In the last two years, Pakistan has witnessed a large increase in terrorist attacks: Pakistani Taliban, ISIS, and some Baloch and Sindhi separatists have been revived. 

Terrorist groups have maintained their camps and personnel in Afghanistan, and the return of militants and extremists to Pakistan has threatened the country’s internal security and stability.

Despite some progress exerted by Islamabad in pressuring the leaders of the Taliban to stop Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan’s activity (TTP), the gap between Islamabad's expectations and the performance of the Afghan Taliban is too wide.

Taliban seeks to maintain the position of TTP in Pakistan. But what Pakistan expects from the Afghan Taliban is to limit and suppress the TTP. Islamabad does not want the Taliban to become a practical model for the Pakistani Taliban and is determined to avoid the unfortunate consequences of an imminent TTP-ISI-K alliance.

From the perspective of many in Islamabad, responding to the Taliban's demand and paying for the movement of TTP fighters is nothing less than paying the ransom. and seems to be the only short-term solution and temporary peace.

However, the senior officials of Pakistan's army and intelligence chiefs warned the Taliban in their recent trip to Kabul that if there is no pressure on TTP, Pakistan will also attack Afghanistan. But the reality is that the country's deteriorating economy is limiting Pakistan's military options. From this point of view, the end of diplomacy with the Taliban would lead to an operation in the border areas inside Afghanistan.

On the other hand, pan-Pashtuns and Taliban nationalists do not want to stabilize the Durand border. Therefore, Islamabad is putting pressure on the Taliban to practically recognize Durand, but the policy of the Taliban proved to be non-cooperative. Also, Islamabad does not want the Taliban nationalists to win over the extremists in the Taliban's internal power struggle and pay attention to territorial claims about Durand and Pashtunistan. In addition, the Taliban's priority is to establish economic cooperation, regional relations, trade with Pakistan, and ensure that political and security concerns do not affect economic relations.

On the other hand, having railway lines gives easy access to trade between Pakistan and Central Asian countries, and Afghanistan could be a potential corridor. Gwadar port could also act as the main center for connecting Central Asia and Afghanistan.

In fact, achieving deeper economic relations with Afghanistan, resuming TAPI and railway projects, and opening new trade routes is also a priority for Pakistan, but this country has also tied bilateral economic cooperation to those concerns.

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Islamabad also does not want the Taliban to harm Pakistan's economy through its political and security approaches and monetary policy to regulate foreign exchange and trade. Also, Pakistan does not want the Taliban's water policy to continue with the reduction of Pakistan's water share. More than three million Afghan immigrants, both legal and illegal, are an increasing challenge in Pakistan. Pakistan considers humanitarian aid and the lifting of sanctions against Afghanistan a must in order to prevent a humanitarian crisis given the flow of millions of refugees in this country.

From this point of view, it is important to prevent the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and the dangerous consequences of the new wave of Afghan refugees toward the borders. In this regard, Islamabad has continued to advise the Taliban to form a comprehensive government in order to fight international terrorism and respect human rights and women's access to education.

Pakistan is well aware of the geographical importance of Afghanistan and wants the government of Kabul to stop India's influence. Recently, an Indian delegation visited Afghanistan. Pakistan expressed anger over these developments.

"Searching for strategic depth" in Afghanistan is still an important focus of Islamabad. There is some apprehension about the bilateral Taliban/India cooperation. In fact, Pakistan is trying to avoid any abuse of its internal weakness: support of militia groups, proxy forces, and separatists against Islamabad.

The future of relationships

The recent visit of Khawaja Muhammad Asif, Defense Minister and the head of Pakistan's Military Intelligence (ISI), to Kabul was the second visit of a high-level Pakistani security delegation to Taliban-dominated Afghanistan.

However, the Afghan Taliban either did not want or could not act in the direction of Pakistan's demands. But Islamabad has still decided not to unilaterally recognize the new government in Kabul.

Islamabad considers the prevention of civil war and more bloodshed in Afghanistan and the formation of ethnic war between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns throughout Afghanistan to the detriment of its interests, and has to do with the massive migration and its security implications.

Unlike in the 1990s, the Taliban is not very close to Pakistan. Therefore, despite the lack of widespread insistence on the formation of an inclusive government in Afghanistan, Islamabad considers it the only practical and accessible way in the current situation. Therefore, it is likely that with the participation of the Taliban and their opposition in the structure of a new transitional government in Afghanistan, the political balance in the future government of Afghanistan will be in favor of Islamabad. Because the complete control of factions and the balance of Afghanistan can partially satisfy Pakistan's demands in Afghanistan.

Taliban is still the closest group to Pakistan in Kabul. But the presence of anti-Pakistani groups in Afghanistan is also considered a very important threat. Meanwhile, the Taliban's behavior toward the TTP is seen as a test for the official identification of Taliban leaders.

It seems that Islamabad will try to control the behavior of the Taliban in such a way as to prevent more damage to its interests through approaches such as frequent border closures, visa restrictions, non-identification of the Taliban, strengthening border security, and improving monitoring and information gathering capabilities.

Despite the previous departure of the head of the Pakistani embassy in Kabul, the embassy in Kabul is still operating normally. Now, the increase of the embassy's activity, the facilitation of Afghan nationals' movement, and the reopening of the Torkham and Spin Boldak Chaman crossings, these all show that the tension has decreased to some extent. However, the relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban is on the edge of tension.