At least two dozen nations have moved to curb arms sales to "Israel" over its genocide in Gaza, as global outrage intensifies against the occupation’s actions. Over the past year, the number of restrictions has steadily grown, reflecting mounting political and moral pressure on governments to distance themselves from "Israel’s" war machine.

By the time the current ceasefire took effect, six countries had already imposed full bans on weapons transfers, a significant escalation in international efforts to hold "Israel" accountable for its crimes in Gaza.

Spain is the latest country to impose a blanket ban: a parliamentary vote last week bars the sale of weapons, military equipment, or related technologies to "Israel". Other governments have opted for narrower measures,  limiting exports tied to operations in Gaza rather than an outright embargo.

Some leaders have linked those export curbs to accusations that "Israel" has committed genocide in Gaza, a finding reached by an independent UN commission, an association of genocide scholars, and several Israeli and international human rights groups.

"Israel" has rejected those conclusions: the Foreign Ministry dismissed the UN commission’s report last month as a “fake report” based on “falsehoods.”

Despite the growing diplomatic pressure, these restrictions are unlikely to meaningfully degrade "Israel’s" military capabilities, The Washington Post argued in an investigative piece.

Why the impact is limited

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which monitors global weapons transfers, reports that 99% of "Israel’s" imports of “major conventional weapons” come from the United States and Germany, with Italy a distant third. In practice, this concentration means that most of the new bans,  often from smaller suppliers, do not significantly affect the core sources of "Israel’s" heavy weaponry.

Germany and Italy have imposed partial curbs; yet senior German officials have already begun urging a rollback of restrictions now that the ceasefire is in place, Politico reported. The United States has shown no sign of restricting its weapons sales to "Israel".

What SIPRI counts and what it doesn’t

SIPRI’s dataset covers large conventional systems: military aircraft, armored vehicles, and warships; major munitions such as guided missiles, torpedoes, and guided bombs; aerial radars and air-defense systems; and artillery pieces over 100mm caliber.

It transfers database records of legitimate sales or grants of these systems between states, armed groups, and international organizations.

Smaller conventional arms, machine guns, small arms ammunition, and some munitions are excluded, as are drones, which Israeli occupation forces have used extensively in Gaza and the occupied West Bank. That omission is significant given the centrality of drones to recent operations.

Early movers, broader blocs

Several nations, Turkey, South Africa, and Ireland among them, had already curtailed arms ties with "Israel" prior to its war on Gaza. Turkey, the first Muslim-majority state to recognize "Israel", told its parliament in August that it had “completely severed” trade with "Israel" and closed its airspace to Israeli military flights or flights carrying weapons.

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Meanwhile, "Israel’s" defense industry reported record export revenues after October 7, 2023.

The Israeli Security Ministry said exports totaled $14.8 billion last year, with more than half destined for European buyers.

Country-by-country: What’s changed

Belgium

Belgium has banned arms exports to "Israel" since 2009, and in July, a Brussels court broadened that stance, ruling that military equipment transiting through Belgian ports to "Israel" is also prohibited. The government will fine carriers €50,000 (about $58,000) per offending container.

UK

London suspended export licenses for 30 firms that supplied parts used by Israeli occupation forces in Gaza after finding the components, for jets, helicopters, and drones, could be implicated in serious violations of international law.

The suspended licenses accounted for roughly 8% of Britain’s permits for "Israel". The ban does not automatically apply to parts for F-35 fighters unless they are shipped directly to "Israel".

Scotland separately suspended public funding for companies that supply arms to "Israel". Scottish First Minister John Swinney urged the UK to “end military cooperation with the Israeli government while the war continues, and the question of genocide remains current.”

Canada

The Canadian government said it halted all arms shipments to "Israel" in January 2024. An advocacy group, Arms Embargo Now, reported commercial shipping records showing possible transfers between October 2023 and July 2025; Ottawa insists it has refused any new permits for controlled goods that could be used in Gaza and says it will impose “severe legal sanctions” on parties found to be circumventing export rules.

Germany

Germany, "Israel’s" second-largest supplier of major conventional weapons, announced a partial pause on transfers in August when "Israel" prepared an offensive in Gaza City, limiting shipments “clearly” usable there.

In practice, parliamentary documents suggest Germany largely stopped sending weapons. Between January 1, 2024, and June 26, 2025, Germany approved roughly $292 million in arms transfers to "Israel", SIPRI records show. Historically, Germany supplied warships and engine parts for Merkava tanks.

The Hague Group

In January, South Africa convened a group of eight countries pledging to restrict exports to "Israel". Since then, Turkey, Iraq, Libya, Oman, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have joined the so-called Hague Group. Leaders from 32 countries met in Bogota this summer to discuss further measures to halt the waar.

Ireland

Ireland had restricted exports before October 7, 2023, then in August 2024 declared a ban on military purchases from and arms transfers with "Israel", the first EU country to sever inbound arms orders.

Italy

Italy initially said it stopped weapons shipments after October 7, 2023, though Rome has authorized a small number of transfers to honor contracts signed before the war. Past deliveries include naval guns and AW119 Koala helicopters; SIPRI notes partial deliveries in 2022–23.

Domestic pressure on Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has intensified, with mass protests and dockworker refusals at Ravenna. A 1990 Italian law forbids arms exports to nations engaged in war or breaching international humanitarian law.

The Netherlands

The Netherlands halted weapons exports after October 7, 2023, though it continues to supply parts for "Israel’s" F-35 program. Israeli firms have been barred from the Netherlands’ largest military exhibition this November.

Slovenia

Slovenia became the first EU state to impose a full embargo after October 7, though SIPRI records suggest it had not been a recent supplier.

Spain

Spain last week implemented a total arms embargo on "Israel", a step Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez framed as an attempt to stop “genocide in Gaza.”

The ban extends beyond weapons to block the transit of aviation fuel for military aircraft and imports from Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Sanchez said, “This isn’t self-defense. It’s not even attacking. It’s exterminating a defenseless people. It’s breaking all the regulations of humanitarian law.”

The limits of embargo politics

Taken together, these measures signal growing international isolation and moral condemnation of "Israel’s" campaign in Gaza, as per the piece.

Yet because the supply of the heaviest and most sophisticated systems is concentrated in a handful of suppliers, principally the United States and Germany, the practical effect on "Israel’s" core arsenal is likely limited unless Washington or Berlin takes more forceful action.

Meanwhile, "Israel’s" arms exporters continue to find markets abroad, and the exclusions in data sources like SIPRI,  notably on drones and smaller weapons, mean the full picture of military trade and its operational impacts remains complex and partially obscured.