'Israel' used Hannibal Directive on October 7: The Jerusalem Post
5 Min Read
The IAF was unprepared for the scale of the assault that came on October 7, with delays in deploying aircraft and reliance on heavy bombs unsuitable for urban combat.
-
Israeli police retrieve weapons used by Resistance fighters outside a police station in Sderot, occupied Palestine, Sunday, Oct. 8, 2023 (AP)
The Israeli occupation's Air Force disclosed Thursday for the first time details of a classified operation, code-named Sword of Damocles, which targeted Hamas commanders and headquarters in Gaza amid the implementation of the Hannibal Directive during Operation al-Aqsa Flood on October 7, The Jerusalem Post reported.
The Hannibal Directive is a controversial policy aimed at preventing the abduction of Israeli soldiers or settlers even if that is at the cost of their lives.
Hours after the operation began and at around 10:30 am, the IAF focused significant resources on eliminating the leadership of the Resistance within Gaza instead of prioritizing the settlements of the Gaza envelope.
Some Air Force sources have expressed regret over the decision to prioritize the Sword of Damocles, suggesting that more air power should have been directed at repelling the Resistance fighters who had breached the Gaza border.
Read next: Israeli Gaza Division defeated in 2 hours: Military October 7 probe
"If we had known all of the information being debated between IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi and IDF Southern Command Chief Maj.-Gen. Yaron Finkleman—such as the Israeli SIM cards activated by Hamas in Gaza—our response might have been different," one source stated, as reported by The Jerusalem Post.
Others within the Israeli occupation forces, particularly from the Southern Command, have defended the Sword of Damocles operation, arguing that the aerial strikes prevented an even larger influx of Resistance fighters. Israeli intelligence failures led them to believe that tens of thousands of Resistance fighters had barged in from Gaza instead of the over 5,000.
Delayed deployment of the Air Force
The IAF had originally planned for limited surveillance over Gaza that weekend, with only one drone monitoring the area. The assumption was that any significant escalation would be preceded by warning signs, allowing time to deploy reinforcements.
As Operation al-Aqsa Flood was launched, Halevi ordered additional aircraft to be positioned nearby, leading to the dispatch of two more drones.
Yet, Air Force and Operations Command officers further down the chain of command delayed moving a fighter jet from Ramat David Airbase in the north to Ramon Airbase, closer to Gaza, which meant many aircraft were not in position when the operation took place.
By the time the operation was in full-throttle, much of the Air Force was equipped with heavier bombs designed for large-scale destruction rather than precise strikes. These munitions were unsuitable for engagements involving Resistance fighters engaging the Israeli occupation forces in close proximity to Israeli settlers.
The Hannibal Directive
The Hannibal Directive was issued as part of the Israeli occupation's response, instructing forces to prevent the capturing of any settlers through lethal force. However, reports indicate that many Israeli pilots were hesitant to strike Hamas fighters due to the high risk of killing Israeli captives.
The Air Force carried out approximately 945 attacks, with helicopters alone firing 11,000 rounds. Out of the estimated 1,600 Hamas fighters martyred that day, the IAF believes it was responsible for around 1,000.
Complicating the aerial response, Hamas launched a barrage of 3,889 rockets in a short period, overwhelming the Israeli Iron Dome air defense system in the south.
As interceptor supplies were rapidly depleted, protection for key infrastructure, including airbases, diminished. Several southern runways sustained direct hits, requiring emergency repairs before they could resume operations, which subsequently delayed the aerial response to the operation.
Deafening blow
The Resistance's operation dealt a severe blow to the Israeli occupation forces within the first few hours, as the Gaza Division was effectively defeated within two hours. Additionally, most mid-level commanders, including battalion and company leaders, were killed in the early stages.
On top of the staggering losses, the commanders of three brigades were also eliminated, making for a total of 157 Israeli soldiers killed in the first three hours.
Israeli newspaper Walla! reported that Hamas targeted the air bases of the Israeli Air Force with heavy rocket fire, disrupting takeoffs, which subsequently caused further confusion in terms of the military response.
A separate investigation by Maariv described the Israeli occupation forces' military performance on October 7 as "a historic and unprecedented failure." A senior Israeli military official admitted, "The investigations into the events of October 7 do not provide satisfactory explanations."
Maariv commented on the report saying the Israeli Gaza Division was defeated in the first two hours of the war by Hamas.
