Hegseth military education reforms risk overlooking strategic failures
Greg Pollock argues that US military education must prepare officers to turn battlefield gains into lasting political results.
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US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth addresses the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, during the announcement of military education reforms, November 9, 2026 (US Navy)
US military education reforms introduced by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth risk overlooking Washington's difficulty converting battlefield achievements into lasting political gains, former Pentagon official Greg Pollock argued in an analysis published by Defense One.
Pollock, who taught at the National War College from 2019 to 2021, warned that an emphasis on combat proficiency could leave senior officers insufficiently prepared to assess the political consequences of military action or advise civilian officials on preventing conflict.
The analysis examines a 33-point memorandum and accompanying speech Hegseth delivered Monday at the Naval War College. The proposals concern professional military education, the system through which service members receive instruction at successive stages of their careers.
While supporting several proposed changes, Pollock questioned both the reforms' underlying priorities and their implications for academic independence.
Political oversight raises concerns
Among the changes drawing scrutiny is a proposal to transfer responsibility for military education from the Joint Staff's J7 to the undersecretary for personnel and readiness, a presidential appointee subject to Senate confirmation.
Pollock argued that the transfer was not inherently problematic but could give political officials greater influence over curricula, creating opportunities to shape education around an administration's ideological preferences.
He also warned that removing tenure protections for civilian faculty and allowing political considerations to influence recruitment could erode expertise in fields including history, economics, international relations, and regional affairs.
Civilian academics, he argued, make an important contribution by questioning assumptions that experienced officers may otherwise leave unchallenged.
"The military's strategic culture cannot be remade every four years."
Pollock maintained that institutions responsible for educating senior commanders need stability and room for disagreement, including criticism of policies favored by the government in office.
"Senior officers must understand and execute civilian policy, but they must also possess the intellectual independence to identify flawed assumptions, offer candid advice, and challenge strategies they believe will fail."
Battlefield gains leave political questions unresolved
At the center of Pollock's criticism is the distinction between carrying out a military operation successfully and securing the political objectives behind it.
He cited Iraq and Afghanistan as examples of conflicts in which American forces demonstrated operational capability without producing corresponding long-term political results.
The US-Israeli war on Iran, he argued, exposes a similar gap. Despite the damage inflicted by American and Israeli attacks, Pollock noted that Iran's governing system remained in place, commercial navigation through the Strait of Hormuz remained dangerous, and Washington had yet to secure a durable settlement serving its objectives.
For Pollock, these outcomes point to shortcomings in strategic judgment that additional emphasis on battlefield performance alone cannot resolve.
He challenged Hegseth's repeated assertion that "the fundamental purpose of the Armed Forces of the United States is to fight and win our Nation's wars," arguing that this formulation gives insufficient attention to the military's role in preventing conflict.
Using Taiwan as an example, he said effective deterrence requires more than preparing forces for a possible confrontation with China. Officers must also assess Beijing's decision-making, Taiwan's internal politics, the potential economic fallout, and how regional governments interpret American commitments.
Such responsibilities, he argued, require an education that connects military planning with diplomacy, economics, and political analysis.
Support for selected reforms
Pollock nevertheless identified several proposals he considered valuable, including expanded instruction on artificial intelligence, greater involvement from private-sector specialists, and a new mid-career educational requirement.
He also supported using simulations and competitive war games to assess how officers respond to incomplete information, competing priorities, and pressure.
Other elements of Hegseth's agenda, he argued, largely reinforce practices already established at military colleges, including cooperation among the armed services.
Drawing on his teaching experience, Pollock disputed the characterization of military education as resistant to change, describing institutions that regularly revised coursework and incorporated lessons from emerging security challenges.
The essential test of reform, he concluded, is whether it equips officers to connect military decisions with achievable political objectives, provide informed advice and help prevent conflicts—not simply improve their ability to conduct them.
Read more: US military chiefs warn Hegseth against prolonging war on Iran: WP