On September 11, 1973, the democratically-elected Chilean government of President Salvador Allende was overthrown in a brutal coup organized and backed by the US Central Intelligence Agency, and executed by the Chilean military. General Augusto Pinochet assumed leadership of the country, killing and torturing thousands of opposition figures.

The role of the US government and intelligence services in supporting Pinochet before and after the coup is well-documented. The British state doing much the same, less so. However, declassified files expose London’s secret collusion with Pinochet's repressive junta. 

The papers make clear Allende’s overthrow was prompted by his nationalization of various industries and economic sectors, in particular copper. The popularly-supported policy provoked much panic in Washington, and the US moved quickly to penalize Chile, cutting off all credit and aid to the government, and pressuring the World Bank to follow suit. The policy was also poorly received by British officials. As an internal Foreign Office memo noted, London’s “major interest in Chile is copper”:

We import about one third of our copper from Chile. Largely owing to the disruption to production in Chile this year and fears for the future, the price has now risen to over £800 a ton. Each £1 on the price of copper taken over a year costs the UK £1/2 million in foreign exchange. We therefore have a major interest in Chile regaining stability, regardless of politics.

There were other major British business interests in Chile, and Latin America more generally, several of which were affected by Allende’s policies. In a September 3, 1973 memo sent by British Ambassador to Chile Reginald Seconde back to head office in London, he acknowledged many people “in the poorer and most depressed sections” of Chile had, as a result of Allende's policies, “attained a new status and tasted a better standard of living.”

Such developments were by no means welcome in many quarters. In the same dispatch, Seconde said the Chilean business communities were “pinning their hopes” on a coup, followed by a “military-guided regime.”

Stick it up your junta

A blood-spattered coup became a reality eight days later. British officials warmly received the action, quickly moving to establish positive relations with the junta, despite being fully cognisant of the atrocities it was carrying out. On September 14, Ambassador Seconde noted in an internal Foreign Office memo that casualties would probably “run into the thousands.” In another memo sent the next day, he said the extent of the brutality had “shocked people”.

The British government was not shocked, however. In fact, officials were intensely relaxed about the new government, albeit reticent to make their support for Pinochet’s junta too public; conservative Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home wrote on September 13:

It would not be in anyone's interest to identify too closely with those responsible for the coup. But we still have enough at stake in economic relations with Chile to require good relations with the government in power.

Seconde was nonetheless outspoken in his support for the junta, albeit behind closed doors. He welcomed the prospect of Pinochet “[imposing] a period of sensible, orderly government,” and said the nationwide ban on political activity was “for the time being, no loss.” He wrote on September 19:

Most British businessmen, whether they have investments here or are interested simply in exporting to Chile, will be overjoyed. British subsidiaries and investments are all breathing deep sighs of relief. Now is the time to get in. If we delay too long, while we may not miss the bus, we are likely to have difficulty in finding a comfortable seat.

Three days later, Seconde met the Chilean government’s new Foreign Minister, Admiral Huerta. Top of the agenda was agreeing a statement Edward Heath’s Conservative government could issue to “reassure public opinion at home,” while making clear the administration privately “understood the motives of the armed forces, intervention and problems facing the military government.”

Huerta was given a draft declaration to sign off. The British government would say the savagery unfolding in the country was “a matter for the Chilean government only,” while alleging London’s ambassador had expressed “the very strong feeling which exists in many quarters in Britain over the deaths of President Allende and others and over the many people arrested.” In response, the Chilean government was claimed to have “offered assurances” that they would deal with political prisoners “in a humane manner.”

Huerta agreed, and it was subsequently circulated to the British media. This was despite an internal Foreign Office acknowledging no one in Whitehall “seriously doubts torture is going in Chile.” In turn, London recognized the legitimacy of Pinochet's military dictatorship, one of the first countries in the world to do so.

'A few grey years'

On October 1, in a lengthy dispatch reflecting on the state of Chile three weeks after the coup, Seconde celebrated the junta’s victory, noting “the final seal of failure” had been put on Allende's socialist experiment, which had “obvious advantages for the West.” In essence, Pinochet’s government “[suited] British interests much better than its predecessor.” He added:

Five months ago it seemed possible Chile would follow Cuba, with all the consequences for Latin America that would follow. Moreover, there was a danger a successful outcome to the Chilean experiment would have repercussions beyond Latin America.

While recognizing “internal security problems, diplomatic isolation by the Soviet bloc and critical world opinion” could push Chilean military leaders “in directions public opinion will deplore,” and the next few years “may be grey ones, in which freedom of expression [suffers],” ultimately Pinochet had “infinitely more to offer British interests” than Allende, Seconde wrote, adding:

The new leaders are unequivocally on our side and want to do business, in its widest sense, with us. I hope Her Majesty's Government will respond.

Her Majesty’s Government did indeed respond, albeit again not publicly. Foreign Office Minister Leo Amery met with Judith Hart, Labour’s shadow minister for overseas development, who was campaigning for an end to British aid and credit to Chile.

He made it clear that “this will not happen.” As an October 12 Foreign Office note explained, Britain’s priorities in Latin America were “determined largely by trading and investment interests…our public policy is to refuse to be drawn into the controversy of the rights or wrongs of the new military government.”

​Arms were a major “trading interest” for Britain. In a bitter incongruity, Hawker Hunter aircraft supplied to Chile by Britain proved instrumental in the coup, as Seconde happily noted in his October 1 dispatch:

Hawker Hunters put on an impressive show of force [diving] down at the Moneda Palace and with remarkable accuracy released their aerial rockets. These did much damage and set the Palace on fire. The President’s residence on the outskirts of the city, where resistance was encountered, was similarly attacked.

A November 19 Conservative party briefing paper stated the government’s policy was “to supply arms to the new Chilean government on the same basis as we did to their predecessors.” An order from Allende’s government for eight more Hawker Hunters, and assorted military equipment worth over £60 million, was ready to be honored.

However, British officials wished to boost these receipts. Diplomat Peter Fullerton wrote to Seconde on November 2, stating the Heath administration “shall want in due course to make the most of the opportunities presented by the change in government.” On the 1974 election, which Heath lost, millions had been reaped by UK arms firms through Chilean orders.

The election of Labour signalled a reversal in Anglo-Chilean relations. The new government halted all arms sales, aid and credit to Pinochet’s junta, withdrawing Britain’s ambassador in 1977. Moreover, trade unionists refused to fix bomber-plane engines destined for Santiago, compelling Rolls Royce to break its existing contract with the Chilean Air Force.

This in turn was reversed in May 1979, with the election of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister. Diplomatic relations were rapidly restored, and arms sales resumed. By June three years later, her government had sold Pinochet warships, missiles, bomber planes, naval pyrotechnics, machine guns, ammunition and much more.