Israeli field observers monitoring the Israeli fronts in the north and south say their leaders are ignoring them, just as they did before Operation al-Aqsa Flood. 

Over the past year, members of the all-female military unit known as field observers have attempted to track Hezbollah fighters as they navigate narrow alleys and green valleys, adjusting and readjusting launch pads, approaching the border fence, and then retreating.

These observers, aged 18 to 20, were responsible for identifying and reporting numerous drones, mortars, missiles, and anti-tank rockets that have flown over northern occupied territories since October. 

However, a year after the war on Gaza began, these soldiers say "Israel" is still not making enough effort to address this type of "threat."

The field observers near Gaza were among the first to raise alarms about the Palestinian resistance and Hamas’s preparations for a large-scale attack, and they were also among the first to be killed or taken captive.

As Israeli aggression increases in Lebanon, field observers who monitor Hezbollah fighters—whom Israeli officials allege have been formulating similar plans for years—fear they will meet the same fate.

One observer near the border with Lebanon, who spoke on condition of anonymity by Israeli military protocol, said that they were unprotected and in danger, adding that their superiors “only want to shut us up, to not come to them with complaints, so they’re ignoring us even more.”

Many field observers attribute this partially to the ingrained misogyny in the Israeli occupation forces (IOF) where men dominate decision-making ranks.

More broadly, the observers point to a heavy, unmanageable bureaucracy that prioritizes technology over field intelligence in Gaza and remains resistant to structural change and accountability.

Israelis widely used Hannibal Directive on Oct.7: Israeli report

Mismanagement is deeply rooted within the Israeli occupation, as seen on October 7. Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported in July that during Operation al-Aqsa Flood, the Israeli occupation forces (IOF) routinely used a command that allowed soldiers to murder their own soldiers, namely the infamous Hannibal Directive.

The Israeli Air Force targeted at least three military facilities and outposts during the operation and the IOF opened fire on the walled separation barrier dividing Gaza and "Israel," when Israelis were being taken captive.

According to a source in the Israeli Southern Command, the region was designed to become a "killing zone," while another commanded that "not a single vehicle can return to Gaza."

These instructions are known as the "Hannibal Directive," requiring the IOF to take all measures to avoid the capture of Israeli soldiers, including murdering them.

Haaretz's investigation was based on records and testimony from troops, mid-level, and senior army commanders and data indicated that many taken captive were subjected to Israeli gunfire and "were in danger."

According to Haaretz, Israeli commanders took decisions early on October 7 based on unverified intelligence with one source citing "crazy hysteria," adding that "No one had a clue about the number of people kidnapped or where army forces were."

An Israeli source told Haaretz that any person making a decision "knew that our combatants in the area could be hit as well."

Another order directed all units to fire mortars against the Gaza Strip, despite the occupation's feeble knowledge of the locations of soldiers and citizens. The order was expanded later to prohibit any vehicle from entering Gaza.

A source in the Southern Command told Haaretz that "Everyone knew by then that such vehicles could be carrying kidnapped civilians or soldiers," adding that "everyone knew what it meant to not let any vehicles return to Gaza."