After 10 months of war, the occupation entity has cornered itself by adopting a risky strategy that has pushed it to the brink of a regional war, dragging its US sponsor with it. 

This strategy has come as a result of its inability to achieve any of its outlined goals in Gaza, including the complete dismantling of the Gazan resistance which has only grown in its strengths and capabilities [1]. These strategic failures on the battlefield have given it no option but to devise a new goal instead, which is to do everything in its power to create the appearance of victory.

However, the cracks in this strategy have exposed them to some major miscalculations that risk the very goals they seek to achieve. 

What is the occupation entity’s strategy? 

At the beginning of the war, the occupation entity’s primary goals were to eliminate the Gazan resistance and to bring all hostages home to alleviate internal pressure and keep public support and morale high. This has now changed; now, its primary goal is to create the appearance of victory and control to ensure its survival after the war since it has become clear that its initial aims are unachievable [2]. 

This change is reflected in its increasingly precarious strategy which toes the line of a full-blown regional war. This strategy is built on a few key methods and assumptions; 

Amass material power to exert full force on a geographically isolated area. Leaning on their strongest assets which are intelligence and military power should restore their shattered image of deterrence. Control public opinion through false flag events, propaganda, and assassinations of high-ranking officials.

Leverage open-ended support from the US which has given them the confidence of guaranteed assistance if a regional war ensues, even if it risks the quality of their alliance after the war. Use the Axis’ clear unwillingness to expand the war to push its limits, so that it can exercise high-risk methods with uncertain outcomes, in hopes of a limited response in return. 

A strategy that relies on such precarious methods and assumptions indicates that this is a war of survival for the entity, rather than one in which they have the upper hand. 

Assassinations of high-ranking officials

Assassinations have been a longstanding method of the occupation [3], which takes pride in flexing its intelligence capabilities to assert itself. Mirroring imperial strategies, assassinations are thought to be the key way to destroy the enemy; if you kill the leader, you weaken the organisation. This was the logic behind the assassinations of Fouad Shukr, Ismael Haniyeh, and Saleh Al Arouri in January, which all violated both Lebanon and Iran’s state sovereignty. These assassinations leveraged one of their strongest assets which is their intelligence capabilities, but ultimately failed in achieving its expected result of weakening the resistance [4].

On a secondary level, by targeting high-ranking officials the occupation entity attempts to create the appearance of victory aimed at restoring their self-image and deterrence [5] by playing on the average person’s perception of non-state actors in the region. This perception, whereby there is one mastermind and a pool of blind followers who easily stand down with the loss of their leader, has been carefully contrived over decades by the US since the War on Terror era.

The problem with this logic is that it is a false assumption imposed on the resistance, which functions on an entirely different model. This is especially true for the Gazan resistance which started as a social movement, primarily focused on developing the social sector, to ease the harsh realities of life under occupation for the youth [6]. After breaking away from the Muslim Brotherhood, it developed into an armed resistance movement in the 80s that participated in the first intifada as conditions worsened [7]. Over time, resistance has therefore been deeply entrenched into Gazan society, while resistance fighters represent the sentiments of the average person. Consequently, assassinating leaders cannot weaken any front of the resistance which can be characterised as a coordinated liberation movement, rather than a single organisation with clearly defined walls, uniforms, and fighters. This idea is encapsulated perfectly by the words of the late Haniyeh: 

“When a great man leaves us, another will take his place.” - Ismael Haniyeh [8]

Soon after the assassination of Haniyeh, Yahya Sinwar stepped into the leadership position [9]. The occupation entity made a severe miscalculation and brought on their worst nightmare by facilitating Sinwar’s leadership– a man who used more than two decades of his sentence in the occupation’s prisons to deepen his understanding of the entity inside and out. As Sinwar is known to have called Al Aqsa Flood, the war potentially ending with him in power would be the biggest sign of defeat for the entity. Sinwar is also known to keep strong ties with the regional resistance [10] continuing the trajectory of the leader before him, which suggests that the assassination was unsuccessful in setting the Gazan resistance back.

The entity also facilitated a new organisational phase for the Gazan resistance, by bringing the diplomatic leadership which has traditionally remained in Qatar right into the heart of Gaza, which is a territory they do not strategically understand and have not had a presence in since 2005. On the resistance’s part, this move highlighted the strength of their position and the confidence they have in maintaining it.  

Toeing the line of a regional war 

The entity knows that though the US is not keen to expand the genocide of Gaza into a regional war, it will continue to defend it militarily and diplomatically to ensure that any settlement is not made on the terms of the Axis, which would be contrary to its interest of maintaining the status quo of US dominance in the region. It is also aware that Iran and the Lebanese resistance do not see a regional war as conducive to their interest of keeping attention on Gaza, through both official statements and the nature of previous responses which have skilfully avoided expanding the war, like the drone attack carried out in response to the bombing of the Iranian consulate in Syria back in April [11]. 

These factors have given the entity a false sense of confidence that regardless of the outcome– regional war or not– their position will likely be secure; the US will offer blanket support if a regional war breaks out, and the resistance will practise ‘restraint’ to prevent a regional war from ensuing and keep their responses limited. 

But this risky strategy is indicative that the cards they have been dealt are not favourable. Both options rely on assumptions made about the strategic decisions of external players. The entity does not have control in either scenario. It also assumes that the strategic logic behind the resistance’s previous operations was to ‘practise restraint’ to no end when in reality, their strategy was designed to leverage their role as leaders of the Axis to support the Palestinian resistance while not giving the entity what it wants, which is an expanded war that would draw in the US. For example, the Iranian response to the consulate attack was effectively an intelligence mission [12] used to identify key military and intelligence sites, which could then be passed over to the wider Axis to make their attacks more impactful by exposing key locations. A wider war which brought in the US was avoided, and Iran’s deterrence capabilities were cemented. 

It also signifies another issue in the entity’s understanding of its alliance with the US; the US is not as concerned or interested in the survival of the zionist entity as it is in the defence of its interests in such a strategically important region.

The entity relies on exercising a policy of entanglement [13] which rests on the assumption that the US will continue to stand by the entity regardless of the outcome because in their view, the survival of the entity is the US’s main interest in the region. However, what it fails to understand is that open-ended support for the entity has always been a means to an end; support for the entity is only to maintain US dominance in the region. 

This means that US support may not be as unconditional as it seems in future, 1) if the entity has proven that it could jeopardise their interests in the region in its pursuit of survival, and 2) if their goals can be more easily met through other means, especially after this war, which has proven that the resistance is here to stay and the extent of their capabilities, confirmed by US ships being attacked in the Red Sea by AnsarAllah [14], and the numerous successful attacks on US bases in the region by the Iraqi resistance [15]. The US has already begun to adapt to this reality by pushing the occupation entity towards the negotiating table to reach a settlement with the resistance, which shows some level of acceptance that the resistance is too strong to eradicate– the only solution left for the US is to push the entity to draw out favourable terms through negotiations if it wants to avoid being pulled into a regional war. 

Therefore, the current priority for the US during this war is to reach a settlement that is conducive to their interests and does not give the upper hand to the Axis. Keeping the entity alive during the war is necessary to achieve this goal. Post-war however, cracks in the US-‘israeli’ alliance may begin to form if the entity continues to be a liability to its interests.

The only way for the occupation entity to be severely weakened is for it to lose its appeal in the eyes of its US sponsor which keeps it afloat. For the breakdown of the relationship to begin, the US would need to see that the entity is becoming an obstacle to its interests. Blanket support for the entity has traditionally rested on a guarantee that the occupation would act on the offensive, fulfilling its functional role as an extension and protector of Western interests in the region, but it is now on the defensive. The resistance’s operations have been key to facilitating this outcome, which has not only exposed the occupation’s fragility but shown that it is willing to do anything to ensure its survival, including dragging the US into a regional war which it would prefer not to fight.  

Anticipation of an Iranian attack and the pivot to negotiations

The entity’s quick pivot to the negotiating table right after carrying out a series of assassinations reflects the rush to reach a settlement quickly and buy time ahead of the Iranian retaliation, which has kept the entity and its Western sponsors at the edge of their seats [16]. 

Though the occupation has shown that it is willing to escalate the war into a regional one to secure its survival, its Western sponsors have made clear that they are not entirely aligned with the entity on this point. A joint statement recently issued by the UK, France and Germany, pleaded for Iran to practise restraint in its response to the assassination of Haniyeh and violation of its sovereignty which was ultimately rejected [17]. Though directed at Iran the statement itself suggests that regional stability, which in their framework should uphold the status quo of Western dominance, is of the highest priority for the entity’s greatest allies, rather than an expanded war simply for the purpose of the entity’s survival. The trajectory of Netanyahu’s war of survival has been unpopular internally too among members of his own party, for its lack of direction and the inability to achieve any of its established goals in Gaza;

 “The results in Gaza are very bad, they’re very poor. The IDF has barely made any strategic achievement in the Gaza Strip [...] The government set goals — the elimination of Hamas’s military and governing capabilities — and the IDF brought a plan that can’t fulfil these goals” - Amit Halevi [18]

Previously, Halevi also stated that 24 of the resistance’s brigades were still present and functional in Gaza, and that the leader of his party, Netanyahu, had inflated the IOF’s achievements [19]; 

“I say with full knowledge and full responsibility, all Hamas' 24 brigades function normally, exist everywhere we do, and keep returning to where we finish operating.” - Amit Halevi [20]

Schisms have also formed among Netanyahu’s close ministers too, with Defence Minister Gallant recently taking a stand against Netanyahu's claim that ‘total victory’ in Gaza is still attainable [21]. Pressure is thus mounting on the occupation entity from all sides to wrap up the war soon on favourable terms. If the goal of assassinating the Gazan resistance’s key negotiator was a way to pressure them to meet the entity’s demands, it failed to do so, as the resistance is doubling down. The resistance announced its withdrawal from a new round of negotiations until the existing terms are met which the entity has brazenly ignored through its continued massacres. This indicates that 10 months of war and the assassination of Haniyeh have not led to any compromise in its position and demands as it was thought to. In fact, the withdrawal suggests that the assassination had the opposite effect, by making the resistance even more uncompromising, and unwilling to accept any deal that provides cover for the entity: 

“The main message here is that we are not prepared to give the enemy more time to commit more massacres, and the goal is to stop the aggression. The role of the mediators is to compel the party committing the aggression to adhere to the terms of the proposal, which the Americans promised. If the mediators inform us that the enemy has agreed to the proposal, then the Hamas delegation will participate in negotiations.”- Osama Hamden [15th Aug, via RNN]

“ […] Talk of a ceasefire and scheduling new negotiations is nothing but deceit and lies that will not fool the Palestinian people, their resistance factions, and the supporting fronts, which are increasingly convinced of their determination to resist and work with all their might to halt the massacre and prevent the enemy from achieving its declared and hidden objectives.” - excerpt from a statement issued by the Lebanese resistance soon after the Fajr Massacre [10th Aug, 2024]

“We will not enter into negotiations that provide cover for Netanyahu and his extremist government.” - Dr. Ahmed Abdel Hadi [22] 

The resistance remains undeterred, their terms have remained consistent and the message is clear; their terms must be met by the occupation entity and its US sponsor if a settlement is to be reached. A statement like this can only be made by those who are in the driver's seat– it is the entity that is still having to operate on the backfoot even after pulling out its strongest card through the assassination of Haniyeh which proved unsuccessful in pressuring the resistance to falter and accept their terms. 

While the occupation scrambles for victory with hasty decisions, the resistance is preparing its response carefully. Psychological warfare has been leveraged at every step, with the entity being drip-fed information on the scale of the response, and when it may occur. Soon after the assassinations, Hassan Nasrallah kept his cards close to his chest, by suggesting that while a response is inevitable, it may or may not involve the entire Axis [23]. A video published on 16th August revealed the Imad 4 underground facility for the first time, reminding the occupation of the extent of the Lebanese resistance’s deterrence capabilities, while it waits in anticipation for their attack. Continued delay has not only raised anxieties but has prevented the entity from functioning normally; a growing number of airlines have suspended flights to the entity amid fears of the Iranian retaliation, which will have grave consequences for the economy if it continues [24]. The entity has therefore been left to prepare for all kinds of attacks while knowing that their position has already been compromised during previous battles with Iran and the Lebanese resistance which have exposed their key deterrence locations. 

Conclusion: 

The occupation entity’s increasingly risky strategy which is based on assumptions and suspected outcomes rather than clear strategic evaluation is a reflection of its failure to keep control of this war. The power over outcome lies in every other player's hands except its own. The resistance has cornered the entity, forcing it to adopt a strategy that could even jeopardise the quality of its relationship with the US in future, if it finds that the entity is becoming too much of a liability to its interests in the region. The adoption of such a risky strategy indicates that for the occupation, this is a war of survival, which would necessitate precarious methods. The goal is no longer to entrench the occupation, it is now simply trying to keep afloat at the bare minimum. The resistance on the other hand has not budged on any of its terms even with the assassination of its key negotiator. In fact, the entity’s recent escalations have only made the resistance more headstrong and determined to have their terms met before entertaining any further talks. None of its escalations have given the occupation the upper hand; as it stands, the entity is still left anticipating the nature and scope of the Iranian and Lebanese resistance’s response, once again proving that the resistance defines the terms of engagement, while the entity is left to find ways to adjust to it.