Within the same timeframe, the European Parliament unilaterally resolved for Syrian refugees to remain in Lebanon against the will of its people and government, and the World Food Programme decided to cut aid to refugees in Jordanian camps by one-third (from $32 to $21 per person per month) after removing 50,000 refugees from the list of aid recipients under the pretext of prioritizing support for the poorest families.

The suspicious timing of the two decisions speaks to the two main aspects of the overall Western perspective regarding the refugee issue in general and Syrian refugees in particular. The first is to confine waves of displacement, old and new alike, to Southern Mediterranean countries and prevent them from spreading to states in the North, while the second is to lessen their own share of the responsibility and shift the burden of hosting refugees on the financially and economically exhausted host countries.

The situation is further complicated when EU states (along with the UK and the U.S.) stand against any attempt or initiative to open up to Damascus and its government so as to find solutions for the many problems related to the repercussions of the Syrian crisis, including the refugee dossier.

It is becoming clear that the West does not want a solution to the refugee crisis that involves their repatriation until scores are settled with Damascus and its allies. Not only is the West unwilling to accept more refugees, but it is in fact seeking to relocate some of them. To make matters worse, it has become reluctant to bear the financial burden of aid and rehabilitation programs, especially since the Ukrainian war, and seeks to shift the costs to states and governments that can barely meet their own citizens' basic needs.

To take a sample of this Western rhetoric, the European Parliament's statement is full of lecturing about human rights and international humanitarian law, yet disregards the fact that it places the burden on the weak while turning a blind eye to the powerful Western states and allies that violate these moral and human rights frameworks and that furthermore deal with refugees on their own soil with extreme condescension.

The UK and Denmark have struck deals with Rwanda to 'relocate' refugees in exchange for a handful of dollars, and Rishi Sunak's government is leaving refugees moored on overcrowded barges at closed ports, prohibited from entry or exit without special security permits.

"Israel", while not typically a destination for refugees (but often the cause of their displacement), has become fed up with the small number of African migrants arriving at its borders via Sinai and is 'relocating' them to Uganda and Eritrea for a paltry sum. And let us not forget the 'Wall of Shame' that Donald Trump boasted about building on the U.S./Mexico border.

Since the early stages and first manifestations of the Syrian crisis, the Syrian refugee dossier has been politicized. The Friends of Syria group believed it would provide a strong card to be used in their war against Damascus and its allies. The group even encouraged Syrian citizens to cross borders, promising that generous aid and assistance would await them on the other side. Economic difficulties that predated the war and were exacerbated were used to encourage more Syrians to leave their country.

Host countries were motivated to open their borders to successive waves of refugees based on assessments in the early years of the crisis, some of them naive and others manipulative, predicting an imminent military resolution of the conflict with Damascus and that Assad's days were numbered. Therefore, the refugees would not remain outside their country for long and would soon return with the 'conquerors'.

Generous funding programs blinded host countries to the long-term effects of this dossier on their economies, societies, and sometimes their security and stability.

A core objective of the Friends of Syria, whose numbers and role have been diminishing, was to use the refugee card as a means of pressuring Damascus, delegitimizing its political regime, and ensuring that a substantial bloc of refugees in the diaspora would vote for the candidate chosen by the influential members of the group in the event of new elections as part of a political process designed to change the regime and usher Syria into the post-Assad era.

But none of this happened, and the chances of it happening declined the more that Damascus and its allies advanced on the battlefield, especially in the wake of Russia's military intervention in 2015. The magic had begun to turn against the magician, and the hourglass counting down to the regime' demise shattered. The refugee issue transformed from being a burden on Damascus into a heavier burden on the Friends of Syria member states, especially those in Syria's neighborhood.

In Lebanon, a country deeply divided on almost everything, there is a rare consensus today on the need to secure the safe and dignified return of over 1.5 million refugees. This country with perhaps the most precarious demographic balance in the world is currently suffering from an economic and financial collapse bordering on bankruptcy, along with a no less serious breakdown in the functioning and performance of state institutions, with key positions in the political, financial, and security sectors left vacant and the entire state running under a caretaker administration.

Lebanon, more than any other country, is reeling under the weight of this heavy crisis, and its only way out of the intensive care unit is to get the wheels turning on a solution. Jordan, for its part, hosts a similar number of refugees (1.3 million) and also suffers from a devastating economic crisis, though less severe than Lebanon's, as well as a sensitive demographic balance, although one less precarious than Lebanon's. For years, Jordan has struggled with declining enthusiasm from international donors to finance national response plans for the Syrian refugee crisis. Today, Turkey faces the challenge of aid being scaled back for some refugees and entirely withheld for others.

Turkey fears being left alone to shoulder the heavy burdens of this dossier. This, among other issues, was one of the reasons that drove it to adopt a new approach towards Syria, actively pursue a similar Arab approach, and take the initiative to reach out to Damascus on its own behalf and on behalf of the Arab working group on Syria.

Turkey, however, has been one of the most insincere in dealing with the Syrian refugee crisis. It initially opened its doors to numbers approaching four million refugees in a bid to create a foundation of support for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the 'Sultan' among the ranks of the Syrian opposition and in 'post-Assad Syria.' Turkey exploited hundreds of thousands of refugees in its project to 'engineer Syrian demographics' in Northern areas. Ankara also did not hesitate to use refugees as ammunition in its conflicts with Western Europe opening its borders with the Old Continent to successive waves of refugees in an attempt to extort Europe before settling the issue with financial and political deals that are no longer a secret to anyone.

Today, the Syrian refugee issue has transformed from ammunition for Erdogan to use to a burden on his shoulders. It has also become a hot-button issue in parliamentary and presidential election campaigns, which nearly spelled the doom of the AKP and its leader. It was also a key factor in poisoning social relations between local communities and refugee populations, fueling hardline nationalist trends and propagating a culture of bigotry.

As in the case of Jordan and Lebanon, this issue has driven Ankara to reassess its relationship with Damascus and adopt a new approach towards Syria, whose features have yet to fully emerge.

The states that host Syrian refugees, all of which are Western and U.S. allies, have begun to realize that the key to solving this predicament lies in the West's hands. They understand that their own interests are at stake, and they are secondary victims of the sanctions policy hindering any significant progress from being made toward the early recovery of the Syrian economy. This economic revival is a necessary requirement and precondition for motivating refugees to return to their homes, undergo rehabilitation, and reintegrate into their local communities.

Sanctions are also a stumbling block to the new Arab initiative towards Syria approved in Amman and Jeddah as a roadmap outlining what various parties need to accomplish according to a 'step-for-step' principle, as part of a comprehensive vision for resolving the Syrian crisis in all its aspects, from the security dimension (smuggling) to humanitarian aspects (refugee issues, relief, and aid), and ultimately reaching a political solution.

The Arab contact group and Arab summit institution have no option but to work towards providing a collective umbrella to shield the affected states from the dangers of sanctions and the Cesar Act. Washington may have taken a threatening and warning stance against normalizers with Washington, but it would not dare impose sanctions on all its friends and allies in the region if they united on a collective stance and will. In that case, the U.S. will find itself forced to negotiate the reduction of sanctions as a prelude to lifting them.

Therefore, Damascus's responsiveness to the plan agreed on in Amman and Jeddah and its commitment to accomplishing its share of reciprocal steps will play a crucial role in reinforcing this new approach in Arab collective action.