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To understand how Ansar Allah-led Yemen defeated an apparently superior military force, led by Washington, and then directly confronted the Israelis and their sponsors in the Red Sea, we should return to the values and ideology of the movement. 

Ansar Allah ideology comes from the Quranic Project of Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houhti, who was killed in 2004 during the six northern wars, carried out by the late President Saleh, following a green light from US President George W. Bush (Root 2013), as part of his "war on terror"; even though Saleh himself had been linked to Al-Qaeda (Jordan 2015). This Quranic Project shares values with many independence movements, some with the Iranian Revolution, along with some of its own distinct features.

Ansar Allah is a movement, not a party like Hezbollah. Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, head of the Supreme Revolutionary Committee (SRC), said, “The revolution is every member within the … Yemeni fabric who rejects corruption and … upholds values and freedom, rejects tyranny, guardianship, invasion and occupation and resists aggression, siege and blind subservience” (Almahfali and Root 2020; Sputnik Arabic 2018). The Yemeni people “are a people who reject injustice, humiliation, subjugation, arrogance and conceit. They are a people who, by nature, carry within their culture and awareness a revolutionary sense … [they] have always rallied and moved with those who reject colonialism … those who stand with the invader are rejected and denounced and remain agents and mercenaries in the eyes of the popular majority” (Sputnik Arabic 2018).

This movement grew with a charismatic leader, Sayyed Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, but it is not a personality cult. Sayyed al-Houthi “had a leadership personality, everyone that knew him loved him,” said Abdulkareem Jadban, an MP from Saada. “He urged people to face the [North] American hegemony after 9/11” (Root 2013). His ideas remain important, as should be obvious from the strong growth of Ansar Allah in the 20 years since Hussein’s death. 

We could speak of the values of Ansar Allah under six themes: the defense of an independent nation and culture; Islamism through Quranic values; a culture of resistance in the face of hegemonic attack; clear identification of the enemy; social inclusion and avoidance of war; and the persistence of Yemeni customary law and tribal governance.

Understandings of these values are particularly important in view of several Western war myths that Ansar Allah are “Houthi rebels” who are “Iran’s proxies” and part of a “Shia crescent” destabilizing the Arabian Peninsula and the region. These myths disguise the revolution of 2011-2014, underline the refusal to recognize the new government in Sanaa, and help bolster UNSC resolutions, which legitimized the dirty war and siege of the country.

Some of the better Western analyses of Ansar Allah appreciate its local origins and that it has been influenced, but not determined or controlled, by the Iranian revolution (Gordon and Parkinson 2018); and that it builds on nationalist and republican roots which recognize religious traditions and authority (Almahfali and Root 2020). But most tend to turn against the Yemeni revolution for its Islamism and incompatibility with bourgeois liberalism (i.e. Anglo-American corporate rule with a semblance of individual liberties). 

Despite that deep prejudice, there is huge popular interest in how Ansar Allah-led Yemen defeated the US-Saudi-Emirati aggression and then came fearlessly to the direct defense of the Palestinian people under attack by the Israelis in Gaza. I suggest the answers to these questions lie in popular support for Ansar Allah values. So what are those values and how are they seen in practice?

First, as an independence movement, Ansar Allah aims to protect and defend indigenous, inclusive Yemeni culture and values in the face of foreign intervention. This is a common theme of all anti-imperial and anti-colonial movements, including the Islamic Revolution of Iran.

The defense of independent cultures, values, and nations is a key global theme. We could go further, arguing that the central polemic today is not capitalism versus socialism or liberal democracy versus the rest, but rather a globalist dictatorship versus independent nations. In a supposedly post-colonial era, we still see this struggle for independence across Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Arab and Muslim world. 

Anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and anti-Zionism – counter-hegemonic struggles – are all consequences of this drive for political, economic, and social independence. In Yemen, despite the important national unification of the 1990s, there remained a corrupt regime that collaborated with the imperial power and its agents, making use of sectarian groups to divide and rule the nation.

Second, Ansar Allah shares with the Iranian Revolution an Islamic foundation of independent values based on the Quran – humility, honor, self-sacrifice, social justice, and social inclusivity – values which inform and sit alongside nationalism, anti-imperialism, and anti-Zionism (Panah 2008: ch.3; Almahfali and Root 2020). 

Ansar Allah, from its Zaydi roots, while recognizing the Prophet’s Holy Family (Ahlul Bayt) and the Sayyed lineage, does not share the Shia doctrine of Twelve Imams (including the Mahdi) nor does it accept the infallibility of Imams (Almahfali and Root 2020). Mandated struggle against the unjust rule is one feature that the Zaydi tradition has in common with the Shia. In the tradition of Zayd ibn Ali, true imams must fight corrupt rulers; but imams are neither divinely ordained nor infallible and this leads to greater jurisprudence in Islamic law, preventing the idea of an imamate or strict religious rule (Almahfali and Root 2020). 

Sayyed Hussein was deeply impressed by Iran’s Khomeini and Lebanon’s Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah because of their firm principles. He said of Khomeini and Nasrallah that, in their application of Islamic values, “we do not notice the doctrinal side,” and so there is room for jurisprudence (Almahfali and Root 2020). So, while the historic sacrifice of Imam Hussein (a central Shia theme) has entered Ansar Allah’s broad Islamic tradition, other more secular or non-doctrinal themes have developed, such as Sayyed Abdul-Malik al-Houthi’s stress on nationalism and social justice. 

Recognizing the legacy of the leader of the Iranian Revolution, Sayyed Hussein said, “Imam Khomeini was a blessing to the Arabs if they had wanted liberation from Israel." Sayyed Khomeini was “a great leader with a correct vision and a strong people." It has been said that Iran’s Islamic Revolution both “does and does not” influence Ansar Allah (Almahfali and Root 2020). Ansar Allah extends the Zaydi principle of “commanding what is just and forbidding what is wrong” (Almahfali and Root 2020).

Importantly, Ansar Allah also parallels Sayyed Khomeini in placing a similar emphasis on a pure Islam of “the downtrodden and humble … the barefooted” [Al-Mustadh'afin] as opposed to what he called “American Islam … the Islam of comfort and luxury … of compromise and ignominy, the Islam of the indolent” (ITF 2014) – following the Quranic declaration (al Qassas 28:5) of “our favour on the oppressed."

That responsibility to the oppressed and downtrodden [Al-Mustadh'afin] was fundamental to both Sayyed Khomeini’s initiatives in support of Palestine and to Ansar Allah’s Red Sea operations, after the Resistance's Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. 

Nevertheless, Ansar Allah leaders have made it clear that Yemen’s governance is for Yemenis to decide. “There is no Iranian intervention in Yemen. and the Saudis can inspect the missiles [we fire] … they are purely Yemeni made … We reject any sort of foreign intervention either by the Saudis, the Americans, the Egyptians or the Iranians” (Mohamed Ali al-Houthi in Ya Libnan 2015). 

Third, dedicated resistance is a step beyond simple claims of political independence. Resistance is a commitment in the face of a hegemonic attack. Ansar Allah stresses active defense of the nation and culture in the face of those who “occupy our countries and wage war against our religion” (Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi 2001b). That includes the duty toward other oppressed Arab and Muslim peoples, especially the Palestinians. One Ansar Allah leader explained to me: we oppose war, but fighting in self-defense and in defense of the oppressed is both permitted and mandated. This moral obligation to support the oppressed comes before political considerations and helps explain Ansar Allah’s unhesitating confrontation with the Israelis and the Anglo-Americans.  

An Ansar Allah cultural leader explained to me that, historically, the Muslim communities in Yemen’s highlands, farther away from colonial invasions (mainly Zaydi), had maintained a stronger resistance to invading cultures than those (mainly Shafi) on the coast. 

Secular parallels are made to stress the necessity of resistance and social transformation, in defense of indigenous culture. Mohamed Ali al-Houthi said, “The scale of the conspiracy [against Yemen] has pushed the people to engage in a long-term battle until … victory, just as revolutions around the world, including the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, triumphed” (Sputnik Arabic 2018). 

The steadfastness of Ansar Allah has become a thing of legend. They have repeatedly vowed to maintain their support for Gaza even after multiple bombing attacks by the Israelis and the Anglo-Americans (Abdul Malik al-Houthi 2025). Those Red Sea operations have established the Yemeni resistance as an icon for the world (Tuboltsev 2025). Even conservative British bodies recognize that the Yemenis are “diversifying their alliances and deepening their military capabilities, leveraging regional conflicts and pragmatic partnerships to expand their influence beyond the Iranian-led ‘axis of resistance’” (Ardemagni 2024). Hundreds of thousands of Yemenis have rallied in support of these commitments by Ansar Allah leaders (MNA 2025).

Fourth, clear identification of the enemy is a distinct emphasis in Ansar Allah's ideology. Sayyed Hussein put this in the context of a world where North Americans elevated former collaborators like Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein to the status of ‘enemies’ of the imperial powers, but these were false stories designed to fool people. “Thus they direct people towards imaginary figures and illusory danger." We are in a “civilizational struggle,” and “the Jews know who really poses a threat to them,” and this is why in Iran they chant “Death to America, death to Israel” (Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi 2001a). 

In this deceptive world, Yemen must clearly identify its enemies, including cultural enemies, so as to empower and focus the masses in their popular struggle. Hussein added we must “train ourselves and our children to carry enmity towards the enemies of God – the Jews and the Christians.” Borrowing from Iran but building its distinct Yemeni character, Hussein railed against the US attempts “to force their culture upon us, to occupy our countries and to wage a war against our religion” (Almahfali and Root 2020).

While Ansar Allah shares with Iran the slogans “Death to America, Death to Israel”, in their political sense of opposing those regimes, Sayyed Hussein also demanded recognition of the cultural assault from “Jews and Christians”. Has “the Ummah [Islamic community] reached a point where it cannot stand up to the Jews?” he asked. Quoting the Quran (Al Baqarah 2:120), he said, “Never will the Jews or the Christians be satisfied with you until you follow their religion” (Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi 2001a). By this, he means they force us to adopt their ideas and terminology. 

Hussein spoke of the need to “train ourselves and our children to carry enmity towards the enemies of God – the Jews and the Christians. Enmity in Islam is positive and important. If you carry genuine enmity towards America and Israel, if the leaders carry genuine enmity, and if Muslims carry genuine enmity, then they will prepare themselves to be able to face the confrontation. But if there is no real enmity then they will not prepare” (Hussein Badr Din al Houthi 2001b).

The same confusion applies to opposing a particular Israeli regime rather than the usurping entity itself. Hussein said, in his time, they spoke of “Sharon’s government [referring to former Israeli PM Ariel Sharon] but not Israel ... Israel is not considered a problem, not even its existence is seen as a problem. So they say Sharon’s government” (Hussein Badr Din al Houthi 2001b). 

The cultural influence of these Western colonial cultures, beyond just the invading occupation projects and the Zionist entity, was therefore part of the enemy that sought to “wage war on our religion." Hussein decried the colonization of Arabic and Islamic language so that, for example, “jihad” (in its original sense of a holy or spiritual struggle) has been virtually disqualified as an aim (Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi 2001b). 

Fifth, Ansar Allah leaders have stressed their commitment to social inclusion within Yemen and their desire to avoid war. There is much evidence of this. Mohamed Ali al-Houthi said, “Yemen has not fired the first shot in the war ... rather it is resisting and will triumph over the richest and strongest countries” (Sputnik Arabic 2018).

Recall that former President Ali Abdullah Saleh was the one who declared war against Ansar Allah and killed its leader Hussein in 2004. Nevertheless, after the Revolution and until the 2017 betrayal by Saleh, Ansar Allah included him in its Supreme Political Council. Many from the GPC, the main opposition party, are still included in Yemen’s revolutionary government. Others have defected to Ansar Allah from the Muslim Brotherhood. This is another reason why it is absurd to call the Sanaa government “Houthi rebels”.

Ansar Allah did not simply seize power in 2014; it filled a political vacuum left by the collapse of both Saleh’s regime and his transitional regime, plus the widespread rejection of the repartition proposals from the GCC (Popp 2015). 

After the US-Saudi coalition declared war on the Sanaa Government, Ansar Allah leaders were ready for peace talks in 2015, without conditions. It was the puppet Hadi regime, which made demands that Ansar Allah surrender territory before any talks, which killed that early peace process (Ya Libnan 2015).

Sixth, the preservation of customary law and tribal governance continues to play an important role in Yemen and has long had a relation to state law, but its composition has changed since the rise of Ansar Allah (Worth 2016).  

Tribal authority and mediation are used for everything from land disputes to justice over violent conflict (Mojalli 2015), and relations between local clan authorities have been a factor in the national war of liberation against the Coalition of Aggression and its sectarian agents. 

It has been said, by some hostile sides to Ansar Allah, that their system of regional supervisors or mushrifin (Carboni 2021; Mugahed 2022) has weakened tribal authority. 

Yet, principles of customary law seem to have remained well incorporated into Yemeni leadership and justice. In this way, traditional authority and many social norms remain embedded in Yemeni Islamic principles. For example, the use of the Yemeni dagger (jambiya) is regulated by both traditional and state law. It is often displayed, but there are penalties for withdrawing it or making threats with it. 

In sum, Ansar Allah is a genuine, Indigenous Yemeni movement that led the only real and successful revolution of the so-called "Arab Spring". It has been subject to dirty war and siege by Washington and its allies precisely because it is an independent movement. The Yemeni Revolution shares many values with the Iranian Revolution but remains a distinct revolutionary force and a key addition to the regional resistance, especially since the collapse of Damascus. The strength of the revolutionary government in Sanaa and its commitment to the Palestinians can best be appreciated through an understanding of the unique mix of Ansar Allah values and their mass support in Yemen.

For part 1/2: Understanding Yemen 1/2: The Revolution

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