuela's presidential election, polls show that President Nicolás Maduro is likely to be re-elected for a third term, despite a deep economic crisis caused by sanctions from the neighboring United States and a split in the government with 11 candidates facing off against two others from the right-wing opposition.

For Maduro, the race will be the toughest since April 2013, when he was first elected. In that year, the president enjoyed the full political legacy of the Bolivarian Revolution led by his predecessor, Army Colonel Hugo Chávez Frías, who died of cancer less than a month before Maduro's election and his entrance into Miraflores Palace, the presidential headquarters in Caracas capital city.

Today, even without his physical presence, Chávez still deeply marks the Venezuelan soul. He died, but Chavismo - a political movement that organized what he called the Bolivarian Revolution - still has hundreds of thousands of organized supporters in Venezuela. For the poor, Chavismo meant permanent social mobilization and better living conditions.

Inspired by General Simón Bolívar (who declared Venezuela's independence from Spain in 1811), the Revolution put into practice during Chávez's 14-year presidency in the South American country - which holds the world's largest oil reserves - is peaceful and based on socialist principles. It rapidly improved the quality of life of the poor, democratized the income from oil exports, broke with US imperialism associated with Venezuela's own elites, and began a process of union with the other nations of Latin America and the Caribbean.

The presidential election will now take place on July 28, the date of Chávez's 70th birthday. The date, full of symbolism, is an attempt to revive the mythical memory of Chávez.

“Maduro's government is going to consolidate, and I have no doubt it will win, but the math of the vote doesn't result in a movement of resistance to the US. But if there is an invasion or physical aggression, yes,”, says Venezuelan journalist and Chávez's biographer, Modesto Emilio Guerrero.

Guerrero, who has been living in Argentina for 33 years and helped to found PSUV (the political party Chávez also belonged to) means that the “mythic memory” of Chavez's years still resonate among Venezuela's poor, and that this would help Maduro reach a new term. 

         Below follows Gerrero's full interview.

The historic moment of the greatest popular mobilization in the recent history of Latin America - after the events of the entry into Havana (1958) of Fidel and other revolutionaries, as well as the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua (1979) - was the rapid and enormous mobilization in Caracas to bring Chavez back to Miraflores in 2002 after the coup attempted by the Venezuelan opposition in agreement with the CIA. Regardless of the differences in time and political figures, is there still today in Venezuela a popular mobilization capable of defending the country against external aggression - wherever it comes from, even from and/or with the help of a possible right-wing government in Brazil?

Modesto Emilio Guerrero: Today there is no mobilization of this kind, which doesn't mean that there can't be a response to US aggression. They are two different things. There is a tendency towards inaction, contrary to the years of Chavismo and until 2019, because the need to survive in material terms erases the willingness to make political sacrifices.

There are several reasons for inaction. The main one is economic, due to the blockade: The US-led 360 sanctions have destroyed the Venezuelan economy and led to the migration of six million people, most of them young, in order to survive, as has already happened in many places, or in war situations.

The priority of an ordinary Venezuelan, from the street, the factory, or the rural sector, is to survive and for their children to eat. When that priority exists, the political priority does not come first. So the image of President Nicolás Maduro is not at its best, compared to any of the other four or five moments since he came to power in 2013. He is not helped by state policies and corruption scandals. Both things diminish the will and the state of consciousness that drives the militants.

Five to six million Chavista militants were organized in multiple forms of association, mainly by neighborhood groups. This is explained by the character of the Bolivarian Revolution, which was basically carried out by the poor in their neighborhoods. Which is different from the classic proletariat disciplined by the factory, the labor regime, and a political culture in union life.

A US intervention with the help (of an eventual right-wing government) in Brazil, or Argentina, which is more likely at the moment, would have a response from the official army with some unofficial actors. The popular militias are a great achievement in military terms in defense of the Bolivarian process, but are in a state of dismantling or reduction compared to the several million that were present in 2019.

The response against Argentina would be more forceful, because in Venezuela a degree of awareness has accumulated against the ingratitude of (Argentine President Javier) Milei and against other governments like that of Alberto Fernandez, and to some extent Cristina Kirchner, in relation to the amount of money that Hugo Chávez has lent to Argentina in the past.

'If there is an invasion or aggression from the US, there will be resistance'

Based on the evolution of the political situation in Venezuela, is it possible to say that the presidential elections could confirm the capacity of the political base that supports Maduro to govern in the face of the internal economic crisis and at the same time consolidate Venezuela's position in the face of US imperialism?

Guerrero - The political capacity of the Venezuelan social base for the July 28 elections is dispersed, because there are many candidates who reflect very different interests. The situation is no longer polarized between Chavismo and anti-Chavismo. Options have emerged that drag Chavismo on one side and the opposition on the other. There is also a feeling of despondency detected by various consultancy agencies, which can be verified by talking to 10 people in 10 different places. Some people are separating the mythical and epic figure of Chávez from the process they are experiencing in reality. This didn't exist until 2019.

The July elections will approve the (Maduro) government and not Chavismo. The government is still reeling from Chávez's unexpected death. The movement is limiting itself. Many Chavista people wouldn't vote for Maduro because they don't identify him with the ideology or the mythical character of Chávez.

Maduro's government is going to consolidate, and I have no doubt it will win, but the math of the vote doesn't result in a movement of resistance to the US. But if there is an invasion or physical aggression, yes.

The US government itself has a different relationship with the Venezuelan government. Exxon (US) is the dominant company within PDVSA (the Venezuelan state oil company) and in the Venezuelan oil system, and this is visible. US and Canadian investments and companies have once again become part of Venezuela's political and social life, which is already beginning to change the imaginary of what anti-imperialism is.

This doesn't mean that the population wouldn't defend Venezuela. There is a relationship with memory that is very close to the time of the current generation, 10 years, which is not much in historical terms. This generation doesn't like Maduro as president or as a leader, the way they like Chavismo as proof of a better life over the last 100 years. Maduro for them doesn't mean disaster, but the image of disaster in economic terms.

'The tactic to recolonize Venezuela and a US enclave in neighbor Guyana'

On the US: Is it correct to say that Washington has reversed its decision to approach Caracas? Has it dropped its intention to secure oil for the US and Europe, away from the need to buy Russian energy? Why?

I'm not sure in categorical terms that the US is going to change its strategy towards Venezuela. I think they have changed their tactics to recolonize Venezuela. With or without Chavismo. We already know of cases in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. One example is Peronism in Argentina. The US knows that the cost of Venezuelan oil at a gas station in Florida is 17 times less than the cost of Arab oil. The current state of world geopolitics, competition, and the danger of war with China show that Venezuela is a centerpiece, just as it was in the Second World War. That's why I don't see the US abandoning its strategy of re-entering Venezuela by any means.

On the issue of the Essequibo region, in neighboring Guyana, which Venezuela claims as its own, the US is operating as usual: It allies itself with governments that seem to sympathize with it in order to secure sources of oil, while showing off its weapons (in this case, flights of combat aircraft and the possibility of installing a military base in Guayana) to discourage Venezuela's claim to the Essequibo. From Maduro's point of view, how far is he willing or able to go to guarantee Caracas's possession of this territory?

It is very difficult for the Venezuelan government, in the current world system of states and power, to regain this territory (currently held by) Guyana, which is its right. I believe that there is a process of occupation of Guyana, the purchase of the government of that country, the threat of the installation of a military base, and the passage of US ships on a recurring basis. Since the Second World War, the US has learned, unlike the British, that the enclave system is more productive than the colonial system. Guyana could be a new enclave, like Israel in the Middle East, like South Korea in Southeast Asia. This strategy doesn't just work against Chavismo. It works against Brazil and the entire Amazon arc.

'The relationship between Iran and Venezuela is as good as it is dangerous'

To what extent do the presidencies of Gustavo Petro in Colombia and Lula in Brazil support Maduro in Venezuela, given that both the Colombian and Brazilian presidents also face enormous internal opposition, to the point of constantly expressing their concern about maintaining their mandate?

Both (Colombian President Gustavo) Petro and (Brazilian President) Lula are experiencing the contradiction of having to support Maduro, even though they don't like him, and not being able to withdraw their support for him (which they would like to do). Lula and Petro have to resolve the domestic conflicts of an opposition that is deeply anti-Maduro and accuses him of being a dictator - which they couldn't do with Chávez [...]. Lula and Petro are observing and calculating the situation, because they have to respond to internal pressure - and not just from the CIA, the Pentagon, or Human Rights Watch.

What is the scope of the rapprochement between Venezuela and Iran? Is it “just” a political rapprochement or, over time, will it become an effective and broad economic and commercial rapprochement?

As far as I know, the two countries have a pact that is superior to the one Chávez had with Cuba. But he couldn't make progress with Cuba on the scale that he can with Iran, which is a global power. Chávez had a much more complex and therefore more complete strategy of systems of relations with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, and Ecuador for economic, commercial, political, cultural, and military development. Maduro is isolated by imperialist pressure and has rightly allied himself with Iran and tried to with Russia. The relationship between Iran and Venezuela is as good as it is dangerous.