Ukraine missile disadvantage grows, as Russia ramps up attacks
Despite Ukraine’s audacious drone strikes on Russian airfields, the missile math is turning against Kiev as air defenses wear thin and Russia boosts production.
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Ukranian army artillery munitions are stored in the frontline at an undisclosed location in the Donetsk region, Ukraine, November 23, 2022 (AP)
Ukraine’s record-breaking drone strike against Russian airfields may have offered a dramatic moment of defiance, but in the long run, the numbers don’t lie. According to POLITICO Europe's Jamie Dettmer, Sunday’s bold counterstrike, while operationally impressive, is unlikely to reverse the fundamental missile disadvantage Ukraine faces.
Dubbed “Spiderweb", the attack allegedly struck multiple Russian bomber bases across vast distances, including targets near Japan and within the Arctic Circle. Ukrainian officials estimated the strike damaged or destroyed dozens of aircraft.
The strike was also timed for maximum psychological impact, landing just before stalled peace talks in Istanbul. But as Dettmer argues in POLITICO, Kiev's success in this instance does little to change the long-term trajectory of the Ukraine-Russia missile war.
In POLITICO Europe, Dettmer writes that Ukrainian morale has been boosted by this “absolutely unique operation,” with President Volodymyr Zelensky praising the planning and execution.
However, Dettmer notes that even if Ukraine takes out some of the aircraft launching missile attacks on its cities, Russia will not slow down. The Kremlin launched a staggering 472 drones in a single night just last week, a record-breaking attack that followed a deadly missile strike on a Ukrainian military training center.
Kiev’s defenses being steadily exhausted
Dettmer argues in his POLITICO piece that Russia’s intensifying aerial campaign is deliberately designed to deplete Ukraine’s air defenses, especially its critical supply of Patriot missiles. Ukraine is thought to have only around eight batteries, with just six likely operational at any given time, and it typically takes two interceptors to stop a single ballistic missile.
“Even if Trump were to replenish Ukraine’s stocks,” Dettmer writes, “Lockheed Martin is only scaling up to around 600 missiles a year, and not all of those would go to Ukraine.”
Russia’s missile production is outpacing Ukraine’s defenses
Citing Ukrainian intelligence assessments, Dettmer notes that Russia is expected to produce roughly 3,000 long-range missiles in 2025, including 750 Iskander ballistic missiles and 560 Kh-101 cruise missiles. In contrast, Ukraine’s supply of Patriot interceptors is shrouded in secrecy, but most observers believe the number is below 200.
Dettmer further warns that this imbalance will likely worsen, even if Ukraine continues to carry out complex operations. The pace of Russian production, paired with its deliberate targeting of Ukraine’s defensive infrastructure, could eventually outmatch Kiev’s ability.
Bombers may be hit again, but it’s a tall order
Given the success of “Spiderweb", Ukraine is now focusing more on hitting the platforms that launch ballistic and cruise missiles. But as Dettmer stresses, replicating such an operation is extremely difficult. The recent attack was 18 months in the making and required a high degree of operational secrecy, including staging drones inside Russia’s own territory.
General Vasyl Malyuk, head of Ukraine’s SBU security service, reveled in the strike’s success, and Zelensky added that the drone command post had operated “right next to an FSB headquarters.” But Dettmer tempers this enthusiasm, noting that even this creative success cannot fundamentally shift the balance of power in the air war.
Opinion: Missile math favors the Kremlin
Throughout the POLITICO Europe commentary, Dettmer reiterates that the deeper strategic trends remain in Russia’s favor. With domestic production rising and Ukraine's resupply options limited, Moscow is exploiting every opportunity to increase pressure on Kiev’s infrastructure and morale.
While Ukraine has demonstrated ingenuity and courage, Dettmer concludes that unless the West dramatically changes its support posture or finds a way to accelerate missile production, Ukraine's ability to intercept Russian strikes will steadily diminish.