Canada’s global security reporting program (GSRP), the controversial intelligence-gathering system managed by Canada’s Foreign Ministry, has been exposed by a watchdog report that says it operates in a “distinctly grey zone”, puts its officers at risk, and violates global diplomatic conventions.

An essential component of the foreign ministry’s security and intelligence footprint overseas, the GSRP deploys its officers in countries with “poor human rights records” such as Ethiopia, India, Egypt, Turkey, and "Israel".

The program has been shed light on recently after reports that Michael Spavor, a Canadian imprisoned in China for almost three years, was aiming for a multimillion-dollar settlement from Canada’s federal government, claiming he “unwittingly” gave intelligence on the DPRK to Michael Kovrig, a GSRP officer who shared it with Canada and “Five Eyes” allies.

Both Spavor and Kovrig were imprisoned from December 2018 to September 2021 on charges of espionage.

Diplomatic immunity?

However, the fresh investigation by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency dug up defective aspects of the program, such as the fact that officers lacked “adequate training”, and sufficient risk assessment and security protocols were not present to ensure officers, alongside their sources, were protected.

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The report was concluded three years ago but was not publicly released at the time due to worries over the political sensitivities of Kovrig and Spavor’s arrests in China.

The watchdog stated that “it was not clear if all officers understood that once they are no longer afforded diplomatic immunity, a receiving state may seek retaliatory measures against them”.

Reputational risks

Canada claims that the GSRP “generates focused diplomatic reporting on security and stability issues in countries of strategic interest to Canada”. 

Still, the probe argues that it “does not have appropriate safeguards in place” for the safety of contacts overseas, adding that the GSRP “does not appear to appreciate associated risks” of officers establishing a network of sources.

It continued to warn that “the creation of a foreign intelligence entity, within [Global Affairs, the Canadian foreign affairs ministry,] or the allowance of mission creep by the GSRP into covert collection would run against the principles of the Vienna Convention” which ensures diplomats can work without threat or fear of influence by the host government.

It added as a warning that GSRP officers depended on the Vienna convention to serve as a “shield” for their actions, but did not take into consideration the “limitations” of diplomatic immunity.

The oversight agency explained how receiving nations' view of GSRP activities “have direct implications on reputational risk to Canada and its allies”, which was reiterated by Stephanie Carvin, a former national security analyst and a professor of international relations at Carleton University.

Carvin noted that the controversy surrounding the program only stresses the need for Canada to better comprehend the ways in which intelligence gathering by the GSRP might be perceived by other countries.

“But it also highlights the consequences of Canada’s indecision of whether or not it wants to have a foreign human intelligence agency,” she said, adding that even though “Canada may not want an MI6... it also wants information from people living overseas about the countries they are living in. The resulting situation is very grey.”