FP: Why the Global South won't pick sides in US-China rivalry
6 Min Read
Developing countries want multiple partnerships, not binary choices. A Foreign Policy analysis reveals why developing nations resist choosing between the US and China, preferring strategic autonomy over forced alignment.
-
World leaders partake in the 17th annual BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Monday, July 7, 2025. (AP Photo/Eraldo Peres)
An analysis published in Foreign Policy magazine reveals why developing countries continue to strengthen ties with China despite mounting pressure from the United States to pick sides in the escalating great power competition. The piece, authored by foreign policy experts Galip Dalay and Dino Patti Djalal, challenges assumptions about how Global South nations view the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.
According to Dalay and Djalal's assessment, the Biden and Trump administrations' strategy of pressuring developing nations to make binary choices between the US and China is fundamentally flawed.
The authors give the example of when US President Donald Trump recently threatened tariffs against countries "aligning themselves with the anti-American policies of BRICS," which prompted Brazilian presidential advisor Celso Amorim to respond that such threats were actually "reinforcing our relations with the BRICS" because Brazil seeks "diversified relations and not depend on any one country."
This reaction illustrates a broader pattern that the authors identify throughout the developing world. Rather than viewing US-China competition through a Cold War lens of ideological confrontation, Global South countries approach it from a pragmatic perspective focused on their own development needs and strategic autonomy.
China's compelling economic offer
Dalay and Djalal emphasize that China's appeal to developing nations stems from concrete economic benefits rather than ideological alignment. As they note, China functions as an "infrastructure superpower" that directly addresses one of the Global South's most pressing needs. The authors report that China has invested more than $1.3 trillion in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects across developing countries over the past decade, far exceeding comparable Western initiatives like Europe's Global Gateway or America's Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.
Even when Chinese projects encounter problems, as the authors acknowledge has happened in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Malaysia, Kenya, and Zambia with issues including debt distress and governance concerns, Beijing has demonstrated flexibility in adjusting its approach. Dalay and Djalal highlight China's efforts to align the BRI with the African Union's Agenda 2063, showing adaptability that resonates with partner countries.
China has turned itself into the largest official creditor to low-income countries (larger than the World Bank and the IMF), with a massive increase in lending since the mid-2000s. pic.twitter.com/a5Lg44NP6P
— Philipp Heimberger (@heimbergecon) March 4, 2024
American retreat, Chinese opportunity
A key insight from the analysis concerns how American policy choices unwittingly boost China's position. While the US Agency for International Development closed offices worldwide, China's BRI-related contracts reached $125 billion. This retreat extends beyond the United States, as Britain, Germany, and France have also cut aid budgets to redirect resources toward defense spending, prioritizing hard power over soft power engagement.
According to the authors, this Western withdrawal creates opportunities that China actively exploits. While acknowledging that China itself has limited soft power, people may want Chinese goods but show less interest in Chinese culture or lifestyle, Dalay and Djalal argue that one of China's main sources of influence today comes from America's declining global appeal and leadership.
While the United States has been busy burning bridges, China has been building them.
— Jostein Hauge (@haugejostein) April 3, 2025
52 out of 54 countries in Africa now trade more with China than the United States. pic.twitter.com/p4GLnAVJs5
The authors illustrate how regional organizations navigate US-China competition through the example of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Rather than choosing sides, ASEAN has established comprehensive strategic partnerships with both the United States and China, simultaneously cooperating with China's Belt and Road Initiative and America's Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.
Dalay and Djalal extend this pattern to the Middle East, where countries maintain security relationships with the United States while deepening economic ties with China. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for instance, benefit from American security guarantees while also maintaining comprehensive strategic partnerships with Beijing. The authors argue that regional states see no contradiction in participating in multiple connectivity projects, viewing diversification as a hedge against dependency on any single power.
China's strategic narrative
An important element of Dalay and Djalal's analysis concerns how China positions itself as a member of the Global South rather than as an external power competing for influence. They quote Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's statement that "China is naturally a member of the global south, because we have fought colonialism and hegemonism together in history." This narrative resonates particularly strongly when contrasted with Trump's trade threats and tariff policies.
The authors note that China has reinforced this message through concrete actions, such as eliminating tariffs on 53 African countries while publishing the announcement under the title "China-Africa Changsha Declaration on Upholding Solidarity and Cooperation of the Global South."
A collection of nearly 300 surveys finds that positive views of China among citizens in Africa outweigh negative views by a factor of about 3:1. pic.twitter.com/5ZqPCwmXYp
— Jostein Hauge (@haugejostein) December 15, 2024
However, Dalay and Djalal caution that this narrative strategy has limitations. They point out that China and Global South countries often find themselves on opposite sides of negotiations, citing China's reluctance to participate in multilateral debt restructuring as the world's largest bilateral lender to developing countries.
Long-term concerns about Chinese hegemony
Despite China's current appeal, the Foreign Policy authors emphasize that Global South countries harbor significant reservations about potential Chinese dominance. They worry that once China achieves full superpower status, it may succumb to "hegemony syndrome" like other great powers throughout history.
Dalay and Djalal highlight particular concerns about Chinese behavior in regions of strategic priority, such as Southeast and East Asia, where Beijing might attempt to establish a China-centric order despite promoting multipolarity globally. The authors also note worries about the evolution of Chinese nationalism and whether it might become more assertive and reactive.
According to the analysis, Global South countries fundamentally prefer a multipolar international system that enhances their independence and agency. Global South nations learned from Cold War experiences, when bipolar competition led to regional fragmentation through alliance structures like NATO, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and the Baghdad Pact.
The authors conclude that developing countries view multipolarity not as an abstract concept but as a practical necessity for maintaining strategic autonomy. They want an international system offering multiple choices rather than one forcing them to align with either Washington or Beijing.
The bottom line
Dalay and Djalal's Foreign Policy analysis suggests that US efforts to counter Chinese influence through pressure tactics are counterproductive. Instead of forcing developing countries to choose sides, the United States would be better served by investing in making itself a more attractive partner while respecting Global South countries' desire for strategic autonomy.
The authors argue that the current approach, demanding binary choices without offering compelling alternatives, only pushes developing nations closer to China while failing to address the fundamental drivers of Chinese appeal in the Global South. For US policymakers, this analysis offers a sobering assessment of why current strategies may be achieving the opposite of their intended effects.
