The Israeli occupation regime wanted to launch a "pre-emptive" strike against Lebanon, allegedly to strike the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon - Hezbollah, days after the start of Operation al-Aqsa Flood on October 7, the Wall Street Journal reported. However, US President Joe Biden prevented his allies from taking this step out of fear of a regional war.

Reportedly, the Israeli occupation had "intelligence" that Hezbollah Resistance fighters were planning an operation similar to the one carried out by the Palestinian Resistance, wherein they would cross the border as part of a multipronged attack in a bid to corner the Israeli occupation. 

The United States saw this intelligence as being unreliable, and as it sought not to bring about a regional war, it called on the Israeli occupation to heed.

The United States first caught wind of the Israeli occupation's plan early on October 11 after the Israeli regime informed its backers in Washington that they believed Hezbollah was planning an operation, and the Israeli occupation knew that it could not hold back on its own; therefore it asked the Biden administration for support.

Top US military and intelligence advisers, such as CIA director William Burns and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, convened for a high-stakes meeting a few hours later to discuss what the Israeli occupation was saying. At the end of the meeting, Washington determined that it should not help the Israeli occupation carry out such a blunder because it did not go with US intelligence on the matter.

US President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a 45-minute call that ended with the latter saying he would discuss the issue with his cabinet after he was not convinced by Biden's words for "Israel" to stand down.

Israeli Journalist Barak Ravid contests the WSJ report

Israeli Journalist Barak Ravid, who is also a contributor on Axios, commented on the WSJ article in an X post downplaying the Biden administration's influence over the events and giving more credit to internal divisions inside the Israeli Cabinet.

According to Ravid, Biden did not convince Netanyahu not to attack Lebanon, adding that Netanyahu had no intention of doing so. The Israeli Journalist added that at the start of the war, Gallant and the Chief of Staff intended to launch an attack, and Netanyahu was unwilling to do so.

Because Netanyahu did not want to launch an attack, he did not answer calls from Gallant for several hours on October 11. He also concluded with Gantz the emergency government's membership at the same moment to counter the pressure from Gallant.

That evening, when it was decided that the former Chief of staff join the government, Netanyahu felt more secure having two former chiefs of staff (Eisenkot and Ganz opposed the strike in Lebanon) on his side to reject Gallant's and the chief of staff's idea, Ravid continued.

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Although they did not have a major role in the decision-making process, the Americans did oppose the strike. If anything, Netanyahu's case against Gallant was enhanced by their opposition, Ravid concluded.

On high alert

In the backdrop of the call, the Israeli occupation forces went on alert in northern occupied Palestine as soldiers received orders from their commanders to remain vigilant and prepare to fight Hezbollah Resistance fighters who would enter occupied Palestine on paragliders and various vehicles from southern Lebanon.

Northern settlers were also ordered to head to bomb shelters immediately in light of the apparently unilateral tensions.

The warnings, nothing but false alarms, were solely a part of a lengthy series of those that had fueled fears of another attack, officials from both the United States and the Israeli occupations have said.

There were calls and meetings taking place for around six hours before t the situation returned back to normal and the Israelis agreed to yield to US pressures and stand down with Washington insistent that its intelligence indicated there was no imminent attack from the Lebanese side.

Netanyahu, after being pushed back by his closest ally, Joe Biden, agreed to capitulate and not go forth with his plan for an attack on Lebanon.

Lebanon in the crosshair

Following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on October 7, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu approached President Biden and suggested he persuade Egypt's President to open his country's borders and accept a large number of the more than 2 million Palestinians set to be forcibly displaced from Gaza.

Biden, at the time, believed it was extremely hard, considering that Egypt had been clear that it would not play a role in the displacement of Palestinians, only to adopt a more decisive position later, saying the US "under no circumstances" will permit forced displacement of Palestinians.

Many Israeli officials continue to support the proposal, which has not previously been revealed, highlighting the deep divisions between the US and "Israel" on what should happen in Gaza in the short and long term once "Israel" ends its bloody aggression on the Strip. 

While the Biden administration aims to limit the war to Gaza and halt the intense bombardment there, some Israeli officials are pushing to target Hezbollah in Lebanon next, a move that US officials have fought to prevent for weeks. 

Furthermore, US and Israeli authorities differ on how severely to punish violent Israeli settlers in the West Bank. 

Biden and Netanyahu disagree on practically every significant issue that will become essential when the war ends, something analysts attribute to their differing domestic politics.

Following October 7, Israeli voters shifted drastically to the right, while Netanyahu's support ratings plunged, forcing the Prime Minister to embrace the extreme right as a means of political survival. 

Biden, meanwhile, has been under increasing pressure from his Democratic base to stand up to "Israel" and take meaningful actions to end the bloodshed.