By considering the U.S. foreign policy approach on the 'arc of crisis', or rather the ring of open crises in the region, one finds a common feature despite differences in players and contexts and varying priorities from one crisis to another. 

This common feature is encapsulated by one idea: 'Neither war nor peace'. How does all of this manifest? Why does Washington opt for this choice? And what are its potential repercussions?

First of all, let us begin by explaining and defining the concept of 'neither war nor peace'. The term became common in Arab political literature in the period between the defeat of June 1967 and the 1973 October War. It is borrowed from the Cold War lexicon and the post-WWII power dynamics between the socialist and capitalist camps until the fall of the Berlin Wall. It refers to a state of strategic stagnation that precludes major wars and conflicts, but without closing the door to the possibility of limited, controlled battles and conflicts. It is a state in which frontlines are kept calm and conflicts are managed and contained, but without devoting sufficient time, effort, and resources to resolving or transforming them, and without finding radical solutions that address their key causes and factors.

States typically resort to the 'neither war nor peace' option when it is difficult for one side to inflict a clear defeat against the other. Major powers often employ this strategy to drain an adversary's resources and wear them down or in hopes of enabling an ally to catch its breath and prepare for future rounds of battle and war. In some cases, they hope a temporary situation becomes permanent, making the perpetuation of the status quo the desired solution in itself.

In the broader crisis that has swept the region for a century, this concept has historically manifested in the most obvious form. Prior to the era of normalization agreements with "Israel" that was ushered in by Egypt, the region spent most of the duration of the conflict in a state of 'neither war nor peace', with few exceptions, making it the rule rather than the exception. With heavy, ruthless support from European and Western circles, especially the U.S., "Israel" managed to build the components of its strength, capabilities, and expansion. Were it not for the prolonged years of 'neither war nor peace' the Zionist project would not have managed to consume the entire area of historic Palestine or encroach on the perimeters of surrounding Arab states, nor would it have been able to expand beyond the perimeter to the heart of 'supportive' Arab states through the avenue of economic, security, and cultural normalization.

Today, Washington is doing more of the same. At the core, its political movements serve to perpetuate a state of 'neither war nor peace' in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. A final solution is not on the Biden administration's agenda and there is no expectation that it will be on the agendas of its successors. A major explosion does not seem to be desirable from Washington's perspective since it would be disruptive of other priorities – from Ukraine and the Black Sea to Taiwan and the South China Sea, and passing through the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

The Biden administration's aspirations for Palestine do not transcend the realization of a 'security for economic benefits' equation – even if it results in the PA transforming from a state project to a proxy security force for "Israel" that dedicates its efforts to protecting the settlements and settlers in return for meager economic and trade benefits and easing the degrading restrictions on Palestinian mobility. This is the bar set for U.S. action until further notice, making it a modern interpretation of the 'neither war nor peace' concept in the current Palestinian context.

In Yemen, there are no longer major battles and wars taking place, and the guns have been silent for over a year. Despite the ceasefire expiring and not being renewed, the frontlines have remained calm and quiet, on land, in the air, and at sea, undisturbed by even the occasional skirmish. Meanwhile, the negotiation tracks are suspended, apparently waiting for another era to arrive, and the efforts of UN and U.S. envoys have found no luck. A state of 'neither war nor peace' prevails over Yemen despite warnings from many that it will not prevent an explosion and that it is rife with possibilities that augur dire consequences.

'Neither war nor peace' in the Palestinian context means the attrition of the Palestinians, a fading spirit of resistance among younger generations, and the prospect of more internal disputes and divisions erupting, all while settlements spread like a malevolent weed, growing fat off Palestinian land, rights, and holy sites. In contrast, 'neither war nor peace' in the Yemeni experience appears to be a carefully laid trap for Ansarullah, who must now focus not on the course of the battles on the frontlines, but on ensuring the dignified livelihood of millions of Yemenis in the areas under their control. This is a much more difficult task in times of truce and calm than the task of winning battles and launching drones and missiles in times of war and conflict, especially considering the economic and social conditions in Yemen and the bleak and heavy impact of the ongoing blockade on the North of the country.

In Syria as well, there are no major clashes taking place. Major confrontations are absent. [The Russian base at] Hmeimim has already explicitly declared that the era of major battles in Syria is over. But once again in Syria, we are witnessing neither war nor peace. More than a quarter of the country's soil, where millions of Syrians reside, remains outside of the state's control and sovereignty. Economic warfare continues to be waged through the Caesar Act and other punitive laws. Promises regarding Syria's reconstruction or early recovery, much like the return of refugees, remain complicated by Western red lines that make fulfilling the task very difficult.

There are no major wars or battles, but also no political or diplomatic solutions. The Geneva track remains stagnant and the Astana track has failed to maintain its momentum. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Committee only seems to appear in the meetings of the six-way Arab Contact Group, and hardly a peep is heard from UN envoy Geir Pedersen. It is almost as though the goal is to maintain a strategic deadlock from all sides and perpetuate a state of stasis and stagnation. This by itself is enough to trigger economic and social crises, by banking on a series of internal explosions or a new wave of 'bread riots' while the guns and frontlines remain silent on the one hand and the political prospects and solutions remain missing on the other.

Libya, for its part, is not untouched by this policy. The war has subsided since the possibility arose of the Turkish and Egyptian armies clashing on the Sirte-Jufra line. International envoys come and go, names and figures change, and sporadic clashes erupt here and there. But the result is that Libya has moved past the phase of major wars and battles without yet entering the phase of peace, keeping the door open to all possibilities.

Washington is unable to settle these conflicts through military means or resolve them politically, either directly or via regional allies and proxies. However, it is still able to prevent peace as long as it does not align with its terms and conditions. Hence, it resorts to the 'neither war nor peace' option, which provides it with a broad range of choices and alternatives. For example, it can deploy Marines and warships to the Gulf, bolster its military presence in Northeastern Syria, and enlist clan militias to sever Iran's vital corridor from Qazvin to the Eastern Mediterranean. It can harass Russia in Syria and maintain its so-called 'deterrence strategy against Iran's destabilizing role', but without this preventing it from pursuing 'minor settlements' like the prisoner swap deal through closed-door talks in Muscat and Doha. Meanwhile, it has no objection to fighting 'minor battles' directly or by proxy.

The state of 'neither war nor peace' on the Arab and regional scenes adds to the burdens of regional states and peoples and keeps their futures murky and uncertain – especially for parties that do not turn in the U.S.'s orbit.