Since the conclusion of the Iranian-Israeli war this June, pro-war think tanks responsible for influencing US government policy have been signalling the need for a second round of attacks against Iran and its nuclear program. Now they are picking up the heat.

Despite the boisterous and triumphant remarks coming from officials within the Trump administration, confidently claiming the complete destruction of Iranian nuclear facilities, behind the scenes Washington’s key think tanks appear to uphold a consensus view that the job is not done. 

Think tank panels, analysis, and policy recommendations for the US government’s next steps towards Iran have centred around the understanding that, short of an agreement which spells Iran’s declaration of regional defeat, another round of direct warfare will eventually be necessary. Yet, they often caveat this with the disclaimer that the next round must close the conflict for a long time and not drag things out until another round occurs.

In the interim period between wars, the role of these think tanks is crucial to shaping Washington’s understanding of the tasks at hand. Although by nature, what they are saying is always going to be propagandistic and pursuing a specific agenda; segments of their analyses and certain statements from conference panelists are far more useful than most stories published about Iran in the corporate media. If you pay attention to these think tanks, reading between the lines, it makes the logic behind US and Israeli policy make more sense.

On November 5, Kenneth M. Pollack and Reuel Marc Gerecht recently spoke at a panel hosted by the Washington-based pro-“Israel” Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) think tank, where they addressed the issue of linking US lessons from Iraq, in the post-Gulf War setting, to Iran after the 12-day war.

A few takeaways here were that while regime change should be a target, they also commented on the differences in confronting Iran, drawing key distinctions between Iranian leader Ayatollah Khamenei and former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Gerecht, a resident FDD scholar, makes it clear that Khamenei’s strategic thinking is much more complex, intelligent, and hence difficult to deal with.

Instead of advocating a repeat of the invasion of Iraq, they focus on strategies to weaken and isolate the Islamic Republic, including the aggressive pursuit of disarming Hezbollah in Lebanon and getting heavily involved in Iraq through the upcoming election cycle.

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A policy brief published by the FDD on November 7 specifically looks at the potential opportunities for the United States inside Iraq, framing the election as an influence battle between Tehran and Washington. It is clear that the ultimate goal is to pursue the disarmament of the Hashd al-Shaabi.

Interestingly, despite the propaganda often produced for think tanks like the Heritage Foundation, depicting the Islamic Republic as being at the brink of collapse and that the Iranian public will play a key role in this, the FDD’s Gerecht paints a starkly different picture. It appears as if his calculation is built on the assumption that the anti-government Iranian diaspora are not to be relied upon to achieve regime change. 

Gerecht also labels the son of the deposed Iranian dictator, Shah Reza Pahlavi, “Baby Shah”, as neither of the panelists appear to put great faith in the pro-regime change Iranian opposition, expressing the frustrations that often come along with working with them.

Meanwhile, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) has argued that Iran must be confronted over its growing confidence following the June war with "Israel". The policy analysis entitled “Iran’s Self-Confidence Returns?” lays out the argument that Tehran’s ballistic missile program appears to be the backbone of its defense strategy over that of using its allies.

This article centres around the public statements of Khamenei and the post-war assessments offered by senior Iranian officials, in addition to factoring in the strength and rebuilding process of Tehran’s ballistic missile program.

Without openly stating it, the WINEP piece appears to be getting at the idea that Iran must again be militarily punished due to its growing confidence and that a political deal, which Donald Trump voices interest in, is not a possibility. Overall, the piece makes a number of mistakes in its framing of Iranian confidence over the months, but also is a sober enough analysis to admit that Iran managed to land significant and damaging blows against the Israelis.

It is clear that the Israelis are currently in a difficult spot when it comes to carrying out a new series of attacks against Iran, and this comes down to the number of potential cards that Tehran has to play. This is especially the case in the event that the conflict expands and becomes regional.

Therefore, at least outwardly, the Israelis themselves appeared poised to target Lebanon next, an attempt to weaken the Lebanese Resistance significantly and thus isolate Iran in the event of a future prolonged confrontation.

Meanwhile, think tanks based in Washington are busy forging arguments as to why the United States must get involved in any future Israeli-Iranian war, understanding that this is necessary for “Tel Aviv” to achieve any kind of victory against an enemy that is too powerful for it to deal with alone.