Parasite in action: How 'Israel' exploits normalizing Arab states?
"Israel" not only benefits more its security relations with normalizing Arab countries but ends exploiting these relations and causing damage to the security interests of the country in question.
It is rare to find in the Israeli literature a concept that influenced the formation and fate of the Zionist project on the land of Palestine, as did the Iron Wall concept created by Ze'ev Jabotinsky, who was a Russian-born Zionist. Jabotinsky is one of the first theorists of the so-called "Zionist Right-wing". The concept does not mean physically building a wall of iron around occupied Palestine; instead, it envisions a wall that must depend mainly on forming a potent military organization on one hand, and creating an illusory psychological wall in the mind of the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular on the other hand.
The stones of this imaginary wall are ought to be made of Arab despair and frustration, according to Jabotinsky. While sometimes military defeats can contribute to Israeli plans of building such a wall, forcing normalization on Arab people does create the same effect.
The wall in that regard is not just a mere protective barrier for the Israeli settlers, but a gateway to achieving Israeli colonial interests in the region. Not only do these interests go - naturally - against those who oppose the Israeli project but also against its supposed allies who expected to reap benefits from such actions, especially in the security sector. In this case, the Israeli alleged superiority in the military, as well as its advancement in the security technology domain, becomes a burden rather than a benefit to the normalizer.
Egypt, when it all started
Perhaps the most significant setback of the Arab struggle against the Israeli occupation of Palestine was when Anwar Al-Sadat decided to turn his back on his Arab and Palestinian brethren and on what Jamal Abdel Nasser had accumulated for a noble prize and a fistful of nothing in exchange for "peace".
While a colleague's article had previously discussed the negative economic and political aspects that accompanied such an action made by Sadat, this article will focus on the security aspects.
According to the "peace treaty of 1979" between Egypt and "Israel", the Sinai Peninsula, an Egyptian land, shall be divided into 4 zones, 3 of them extending on Egyptian soil while only one in occupied Palestine. In Zone A, Egypt shall maintain no more than one mechanized division of its army numbering no more than 22,000 soldiers. In Zone B, no more than 4 infantry battalions shall be deployed to support the local police, in military terms, meaning no more than 2000 soldiers for such a huge swath of Egyptian land. In Zone C, only local police are allowed inside this area and UN peacekeepers (they were not sent later on due to fear of Soviet veto).
On the other hand, despite Israeli military superiority, they were allowed to keep 4 infantry battalions, in a land strip extending parallel to the borders - its width is only a few Kilometers in contrast to the Egyptian tens of kilometers wide multiple zones. Without the need for an explanation, the treaty obviously limits Egypt's sovereignty over a huge part of its lands, as any further deployment of Egyptian forces needs to be discussed thoroughly with the Israeli side before receiving an approval that might not come.
Starting from 2011, an insurgency launched by ISIS militants left more than a thousand deaths for the Egyptian army as well as more than 1500 civilians. Despite the fighting receding in the last few years, the insurgency wreaked havoc on the already poor Egyptian region, with the Egyptian army failing to take action since only local police were available at zone C. The militants knew that pretty well and made every use of it.
"Israel" allowed Egypt to send a limited number of troops on occasions to chase the terrorists from one zone to the adjacent one. The New York Times even claims that Israeli warplanes conducted raids inside the Eygptian national territories with Egypt's consent on some occasions. Spokespersons for both the Israeli and Egyptian militaries declined to comment on such a claim. "Israel" says it allegedly allows Egypt to send forces based on the security needs of the latter, but still tangible results could have been different and many Egyptian soldiers coming from the least able social classes of Egypt would be still alive if it were not for the "peace agreement."
A poison dealer: 'Israel' with Morocco
On November 24, "Israel" and Morocco inked a "historic security pact". The MoU, signed by Israeli security minister Benny Gantz and Moroccan counterpart Abdellatif Loudiyi, is said to be aimed at "collaboration and strengthening Israeli-Moroccan relations." That MoU comes after both parties signed a cooperation agreement with Morocco, the first of its kind in the cyber security domain since the normalization of ties between Morocco and the Israeli occupation in 2019.
Morocco is also buying a new set of Israeli-made weapons and military hardware believing that it would increase its security, namely to counter Algeria. Several media reports, including those published before Gantz's, detailed the Israeli-Moroccan arms sales. According to The Jerusalem Post Israeli newspaper, the Moroccan army is now deploying three Heron unmanned aircraft made by Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI), which were obtained through a French business to avoid any link with "Israel."
Morocco is also operating smaller drones purchased from the Israeli company BlueBird. Moroccan security forces got unmanned patrol vehicles from Robotim, an Israeli company that is partly owned by Elbit. Morocco has also purchased anti-drone systems from "Israel's" Avnon company, which are built by Skylock.
According to Israeli media, Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI) will provide advanced air defense and anti-missile defense systems to Morocco as part of a $500 million deal. IAI will offer the Barak MX system, which uses surface-to-air (SAM) missiles to intercept all types of aircraft and missiles. According to Israeli Channel 12, the contract began with Israeli Security Minister Benny Gantz's travel to Morocco in late 2021.
While all these systems can considerably increase the military capabilities of the Western equipped Moroccan armed forces, a problem arises when discussing military topics usually, since weapons are usually bought with the intention of pointing them in the direction of someone at one point, namely Algeria, whose stagnating relations with Morocco suffered even more after the latter's normalization with the Israeli occupation.
Algeria, an Arab state that never ceased to stand by the Arab and Palestinian cause, already announced that it finds itself targeted by Gantz's visit in November, as well as by the increasing Israeli military support to its neighbor. Algeria faces even more challenges along its 1,427 km border with Morocco since "Israel" is increasing its intelligence presence in the latter, an action that Algeria is probably not going to tolerate as it threatens its national security.
The two North African countries share strong ties at all levels, as even some of them treat each other as one community and one people. Opening a gateway to the Israeli presence in the region is only going to increase the threat of an escalation between Algeria and Morocco. Whose interests such an escalation might serve? Most probably foreign powers that will seek to exploit such events to have a firmer foothold in the region, namely the European Ex-colonial powers.
A castle of glass: "Israel" and UAE
"Israel" did not wait long before it tried to exploit the war on Yemen, Naftali Bennet, the Israeli PM offered the UAE "security and intelligence support" after the Ansar Allah retaliatory attack on facilities in Abu Dhabi. According to The Times of Israel, "Israel" even offered the UAE to export its "battle-tested" system, namely the Iron Dome, except that the system won't only be to protect the UAE from Yemeni retaliatory attacks, but its radar system, the EL/M-2084, can be also used as an early warning system against Iran.
On January 31, some Israeli media even said that the UAE is "Israel's" front in the Gulf region, adding that "If detection and warning systems are deployed in the UAE, they will be a cornerstone for a regional air defense system." Israeli security minister Benny Gantz said that "Israel has a huge opportunity if it is able to sell the UAE detection and warning systems," adding that if such systems were deployed in the UAE, they would detect any attack from the South (Yemen) and the East (Iran), "And this would be a cornerstone for a regional air defense system."
The previously mentioned EL/M-2084 radar system is a short-range radar system if compared to its bigger brother the EL/M-2080 Green Pine radar that possesses a greater potential to spot heavy ballistic targets, relaying information directly to the Israelis via data link.
On February the second, The UAE reached out to the Israeli Security Ministry through its embassy in "Tel Aviv" to explore how a formal request for delivering an advanced Israeli radar to Abu Dhabi would be received. The Green Pine Radar, according to its manufacturer, Elta, a subsidiary of "Israel Aerospace Industries," will be able to detect and track dozens of missiles at vast ranges. The ELM-2090s, a more sophisticated version of the Green Pine, is said to be of interest to the UAE.
Such acquisition might prove destructive to UAE's security, why is that?
Despite the ongoing nuclear talks in Vienna with Iran, "Israel" has hinted several times about it being ready to "act alone" regarding the Iranian nuclear program, hence conducting a military strike. The problem with that rhetoric is that it is almost impossible to conduct such a complex and resources intensive operation alone, not only due to the Iranian active and passive defense systems but also because of the retaliatory second-strike capability that Iran possesses. Iran has a large and advanced arsenal of ballistic missiles aimed at "Israel," deterring the Israeli occupation from conducting such non-calculated moves.
Early warning systems and radars in the UAE, can grant "Israel" a wider time frame between the launch time of a supposed retaliatory second strike and the moment they hit. The curvature of the earth prevents radar systems from over-the-horizon spotting of such missiles at the time of launch in Iran, which added to the land distance that degrades the effectiveness of radars, limits Israeli capabilities. So deploying a radar system in the UAE would address these security concerns right?
The problem with deploying Israeli radar systems and early warning systems is not only that these systems can push the other party to target such systems that degrade the ongoing deterrence, but also put the UAE facilities hosting such systems in the crosshairs of any legitimate response.
After many years of avoiding confrontation with Iran, the UAE just painted a bull's eye on its military facilities hosting Israeli manpower and hardware if any escalation is to happen in the future. How does is that supposed to provide more security to the fragile, foreign investment and tourism-dependent Emirate?