The Static and the Dynamic in US Relations with 'Israel'
Blind U.S. bias for “Israel” transcends party lines and both chambers of Congress, extending to the institutions of the deep state.
A New York Times article by Thomas Friedman revealing the Biden administration's intention to re-evaluate its relationship with “Israel” has sparked a wave of debate in Palestinian and Arab political, and media circles.
Various interpretations, scenarios, and predictions have emerged, from those that reject the notion that there is any conflict or dispute between the two strategic allies, to those that herald the imminent upheaval of these relations. Between these two extremes lie a variety of interpretations and thought experiments in every direction.
In my perspective, it is necessary to reaffirm the principles underlying U.S./Israeli relations, without denying or downplaying the gravity of the changes that they may be undergoing on the surface or deep-down.
First: It is difficult to accept the premise that U.S./Israeli relations are fundamentally based on, and solely driven by, the system of 'shared values', which some believe forms the foundation of this strategic alliance and has motivated the U.S.' blind embrace of “Israel” in all cases and circumstances. The 'shared values' narrative is a commodity that has depreciated, and no one in our region buys it at any longer. Those who still tout it after all the experience we have weathered are either doing so out of self-interest or turning a blind eye to the truth.
As evidence, we cite the fact that Washington has backed “Israel” and fought alongside it throughout the various junctures of the past seven decades, and “Israel” has engaged in aggression, killing, settlement expansion, and racist practices with Washington's protection and encouragement, all under the ludicrous pretext of 'Israel's right to defend itself.' It was not enough for Washington to provide military and technological support to “Israel” as its top beneficiary. It has also furnished “Israel” – which boasts of being a “welfare state” – with unmatched financial and economic assistance compared to any other U.S. partner or ally in both absolute terms (at least $4 billion annually) and relative terms (per capita).
Blind U.S. bias for “Israel” transcends party lines and both chambers of Congress, extending to the institutions of the deep state. Barack Obama disagreed strongly with Netanyahu, but that did not prevent him from signing a $40 billion deal with "Tel Aviv". Biden, former VP under Obama and current Democratic leader, proudly identifies as a Zionist, although he is not Jewish. Despite his strong hostility to Donald Trump and his policies, all Biden did during the first three years of his presidency was follow in his predecessor's footsteps, albeit with some differences in rhetoric.
The 'shared values' narrative is not only repeated like a broken record to justify Washington's global policies, as indicated by its support for immoral, authoritarian regimes and its immersion from head to toe in the quagmire of double standards, but in "Israel's" case, it also points to the highest levels of hypocrisy and dissimulation, for one people cannot occupy another and claim to be free.
Although at least a half dozen major international and Israeli human rights organizations have designated "Israel" an apartheid state, all but a handful of members of Congress, Democrats and Republicans alike, voted to deny the racist designation of this state.
In this sense, the 'shared values' narrative as the governing standard for U.S./Israeli relations is utterly ridiculous. It is a set of shared geostrategic interests that fundamentally and primarily governs this relationship, in light of "Israel" spearheading Washington's Middle East and Gulf strategies, whether in confronting competing and 'hostile international powers or in setting the pace of regional events and preventing its revival and development, from the time of Jamal Abdel Nasser and the leftist nationalist tide to the rise of the Iranian crescent with its 'destabilizing' role.
Of course, when 'political figures' like Ben-Gvir and Smotrich ascend to decision and policy-making circles in "Israel" on the back of blatantly racist and fascist discourse, it causes Washington some consternation and embarrassment. Indeed, it even causes discomfort to some of the Israelis themselves, including military and security personnel. However, this changes nothing in Washington's relations with "Tel Aviv". The most the Biden administration seeks to achieve is to remove one or two ministers from the fascist ruling coalition and replace them with others of the same ilk from the 'nationalist camp' and those responsible for successive war crimes in Gaza.
In short, the underlying, deep-seated strategic considerations between the two sides do not justify high hopes or flights of fancy, and any miscalculation and misjudgment will have serious consequences for the Palestinian and Arab sides.
Second: Some believe there is another dispute between "Israel" and the U.S. over Palestine, and they build much more than is warranted on that premise. The Netanyahu government and the Biden administration undeniably differ on the settlement issue, but their disagreement revolves around the pace and rate of expansion, or perhaps the geographic scope of the settlements. Washington does not object to settlements expanding and multiplying in the vicinity of the so-called 'major blocs'. However, it does have reservations about infiltrating deep into the West Bank, as this would jeopardize the two-state solution, which it continues to claim is the ideal and most realistic solution, and more importantly, the solution that best serves Israeli security and democracy in the long run.
However, Washington has no qualms about building a defensive bulwark around "Israel" in the Security Council and international organizations when the settlement issue is discussed as a war crime. It also will not impose sanctions on "Israel" for defying U.S. wishes. In contrast, the excessive, extensive use of sanctions has become Washington's weapon of choice against opponents and adversaries. In fact, the introduction of new sanctions has become a daily news item in U.S. media.
Washington will do nothing to curb Israeli settlement policies or to stop the execution of Palestinians on the streets. It will not pressure Netanyahu to contain the heavily armed, hate-filled settler militias that operate with official protection. When it comes to "Israel", Washington speaks its mind and then moves on. But where others are concerned, it prefers the weapon of sanctions over the weapon of criticism by a mile.
Disagreement over the circumstances in the West Bank is not the main reason why some gray clouds have appeared in the skies of Israeli/U.S. relations. Washington distinguishes between its stance towards some members of the Netanyahu government and its stance towards "Israel". No, the dispute that has emerged today, which is expected to escalate into a crisis, revolves around Washington's need for the guise of 'shared values' to justify its unconditional support for the Zionist state while incurring minimal embarrassment. But Ben-Gvir and Smotrich are not making this an easy task to accomplish.
Third: True, there have been shifts in U.S. public opinion that do not favor "Israel", demonstrating cautious sympathy for the Palestinian narrative and, indeed, expressing ire over the generous support that successive administrations have extended to a simultaneously wealthy and racist state. And true, these shifts include the U.S. Jewry, progressive Democrats, and evangelical Christian youth, according to repeated opinion polls.
But it is also true that there is a long way to go before these shifts reflect the wishes and convictions of the majority of Americans so as to translate into votes for both chambers of Congress and ultimately be reflected in the selection of the president and the approaches of the White House staff.
This process is not expected to be completed in the foreseeable future. For many years to come, we will continue to observe and monitor the developments without witnessing a radical change in U.S. policies and strategies. As a high-ranking U.S. official involved in the Middle East peace process told me in a private meeting, according to the most optimistic assessments it will take ten years at the very least before there may be a shift in the other direction.
However, this does not negate the need to devote every available effort to accelerate the progression of U.S. and Western public opinion, as well as global opinion as a whole. But it is one thing to work towards achieving this goal, and quite another thing to promote the illusion that it has become a reality or within reach.
In conclusion, the differences between Washington and "Tel Aviv" are not new, but have arisen time and again: During the Tripartite Aggression against Suez, on the eve of the Madrid Peace Conference, and as the negotiations with Iran began to verge on an agreement in Vienna. And again today, with the internal changes in “Israel”. But throughout all this, the strong strategic relations between the two sides have remained unchanged and unaffected, and they are not expected to face a crisis or turning point in the future. In my opinion, the Friedman article cited at the beginning of this column is merely a warning message to Netanyahu to tone down his pursuit of 'reforms'. The Palestinian cause, for its part, is not on the discussion table, or at least it is not central to the debate.
Friedman will always be able to ignore it or downplay it, just like the Biden administration and the Netanyahu government.