Can Iran impose a naval blockade on "Israel"? - Israeli reports
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The Israeli Israel Defense website publishes a new study by the Center for Marine Policy and Strategy Research analyzing the strength of Iran's naval force.
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Iranian destroyer Sahand sails in Persian Gulf waters in Bandar Abbas, Iran, on December 1, 2018 (AP)
The Israeli 'Israel' Defense newspaper published a new study by the name of "Greater Marine Strategic Assessment for Israel 22/2021," which attempts to answer the question of what Iran's naval arm is capable of doing. The study was conducted by Haifa University.
The study details the strength of the Iranian navy using unclassified and public information, pointing to several threats that could affect "Israel" in the naval arena.
Among other things, the report notes "defensive and offensive missions in the Gulf and assistance to "proxy" organizations under Iran's control, such as Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and, to some extent, the Gaza Strip," the Israeli news outlet said.
The power building signals to more distant arenas, the report said, namely "the Arabian sea and the southern Red Sea," in addition to "Egypt's Bab Al-Mandeb and the Syrian coast, for example settling in one of Syria's northern ports."
The report also highlights the theoretical possibility of an "Iranian intervention" in gas drilling in Lebanon if "Tel Aviv" and Beirut don't reach an agreement. If no agreement is reached, the report claims that Hezbollah and Iran would deter the Israeli occupation from harming "Iranian assets" in the drilling zones.
The report did not fully answer the title, not clarifying whether or not Iran would be able to impose a naval blockade on the occupation during combat. However, it identifies possible scenarios for the siege of the Suez Canal.
Regarding the threat of a naval blockade on "Israel", the report said that is a scenario in which traders cannot or do not want to reach Israeli ports, not to mention the threat of stopping the operations of the ports, as Iran and Hezbollah have the military capabilities to prevent them from operating.
In the case that ports are still operational, the question arises as to whether merchant fleets would continue docking in "Israel" under an Iranian attack on the Israeli maritime trade routes.
In that case, insurance companies would not agree to insure merchant fleets, so the Israeli occupation would most probably depend on Israeli-owned vessels, or alternatively, rely on those of allied countries, such as the United States, to bring goods to "Israel".
Another point of contingency is the length of maritime trade routes. In other words, according to the report, Iran does not have to operate in the Mediterranean of the coast off of occupied Palestine, an area of strategic importance to the Israeli occupation forces.
The report notes that Iran can operate in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, which reduces the IOF's advantage.
The occupation, on the other hand, surrounds itself with "friends, led by the US Navy. Even in these places, despite the IOF's inferiority, the collaborations constitute a force multiplier and deter the Iranian navy."
