The (in)ability and (un)willingness of the Taleban

It is almost two years since the Taleban were conferred state power. Initially, there was talk of a "Taleban 2.0" – implying that they are no longer the "Taleban 1.0" of roughly 27 years ago… that they have changed and become somewhat more moderate (well, at least there must be some who changed) … that one must simply give them time and be patient.

And then there were reports of sudden infighting within the Taleban. One hoped, and still hopes, that the "moderate" faction will win the power struggle and that their policies will change. 

It may be that there truly exist some moderate Taleban and that they will one day be in charge… and everything, or at least some things, will change for the better: The Taleban will adapt to the demands of the UN and the "international community", girls will go to school, women will go to work, human rights and freedoms will be guaranteed… and, in the end, the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" will be internationally recognised.

In the meantime, the Taleban never tire of emphasising that "no danger will ever emanate from Afghan soil to neighbouring states or to the rest of the world". And, so far, such "danger" has not yet surfaced. (The occasional tensions on the borders with neighbouring countries are not of great consequence.) The potential for it, however, remains… Nowadays nothing is impossible and unimaginable.

In any case, the international media have been rather quiet about the Taleban. The people of the world have many grave and existential problems of their own. And the media is currently focussing on other issues.

The bits of news concerning Afghanistan and the Taleban have in fact become a wearying broken record: Girls are not allowed to go to school… Women are not allowed to go to work… the "international community" admonishes the Taleban and demands an "inclusive" government, respect for human rights and for women's rights – as conditions for the recognition of their regime… the neighbouring states continue to worry about their security…  whilst the UN expresses its concern over the situation affecting the population in Afghanistan. 

The Taleban sit back and pretend they don't understand anything. "If they don't recognise us, why should we meet their demands?" Zabihullah Mujahed, the Taleban spokesperson asked recently. And the broken record keeps on spinning...

And yet the Taleban are very well aware of the fact that they are the ones who must first meet these demands in order to attain recognition. It is an approach they are even familiar with, through the "culture of negotiation" they practice in their own Pashtun traditional tribal structures, namely the so-called "Jerga" ("council" in Pashto – a gathering that brings together representatives from the various communities with the aim of safeguarding the interests of all concerned), where problems are addressed amongst the tribes and mostly solved in a peaceful manner.

Why the Taleban do not apply this practice to their foreign policy boils down to a question of (in)ability and (un)willingness.

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The problem with their "(in)ability"…

Their "inability" is owing to the hierarchy and constraints in their religious structures that prevent them from doing so. They must all follow the orders and instructions of the "Supreme Leader" (the amir) unconditionally – with one exception: when the leader's order or instruction happens to contradict the Shariah code (following the Shariah code has always been a crucial prerequisite for an amir). In this case the Shariah has been determined by the supreme leader himself – the invisible Haibatollah Akhondzada in Kandahar...

Any public criticism and opposition to the supreme leader's orders, decrees and instructions is considered "baghâwat" (rebellion) against the Emirate and is severely punished (up to execution). This means that even the Taleban, who are supposedly moderate, cannot criticise the Amir's decisions, let alone oppose them.

The problem with their "(un)willingness"…

The interwovenness of the extremist religious Pashtun Taleban with the extremist Pashtun "nationalists", who drew their concepts from the racist ideology of Nazism at the beginning of the 20th century, plays a significant role here. To understand this, we need to take a small step back in history.

In 1919, when Amir Amanollah declared himself king and led the country to independence (from Britain), he began to hastily "modernise" the country and society along the lines of Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) and Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran. What he did to achieve this and why he ended up failing miserably is another story and is already described here for those interested. 

In the course of his "modernisation" agenda, Amanollah sent young men and women to Europe – most notably to Germany – to bring modernity to the country. Whether they actually brought this modernity back with them or not is also another matter. But they managed to import a very particular concept, the concept of "Aryan Supremacy"… which was then transposed to Pashtun society by Pashtun elites.

Their mentor and spiritual father within the royal court was "Mahmud Tarzi", the foreign minister and father-in-law of the king. Tarzi, who had spent most of his life abroad (in Europe, Syria and Turkey) since childhood, was himself a Pashtun, but he was not proficient in the Pashto language and composed his writings in Persian like all other scribes in the country. Nevertheless, he propagated the notion of Pashto identity and referred to the Pashto language as "Afghan" – which he elevated to the "mother of all languages" (in the world!) – and demanded that it be the only legitimate and official language of Afghanistan. Accordingly, the identity of all citizens had to be "Afghan", i.e. Pashtun.

What followed was Pashtun autocracy – with the Pashtuns holding sway over all other peoples of Afghanistan and laying claim to the land as their "legitimate" possession. And thus, Pashtun Supremacy was born… which pervaded the minds of the Pashtun elites, revised the history of Afghanistan, and shaped government legislation – with a particular focus on cultural policies – in all Pashtun governments to this day.

The policies of Pashtunisation were at times implemented openly with brute force and at other times covertly with gentler methods. Even those Pashtuns who embraced Marxist ideology were ultimately not immune to the influence of Pashtun Supremacy.

The current situation in which the Taleban find themselves favours the "nationalist" aspirations of those belonging to the Pashtun elites. (Note: To speak of something "nationalist" here is in itself a curiosity, because there is no Afghan "nation".) The so-called moderate Taleban – who ostensibly have nothing against girls' education and women's employment – want this situation to persist so that the resettlement policy and the Pashtunisation of the language can proceed smoothly.

Part 2 of this essay will follow soon.