Sudan is once again experiencing a new chapter of infighting and foreign wars against it.

This time around, as on previous occasions, the clashes between generals, the struggle between the civilian and military camps, and the explosion of tensions between subgroups and sub-identities threaten the nation's landscape, people, and infrastructure. Foreign interventions and the social and demographic interactions between Sudan and its neighbors portend that the power struggle between the army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) will turn into a continental crisis involving nations, societies, and groups from Africa and beyond.

Sudanese history is rife with coups and attempted coups. It is targeted because it is a cornucopia of riches without equal in the Arab and African worlds. It also holds strategic importance to Arab national security in general and Egyptian national security in particular, as evidenced by the torrent of schemes seeking to fragment, divide, and weaken the country before and since its independence.

Khartoum, known as the capital of the 'Three Nos' [No recognition, No negotiations, No peace with "Israel" stipulated in the 1967 Khartoum Arab League summit declaration], has always been a target of Israeli/US evangelicalism.

Although the country, with its vibrant people and forces, has always been a staunch supporter of the Palestinian people and resistance forces, Khartoum was never spared from violence and subjection since Jaafar Nimeiry turned it into a corridor for smuggling Falashas [Ethiopian Jews]. Even now, after Burhan and Hemedti led the country down the disgraceful and disreputable normalization track, "Israel" has the gall and audacity to present itself as a 'neutral' mediator between two generals who are locked in a zero-sum battle, with each seeking to root out the other and send him where the sun does not shine.

As a post-independence nation-state, Sudan has failed extraordinarily at achieving development, fostering a collective national identity, and resolving issues of equal citizenship and justice between its various institutions and demographics - from the days of General Abboud to General Bashir, including Hassan al-Turabi's so-called 'revival project'. The first violent secession of the South was a natural result of the generals' brutality and ideological abuses. Many fear it is a prelude to second, third, and fourth secessions, for when the virus of partition strikes a country or a society, there are no brakes or restraints to prevent it from slipping over the edge of the abyss into the depths below.

Today, Sudan is witnessing the harbingers of a fierce war between 'enemy brothers' imbued with the weight of history, prevalent failure, and the greed of those who covet the country's wealth, position, and vast topography spanning deserts and forests.

Sudan is the vital link between Arab North Africa and the Sub-Saharan and Sahel regions. It has the potential to be an asset to the entire Ummah or to become its soft underbelly, for anyone to meddle with whenever and however they wish.

There is no scenario in which the generals' war ravaging everything in its path ends well. If the army under Burhan's command emerges victorious, it will plunge Sudan into a new dark tunnel of military rule that turns the page on democratic transition. The remnants of the old regime will take back old positions, and the [2020 Netanyahu/Burhan] Entebbe summit will inaugurate an offshoot of the "Abraham Accords" track that Sudan will not emerge from unscathed, and Arab and Egyptian national security will be in permanent danger.

If the RSF, or rather the Janjaweed, are destined to prevail, Sudan as we know it will not survive. The man commanding those forces is obsessed with power and control, and his legacy, background, and authority will allow him to ravage Sudan as he did Darfur and Kordofan. He also strongly rivals Burhan in courting "Israel's" friendship, albeit by means of the more accommodating Mossad rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

As his resume indicates, the man is devoid of any ethical or moral system. His rapprochement with some of the civilian forces involved in the framework agreement is merely an attempt to sedate them as a prelude to slaughtering them at a later phase as he consolidates power over the Northern Nile region, after advancing from the country's peripheries. His conduct, alliances, and actions tainted with the blood of the Sudanese and rebels all indicate that the country will be ruled by a war criminal until the opportunity arises for another bloody coup.

If neither of the power-hungry generals manages to prevail, it is likely that Hemedti and the Janjaweed will seek the aid of their hometowns and clans in Darfur and Kordofan as well as cross-border alliances. Hemedti will find the support he seeks, and his gold mines and investments in metals and natural resources will ensure him the enormous wealth needed to extend his war and power. It is not at all inconceivable for West Sudan to face the same fate as the South, even if the circumstances, figures, and alliances involved differ.

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The West’s Hypocrisy over Sudan

Calls for calm and dialogue, despite the modest chances that they will be met with actions rather than words, may succeed in delaying the moment of truth and deferring the major explosion. The duumvirate model (under the Bashir/Turabi duo) proved to be a failure during times of peace, let alone during a time of militarization, armament, and war! The RSF was conceived to ensure the militia's survival, not to integrate it into military and civilian state institutions – unless these institutions fall under Hemedti's command, which is a very unlikely scenario because the Sudanese military establishment is part of the deep state and its hatred for the RSF transcends Burhan and extends to most commanders and recruits. Whatever one may say about its commander today, the army remains the best guarantee for the Sudanese state's survival and sustainability.

In the raging conflict in and against Sudan, the hypocrisy of the West, and especially the US, stands out. For all the talk of democratic transition in the country, throughout the post-Bashir years, we have seen no concerted efforts to salvage the transition process and dismantle the military's grip over the civilian and revolutionary forces.

Both generals knew which side the bread was buttered. They are each, in their own way, using the channels they knew best, pursuing rapprochement with "Israel" to ensure they would remain in power. They got what they wanted, in collusion with the US and to varying degrees with many European capitals. This is because true democratic transition in Sudan would have set it down a different path in which normalization with "Israel" does not at all figure and would have enabled the Sudanese to control their country's resources and make their own choices regarding international relations, including by reviving traditional ties with Russia and China, which is the last thing Washington, the UK, and Europe want.

The raging conflict in Sudan has therefore shone a spotlight on heavyweight regional and international players and influencers on the scene. Egypt appears to be outside the game entirely, with hardly any of its players engaging in de-escalation, ceasefire, evacuation, and relief efforts.

Ironically, the 'international quartet' concerned with Sudan includes Riyadh and Abu Dhabi along with Washington and London, but excludes Cairo, despite the fact that Sudan has always been an extension of its influence and a vital domain of water and strategic interests since the time of the Pharaohs.

It would not be surprising for Sudan to turn into another Yemen, i.e. a battleground for converging and diverging Saudi and Emirati agendas and the arena of a raging power and leadership struggle between the two Gulf capitals.

Whether we like it or not, Sudan may also become a new arena in the raging conflict over the new world order. What Blinken, the White House, and the Pentagon dread the most is for Moscow to succeed in building bridges with Khartoum and for the Wagner Group to have any presence on Sudanese soil, although the paramilitary organization denies any such involvement, as do both sides of the conflict. Meanwhile, the US war on China's Road and Belt Initiative leaves no weapons, however dirty, off the table.

Today, Sudan has become a testing ground for regional axes and alliances. It presents an opportunity to study the phenomenon of disintegration that has afflicted it during the past two years as a result of major U-turns in the politics, positions, and alliances of regional capitals. Egypt hardly conceals its bias towards the army and Burhan. Meanwhile, its Libyan ally, elderly General Khalifa Haftar, has decided to lend a hand to the Janjaweed general, prompted by Egypt's other regional ally, the UAE, which likewise makes no secret of its bias for the RSF.

Saudi Arabia, which has spared no effort in hunting down the Muslim Brotherhood across the world (as well as Egypt), does not conceal its bias for the army and Burhan, despite the barrage of reports that the Islamist movement and remnants of the old regime back the army in this conflict. It is not unlikely that we will witness further realignments if this crisis is destined to be protracted.

Russia and China are conspicuously absent from the Sudanese scene, at least so far. The two powers are locked in a global war with Washington and its allies over the identity and nature of the new world order. Despite the deep network of interests that they have built over this strategic arena, they prefer to take a backseat. Is this because of the uncertainty of the conflict's outcomes and repercussions? Or is it a tactic that involves waiting until the parties are exhausted and initiatives have been tested before swooping in to save the day? Can the Russian/Chinese doctor fix what was broken by foreign interventions and the generals' infighting if the wait proves to be long?

The only ones in Sudan that deserve solidarity and sympathy are its brotherly people and some of the godforsaken civilian and revolutionary forces. But the majority of its political elites and parties implicitly chose to align themselves with one side or another, and the majority of them were taken in by (or colluded with) the deceptive ploys of the Janjaweed general when they accepted him as a protector of the democratic transition process and guarantor of a secure future for Sudan.

But we who grew up in the fold of the Arab left are especially dismayed to find that some leftists have taken to defending the Janjaweed and their general using claims, arguments, and interpretations that no one is so adept at spinning as the opportunist left, who wield their hatred for the Islamists as a gateway to their self-degradation, sacrificing the blood of the Sudanese on the altar of the petrodollar.

What a disgrace it is to see!