In the early hours of April 7, exactly six months after the Palestinian Resistance movement Hamas launched its Operation al-Aqsa Flood targeting the Israeli occupation, the Israeli occupation forces withdrew from Khan Younis, a flashpoint in the ongoing war on Gaza that is of great strategic importance for the Palestinian Resistance and which the IOF has been unable to hold, marking a devastating failure for "Tel Aviv".

Right after the Israeli occupation withdrew from Gaza's largest city, the Palestinian Resistance was quick to retake it and assume control of it, meaning that the months spent to take the city were sent down the drain.

The loss also proves that despite the Israeli occupation forces inflicting major damages on Gaza, wreaking havoc in its streets, and turning much of its buildings into rubble, they were unable to score a military win. Not only that but "Israel" also lost the battle of public opinion on the international level due to its flagrant crimes and many violations of international laws throughout the war, forcing even its closest ally, the United States, to rethink their unconditional military support for the occupation.

This is accompanied by the many criticisms the Israeli occupation forces are facing, for one would at least expect that if they were going to stir up public opinion against them, they'd at least compensate with some military advances, but they cannot even do that, so they are losing on both ends. The Economist covered this debacle, reporting that the Israeli occupation forces were "accused of military and moral failures in Gaza."

The Israeli occupation forces, even while violating the law of war and acting immorally, have not been able to achieve its military goals in Gaza, and the repercussions of these losses are grave for "Israel" as a whole, especially when it comes to public opinion and the international community, as it is proving to be morally bankrupt and militarily unreliable at the same time, meaning it is a terrible investment for the United States and all its allies.

The investment is so bad, in fact, that it is not only tarnishing the reputation of the United States left and right as the US bears the brunt of its terrible decisions and options it is putting them before, but it is unable to garner even one victory against the Resistance, and at the end of the day, Washington cannot help but stand up for the costly regiment that is the Israeli occupation forces.

Hamas is still standing as the undisputed, democratic leader of Gaza, the Israeli captives are yet to be freed, and are actually being killed at the hands of the Israeli occupation forces, Hamas' military capabilities are still as good as new as "Israel's" military losses continue to rise, and even the declared goal of killing all those who were behind Operation al-Aqsa Flood, was only partially achieved, with only Marwan Issa, one of the three masterminds behind the operation and Hamas' chief of staff, being believed to have been martyred in the ongoing war.

While some top Hamas commanders, along with many foot soldiers, were killed in the ongoing aggression, the Resistance itself as an organization and a military complex is far from being destroyed, and new elaborate, destructive ambushes are taking place daily, with "Israel's" losses skyrocketing and it, in turn, losing many high-ranking officers and soldiers.

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Poor planning

The Israeli occupation's many defeats go back, initially, to one fatal issue: poor planning. The dust hadn't settled yet on October 7 when the Israeli occupation decided to launch its onslaught on Gaza, so, naturally, they were disorganized, and as retired Retired Colonel Reuven Gal put it, the Israeli occupation forces' senior commanders were "motivated by deep feelings of guilt and humiliation" when it came to the response. "Instead of stopping this time to think and plan, [the army] went in fast and hard, to restore lost pride."

The issue is not only poor planning, for one cannot be expected to perfectly plan and execute an attack within hours, but the issue also extends further and reaches the contentious issue of managing the war that was waged on Gaza, namely when it came to the high number of civilian casualties and the paramount destruction inflicted on its infrastructure. That was caused by numerous factors, including the practically nonexistent operational limitations that allow the IOF to launch airstrikes even when there is an anticipated high civilian casualty count, as well as the lack of discipline within the Israeli forces when it comes to sticking the loose limitations that are in place.

These delimitations, according to one veteran reserve officer cited by The Economist, allow "Just about any battalion commander [to] decide that whoever moves in his sector is a terrorist or that buildings should be destroyed because they could have been used by Hamas."

"The only limit to the number of buildings we blew up was the time we had inside Gaza," an IOF sapper in a combat-engineering battalion said, according to the newspaper. "If you find a Kalashnikov or even Hamas literature in an apartment, it’s enough to incriminate the building."

Political blunders

Last but certainly not least, the Israeli occupation forces' third failure is the obstruction of aid to Gaza's civilians, which culminated on April 4 in a heated phone call between US President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Officers have largely blamed politicians for this issue, meaning the decision was not necessarily taken by the IOF but by the War Cabinet. 

Still, many were swift to blame the Israeli occupation forces, arguing that in light of the poor political planning, the military command should have taken the initiative and taken care of delivering aid to Gaza's civilians even without any official orders from "Tel Aviv" to do so as the ones on the ground in Gaza, which really is akin to waiting for the cows to come home, and the cows did not come home until the humanitarian situation was so dire that it started pressuring the political establishment and forced the hand of the IOF to stop hindering aid deliveries to Gaza.

There are two scenarios for the Israeli occupation, both of which are terrible for the political establishment: The first is going the whole nine yards and invading Rafah, which Netanyahu said he has laid out a timetable for, as the last Hamas stronghold, which is actually denied by senior Israeli officials. The other is for "Israel" to agree to a ceasefire in compliance with Hamas' demands.

Both scenarios have their pros, but they certainly have more cons than pros. On the one hand, invading Rafah would allow the occupation to say that it did not crumble under pressure from Hamas and were able to push through the entirety of Gaza, but with a lack of support from the United States and paramount criticism from the international community, the Israeli occupation would be essentially labeling itself a pariah and undermining any legitimacy it might have held on the international stage. 

The other scenario would allow the Israeli occupation forces to regroup and prepare for any future conflicts, especially a direct one with Iran in light of the recently surging tensions between the two parties, but it would mean that "Israel" yielded before the Resistance and practically lost the war as it would have to withdraw from Gaza before "dismantling" Hamas, which is an unrealistic outcome to begin with.

The Israeli occupation is between a rock and a hard place, and from poor planning to poor execution and terrible political leadership, there is no favorable outcome for Netanyahu and his regime, it just all depends on which cyanide pill he chooses to swallow, for there is no option but suicide at this point that he allowed himself to be dragged to.