While it may sound hyperbolic, the Israeli military is only truly prepared to commit high-tech civilian massacres and cannot confront any well-prepared foes. The Zionist regime’s history of asymmetric warfare lulled it into a false sense of security that supplemented their racist worldview, proving catastrophic for them in today's multi-front war.

Who are the soldiers who make up the military?

In order to understand the Israeli military and how it fights, we first have to understand the society that shapes its soldiers. All Israelis are indoctrinated from a young age with a supremacist ideology through their school system and are geared toward military service from the moment they exit the womb. They believe their army to be “the most moral” on earth, while also believing in the concept of their own supremacy over others.

Any discussion on the Zionist armed forces must begin with recognizing who the Israeli public are because when every one of them finishes high school, they are required to do a 2-3-year stint of mandatory service, which is often followed by reserve service for some time. While there are the likes of the Ultra-Orthodox (Haredim) who do not serve due to religious reasons and liberal Israelis who often use mental health issues as an excuse, most are drafted into some section of the military.

Those soldiers who enter their mandatory years of service, who will actually experience real combat settings, will not enter direct warfare and are instead stationed at checkpoints, do crowd control, or participate in night raids that aim to arrest teenagers who do things like throw stones. This is why many young Israelis find it more mentally stimulating to join the Air Force or work on intelligence. It is not uncommon to find soldiers sitting at checkpoints, bored out of their minds and with frustrated looks. For journalists covering protests across the West Bank, the Israeli soldiers who are deployed to shoot at children/teenagers who burn tires and throw stones act as if they are playing a game of paintball.

These soldiers also quickly gain rank in the Israeli army, earning in a matter of years what most other militaries would usually only issue to their forces after 10 to 15 years of service. These are entitled individuals whose minds aren’t focused and especially over the past decades have become ill-disciplined, permitted to get away with all kinds of decisions they take on an individual basis. It is a citizens' army, which means that they are very much part of the society as a whole.

If we look at the actions they have been able to commit during armed confrontations, especially inside the Gaza Strip, it is no wonder that they feel emboldened to take matters into their own hands at this time too. This is exemplified through the trend over the past year where their fighters have filmed themselves committing all kinds of crimes and perverted activities, posting this onto social media. 

These videos that are posted gleefully on online platforms like Tiktok, where Israeli soldiers wear the underwear of Palestinian women they displaced and killed or blow up/bulldoze civilian homes, are not only reflective of a lack of discipline but also hurt the objectives of the Zionist entity too. 

The following are two such cases that highlight how the soldiers damaged the Israeli army’s war efforts: 1) The instant release of information and photos/videos of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, which prevented their superiors from creating a false story about what happened and inflicting a psychological blow. 2) Israeli forces who seized the Rafah Crossing in May filmed themselves callously destroying the site and insulting the Egyptian army while committing an action that technically violated the normalization agreement between Cairo and “Tel Aviv”.

So why can the Israeli army not just clear up this problem? Well, we all saw what happened when 10 soldiers were detained over the gang-rape of a Palestinian detainee; who was being held at the Sde Teiman detention facility without any charge. This led to protests where thousands of Israelis rioted and stormed military facilities in what were dubbed the “right to rape” demonstrations. However, it wasn’t just protesters, the idea of the right of soldiers to gang-rape prisoners was expressed by members of the Israeli Knesset and received support from a large segment of the public.

Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that if the Israeli high command gives the order to begin prosecuting its soldiers for posting videos of themselves burning homes in Gaza and defecating on the floors of houses or committing a litany of other disgusting actions, they would face an internal uprising against such decisions.

What is the Israeli military strategy?

Understanding that Israeli society is inextricably linked to the armed forces, it also helps to shape how we view the mindset of this military. For instance, while in most societies around the world, a civilian death is perceived as more damaging than the death of a soldier, this is precisely the opposite for Israelis. This partly comes down to the supremacist myth of Israeli superiority and also the fact that soldier deaths have not been all that common, with the exception of occasional lone-wolf attacks here and there.

The doctrine of the Israeli military is roughly congruent with that of the US’ Counterinsurgency model that emerged during the so-called “War on Terror” in the early 2000s, yet it differs in key dimensions that make it way less effective than the American military.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, the Israeli military enjoyed asymmetry on the battlefield, heavily relying on their air force to respond to aggression with a significant force that would complete missions and achieve tactical victories at a very low cost to military personnel. While relying on their superior military vehicles/aircraft during the years of the Second Intifada (2000-2005), the Israelis managed to inflict a defeat on the West Bank-based Resistance groups, the most significant blow being delivered during their 2002 “Operation Defensive Shield” that resulted in around 500 Palestinians being killed.

In the year 2000, the Zionist regime withdrew from South Lebanon - as the situation became costly to their forces - then in 2005, they decided to do the same in the Gaza Strip after failing to crush Hamas during a battle that took place in northern Gaza back in October of 2004. 

However, as the Zionists discovered in their 2006 war on Lebanon and later in their countless wars against Gaza, they were now facing a new kind of threat that today they describe as “rocket-based terror armies." Throughout the past nearly two decades, the Zionist military believed that it could manage the threats posed by both the Palestinian and Lebanese Resistance, needing only to periodically attack in order to maintain “deterrence”.

Yet, between 2019 and 2020, the Israeli military began recalculating and released two important publications: “The Momentum Multiyear Plan” and “The Operational Concept for Victory”. In these documents, it is clear that the Israelis were seeking to adapt to their newly faced challenges. It presents a plan to integrate the developments of the technological “fourth industrial revolution” into military planning, noting that the short military operations that the Zionist armed forces had committed were not delivering the desired image of victory in the face of Iran’s ever-growing military power.

Therefore, the Israelis sought to implement a system that would link all their technological surveillance, reconnaissance, and spyware devices together. We see that in 2021, this new system begins coming into practice as the Zionists brag about their AI systems that helped them conduct the 11-day Gaza war in May of that year. The idea here was to use this system that would be eventually fully integrated to enable the Zionist entity to strike first and deliver undeniable blows resulting in strategic victory.

Then came October 7, when the Hamas-led Operation Al-Aqsa Flood flipped the world upside down for an overconfident Israeli military and its leadership. Suddenly, they were the side that had to muster a response to a blow that completely embarrassed them on every single level, delivered by the least powerful bastion of resistance they faced.

Understanding the Israeli strategy, it shouldn’t come as a surprise also that Hezbollah instantly began targeting the Zionist regime's reconnaissance and spyware technology during its first phase of the war either.

If we look at their Counterinsurgency strategy in Gaza on the ground, we see that, unlike the US military, they don’t allow infantry to go through and clear buildings before tanks enter an area, instead they use armored vehicles to protect their soldiers and reduce the number of deaths. But the problem with this improvised US Counterinsurgency strategy is that in reducing soldier deaths, it also makes it nearly impossible to properly combat the fighters that they are supposed to be seeking out. 

This is because the Israelis are simply too cowardly to follow a traditional Counterinsurgency strategy, attempting to perform this task without the required risk it involves. In the absence of anything to show for their ground operations, which are designed to keep their ill-prepared and ill-disciplined soldiers out of harm's way, they began to just destroy more and more civilian infrastructure. 

What has occurred before our eyes is that the Israelis have been knocked back to their armed strategies of the 1970s, where we see today that they are trying to besiege the Palestinian Resistance in northern Gaza the way they besieged the Egyptian military in 1973. Yet, in the current war inside the Gaza Strip, the Israeli ground forces aren’t prepared for the kind of strategies that were implemented during the October war.

The Israelis needed to reinstate their military dominance and were suddenly placed in the worst possible position, knowing only how to use their technology to kill from a distance, and appearing to have no coherent ground strategies, they were forced to use this rather useless army to achieve extremely difficult goals that their air force and AI tech couldn’t perform for them. In light of this understanding, genocide became the choice and the strategy.

In the past, civilian massacres weren’t simply used for the purpose of shedding blood for no reason - although the Zionist regime had no issue with this at all - the massacres that we saw periodically in Gaza were committed with the goal of inflicting real psychological blows on the Resistance and Palestinian public; in addition to sending a message to the wider region. This time, it is an uncontrolled mass slaughter campaign, allowing their racist unhinged soldiers to do whatever they choose to butcher innocent people and completely destroy the infrastructure of the Gaza Strip.

Why? The Zionist entity realized that it had no military options left and the only way to achieve a victory and rescue the image of strength they had lost was to unleash a genocide, to kill, displace, and destroy everyone and everything. Even their tactical achievements in Lebanon around a month ago are today being swept away by Hezbollah, to which they have no real answer. To their peril, it has become obvious that assassinations and booby-traps cannot achieve a strategic victory and in face-to-face combat, the Lebanese Resistance is clearly superior to them.