From al-Mokha to Bab al-Mandab: YAF's strategic advance takes shape
YAF captured al-Mokha and Bab al-Mandab rapidly, undoing nearly three years of Saudi-Emirati investment on Yemen's western coast.
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Sanaa now holds a commanding position on the Yemeni side of Bab al-Mandab, a corridor carrying global trade, energy supplies, and some of the world’s most important subsea cables (Illustrated by Batoul Chamas for Al Mayadeen English)
The Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF) announced Friday that a large-scale operation launched earlier this month had expelled Saudi-backed formations from six districts across Taiz and Hodeidah governorates, culminating in the capture of the historic Red Sea port of al-Mokha and the advance to Dhubab and Mayyun Island, which sits at the narrowest point of the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
In a statement issued Thursday, YAF spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Saree said the operation, codenamed "And Allah Is Stronger in Might and More Severe in Punishment," was launched September 3 and covered 5,400 square kilometers, striking seven military divisions comprising 38 brigades and downing nine Saudi aircraft.
The Saudi-backed government confirmed to AFP that the YAF had completed its takeover of the Bab al-Mandab area and Mayyun Island, while officials told Reuters that their own forces had withdrawn from the island.
The YAF released a statement on Friday detailing the operation they carried out on September 9 along Yemen's western coast, saying it was conducted along several fronts with the participation and support of the Yemeni people and their tribes.
— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) September 11, 2026
Brigadier General Yahya Saree… pic.twitter.com/PkXwN03DLa
What changed hands this week was a stretch of coastline that sits astride one of the world's most important maritime choke points, a position that took a Saudi-Emirati coalition close to three years to build the first time around and that Sanaa has now retaken in a matter of days.
Why Bab al-Mandab, al-Mokha matter
Bab al-Mandab, Arabic for the Gate of Tears, connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, making it one of the world's most critical maritime choke points. Roughly 10 to 15 percent of global maritime trade and millions of barrels of crude oil and fuel daily transit through this narrow channel toward the Suez Canal. Whoever commands the coastlines of Bab al-Mandab holds decisive leverage over the trade routes linking Asia, the Arab world, and Europe.
In the past few days, headlines were flooded with reports about the Yemeni city of al-Mokha as Sanaa reclaimed it from Saudi-backed forces.
— Al Mayadeen English (@MayadeenEnglish) September 11, 2026
The coastal city overlooks the significant Bab al-Mandab Strait, positioning yet another maritime chokehold as a major piece in the grand… pic.twitter.com/0kXBk7dpgH
Commanding those coastlines starts with commanding the port that sits closest to them. That is what makes al-Mokha, rather than any other point on Yemen's western coast, the city worth fighting over.
Long before it was a military prize, al-Mokha was the reason the word "mocha" exists at all. From the 16th to the early 18th century, the port was the dominant hub of the world's coffee trade, exporting beans grown in Yemen's cooler highlands and carried down to the coast by caravan.
Located on Yemen's southwestern coast, the city and port of al-Mokha sit roughly 75 kilometers north of the narrowest passage of Bab al-Mandab. Consolidating control over al-Mokha and the surrounding coastal districts gives Sanaa solid territorial depth along the western coast, extending its reach south from Hodeidah and removing what had been the principal base of forces aligned with the Saudi-backed government.
Territorial depth is only the first layer of what changed on September 10. The second is what that depth actually gives the YAF control of.
What control of al-Mokha means
Control of al-Mokha and the coastal districts around it grants the YAF immediate coastal radar oversight, launch positions, and monitoring vantage points over the shipping lanes running through Bab al-Mandab.
It strengthens the YAF's ability to enforce its declared restrictions on Israeli-linked shipping and hostile vessels, and it tightens the pressure on the occupied port of Eilat by further constraining its already crippled southern maritime access.
What the YAF took control of on the ground was not empty coastline. Al-Mokha's port was rehabilitated by the UAE, and its airport runway, along with military camps including Khalid Camp Base and Jabal al-Nar Camp, the command headquarters for forces on the western coast, had served for years as the operational backbone of a Saudi-Emirati-backed military presence.
Beyond the obvious: What else transits Bab al-Mandab
Oil tankers are the most visible traffic through Bab al-Mandab, but they are far from the only cargo that makes the strait matter. Beneath the surface, roughly 15 to 17 subsea fiber-optic cable systems carry a substantial share of the data traffic connecting Europe, East Africa, West Asia, and South Asia, making the strait a crucial node for global digital communications as much as for shipping.
Wheat, rice, sugar, and fertilizer move through this corridor alongside crude and LNG, a category of food security and agricultural trade that US officials have repeatedly flagged when assessing the risks of a Bab al-Mandab disruption.
As news broke of the YAF's control over the coast overlooking Bab al-Mandab, the US national average diesel price crossed $6 a gallon for the first time in history, reaching roughly $6.06 on September 11. The rise came as markets absorbed a widening set of pressures, from the US war on Iran and the subsequent disruption of Gulf energy flows to tight inventories and refinery constraints, with Yemen's advance compounding the sense that Washington now faces mounting risk at two chokepoints instead of one.
Bab al-Mandab, Hormuz together
With Bab al-Mandab now in the hands of Sanaa and the Strait of Hormuz under Tehran's control, the Axis of Resistance gains more leverage in facing Western imperialist agendas in the region.
The two chokepoints do not hand Iran and Yemen a single, unified command over the flow of West Asian energy, but they give aligned forces complementary pressure points on both maritime gateways serving the Arabian Peninsula, at a moment when Saudi Arabia has increasingly rerouted its own crude exports through the Red Sea to avoid the risks at Hormuz.
Years to build, days to lose
The coastline Sanaa now holds took the Saudi-UAE coalition nearly three years to secure the first time, and it never captured the whole of it. Coalition-backed forces took Bab al-Mandab and Mayyun Island in October 2015, seven months after the Saudi-led aggression began.
Al-Mokha did not fall until January 2017, some 22 months later, in an operation known as "Golden Spear", while coalition forces did not reach the outskirts of Hodeidah until June 2018, more than three years into the war, and the push stalled there after the Stockholm Agreement froze the front in December 2018. Sanaa retained Hodeidah and the northern Red Sea coast throughout.
The UAE turned al-Mokha into the principal base of Tareq Saleh's "National Resistance Forces," growing the force from an initial nucleus of roughly 3,000 fighters to about 20,000, while stationing its own officers there, paying salaries, supplying weapons and vehicles, and rehabilitating the port itself.
On Mayyun Island, construction on a military runway began in late 2016, was abandoned, then resumed years later. By 2021, satellite imagery showed a completed 1.85-kilometer runway with three hangars, and the UAE sought a 20-year lease over the island.
Saudi Arabia picked up much of the financing after the UAE's drawdown, continuing to pay the "National Resistance Forces" and fund reconstruction projects in the area.
Why the collapse happened so fast
Until shortly before al-Mokha fell, reports from the western coast had pointed to government advances, not retreat, after a week of fighting that saw Saudi-backed forces briefly recapture some of the ground they had lost. Their lines then collapsed within hours on September 10.
Ansar Allah's explanation for that collapse centers on command structure. Political Bureau member Hizam al-Assad told Al Mayadeen the entry of the YAF into the western coastal areas was widely welcomed by local residents and that the operation was an internal one aimed at restoring Yemeni sovereignty over Yemeni territory.
Retired Brigadier General Ali Abi Raad, a strategic military expert, told Al Mayadeen the coalition's defeat was the product of a fundamentally divided force, describing the roughly 30,000 fighters aligned with Tareq Saleh, a member of the Saudi-backed presidential council, and the "Giants Brigades" as a patchwork of Salafist, jihadist, and mercenary elements with Arab and Western nationalities among them, and no single unified command.
The YAF, by contrast, is described as having built its campaign under one command structure over two full years since the start of its operations in solidarity with Gaza, developing domestically manufactured missiles and drones that gave it a decisive edge.
The "National Resistance Forces" and the "Giants Brigades" had been marketed for years as an elite, specially trained counterweight to the Yemeni Armed Forces, equipped and funded by Saudi Arabia. Whatever the precise mix of factors behind their sudden withdrawal, the result was a collapse that undid in days what had taken the coalition the better part of three years to build the first time around.