Amid an absence of any signs of an imminent ceasefire in Gaza and undeterred Yemeni operations in the Red Sea, the EU's efforts to address the current Israeli aggression on Gaza and its wider regional implications continue to falter.

That's the take offered by Brussels-based foreign policy expert Eldar Mamedov who contended that the EU formally initiated its naval operation in the Red Sea on February 19 with the "aim of safeguarding international commercial shipping" from the Yemeni Armed Forces' operations after weeks of deliberations.

The YAF assert that their main objectives are to compel "Israel" to agree to an unconditional ceasefire in Gaza and end the blockade on the Strip.

However, despite the ongoing challenges in achieving a ceasefire, the Yemeni operations inflict tangible costs on EU member states. Paolo Gentiloni, the EU Commissioner for the Economy, recently estimated that rerouting shipping from the Red Sea has extended delivery times for shipments between Asia and the EU by 10 to 15 days, leading to an associated cost increase of approximately 400%.

Approximately 40% of the EU's overall trade with the Middle East and Asia relies on the Red Sea route. In Mamedov's view, safeguarding this shipping route is, therefore, a crucial shared economic and security concern for the EU. However, out of the 27 member states, only four have committed to contributing warships to the new operation, and these are France, Germany, Italy, and Belgium. Spain, while refraining from using its veto power to oppose the initiative, opted not to participate. From the beginning, Spain expressed concerns that any military actions could alleviate pressure on "Israel" to agree to a ceasefire in Gaza.

The gist of Mamedov's argument is the effectiveness of this new EU operation in addressing Yemen's operations, considering its solely defensive mandate to offer "situational awareness, accompany vessels, and protect them against possible attacks at sea." As per the mandate, the EU warships involved will be allowed to engage Yemeni targets only in response to an attack on themselves or the commercial vessels under their protection. This allegedly excludes the possibility of pre-emptive action against  Ansar Allah's missile batteries or associated targets.

The alleged defensive character of the operation may not be sufficient to dissuade Ansar Allah from targeting European ships listed under the ban. Yemeni leaders explicitly cautioned Italy, a key proponent of the new operation, that it would be considered a target if it participated in attacks on Yemen.

Mamedov questions, "If this threat comes to fruition, will the EU authorize offensive action against the Houthis, potentially drawing itself into a wider conflict? Will it rely on U.S. hard power for protection given that Washington is already engaged against the Houthis through “Operation Prosperity Guardian,” in which a few EU nations – Denmark, Netherlands and Greece, as well as non-EU NATO members Britain and Norway -- are also participating?"

"Would such developments not lead to a de facto merging of the U.S. and EU-led operations under Washington’s lead — an outcome Europeans sought to avoid and which is the very reason why they launched their own mission in the first place?"

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As a matter of fact, the failure of numerous US- and UK-led strikes to significantly diminish Ansar Allah's capabilities raises practical concerns, as per Mamedov.

The announcement of the EU's mission coincided with the targeting of a British cargo ship in the Gulf of Aden, claiming it as the YAF's most substantial attack to date.

Ironically, the EU could avoid direct military engagement with Yemen by reducing the number of targets in the Red Sea and encouraging ships to reroute. However, such a strategy would validate Ansar Allah's approach to imposing costs on Western powers for their perceived failure to halt the war in Gaza, the author contended.

"And that brings us back to the mother of all conflicts in the Middle East: the continuing war in Gaza. The EU’s approach so far has been to delink Gaza from the crisis in the Red Sea and the broader escalation in the region, including clashes between Israel and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Yet mounting tensions on that front show that its approach is not working."

Certain EU actors recognize the pressing need for a Gaza ceasefire as a crucial step toward regional de-escalation. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell has been notably outspoken in criticizing "Israel", proposing restrictions on arms sales to "Tel Aviv" due to perceived violations of EU guidelines against selling to nations accused of breaching international humanitarian law.

A Dutch appeals court recently ordered a suspension of F-35 jet parts exports to "Israel" for the same reasons. However, it is improbable that the entire EU would collectively adopt such a stance, as several member countries, particularly Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, strongly back "Israel".

A more potent leverage point could involve the partial or complete suspension of the association agreement between the EU and "Israel", considering that the EU stands as "Israel's" largest trading partner, as per Mamedov.

In 2023, this agreement facilitated a bilateral trade worth 46.8 billion euros. The leaders of Spain and Ireland, Pedro Sanchez and Leo Varadkar, respectively, have urged the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, to swiftly reassess whether "Israel" is violating the human rights clauses embedded in the agreement. The Spanish Foreign Minister, Jose Manuel Albares, emphasized the urgency of completing this review before the upcoming EU foreign ministers meeting on March 18.

A complete suspension of the agreement appears improbable, as it necessitates a unanimous decision from all member states, even if the Commission determines that "Israel" has breached its human rights commitments. A partial suspension, on the other hand, would demand a qualified majority, requiring support from 55% of member states (equivalent to 15 out of 27) representing 65% of the total population of the EU.
 
Last week, the EU faced challenges in issuing an official plea to "Israel", discouraging it from executing a ground invasion of Rafah, the southernmost city in Gaza, where nearly a million refugees have sought refuge. Despite Hungary's veto threat, the other 26 member states opted for a collective statement cautioning against the potential catastrophic humanitarian impact of such an invasion.

"Notably, however, Hungary was isolated in its opposition to the appeal as Germany and other member states that have traditionally been reluctant to criticize Israel’s conduct of war were on board. That is a step forward, but it’s too little and it comes too late. As long as the EU keeps avoiding imposing real consequences on Israel for its conduct, it will keep losing influence in the Middle East," Mamedov concluded by saying.

Read next: What the West needs to know about Yemen's Ansar Allah