The Israeli military has dismissed three generals and imposed disciplinary measures on several high-ranking officers following their failure to prevent Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, the most significant blow to the entity's military establishment to date.

This comes after Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir launched an internal investigation into the Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF), despite the Israeli government's reluctance to initiate a state commission of inquiry.

The dismissed officers include three division commanders, among them the former head of military intelligence, all held personally accountable for the catastrophic failures of October 7.

According to a military statement, these actions reflect responsibility for the IOF's inability to foresee or respond adequately to the operation launched by the Palestinian Resistance. Notably, the dismissals follow the earlier resignations of the same officers.

Additional disciplinary measures were announced against the heads of the Navy and Air Force, along with four other generals and several senior officers.

Systematic failures

The expert committee assigned by Zamir concluded its investigation, exposing a "long-standing systemic and organizational failure." The internal report identified severe lapses in intelligence gathering and decision-making, despite the availability of high-quality intelligence prior to the operation. The report emphasized the military's failure to issue warnings or deploy forces effectively on the night of October 7.

Previous investigations underscored the extent of the breakdown across multiple sectors of "Israel's" military and intelligence apparatus. The intelligence directorate, Aman, was described as exhibiting "arrogance and blindness," having underestimated the capabilities and intent of the Palestinian Resistance. The Southern Command wrongly anticipated only limited infiltration, while around 5,000 fighters breached its defenses.

Collapse of intelligence, command systems

The Shin Bet acknowledged its failure to act on intelligence and admitted its network of collaborators in Gaza had failed or misled them. Meanwhile, the Gaza Division was swiftly overwhelmed, with many field commanders killed in the early stages of the operation, leaving troops disorganized and leaderless.

Additionally, operational confusion extended to communication channels, with soldiers relying on WhatsApp and social media for combat updates. Iron Dome batteries failed to respond effectively, with several units inactive during the initial rocket barrage. Around half of the projectiles targeting populated areas reportedly went unintercepted.