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The Knesset's holiday recess can be seen as a short hiatus separating two stages of the conflict with its local opponents, which has escalated to the point of violence and the threat of resorting to extreme measures.

Observers increasingly believe that despite the various scenarios that may unfold in the Israeli internal crisis, intransigence will continue to prevail. "Israel" will not remain unchanged after this crisis. The rift that has divided its society into two cautious sides suggests that worse is yet to come. Even if temporary trade-offs and settlements may be reached, they are by nature only stopgap measures that do not address the underlying problems

This deadlock leads observers to question whether Netanyahu, who is at the helm of his sixth and perhaps final government, will resort to exporting his domestic crisis abroad by fabricating a conflict with an "external enemy". The hope behind this strategy is that a “foreign threat” could unite Israelis and ease tensions among the country's political, intellectual, and social factions, which have historically come together in the face of an external existential threat, whether real or imagined.

This central question posed by observers leads to a series of sub-questions, including but not limited to the following: Where will Netanyahu's next potential misadventure take him? Which 'enemy' will be the designated target? Will Netanyahu succeed in achieving his goals? Will he be able to promote and justify his actions? 

The focus is on three fronts: the Palestinian, Lebanese, and Iranian fronts. Opinions differ on Netanyahu's willingness and ability to wage war on these fronts. The questions that remain are: in which direction will the winds of Israeli escalation blow, and which front is more likely to heat up in the coming phase?

The Palestinian front seems to have been tense for some time, but there is a limit to the escalation that Netanyahu can undertake without risking losses on other fronts. This is because the US, supported by a wide range of international and Arab players, does not want to see the Palestinian/Israeli conflict escalate into a major explosion.

The Biden administration has no vision to offer other than 'calm in exchange for economic development', and shows no serious commitment to achieving the two-state solution and opening meaningful political prospects. In Netanyahu’s personal beliefs, the US/Israeli relations, which are already marked by some chilliness and resentment, do not need any more factors of tension.

Uncontrolled escalation in occupied Al-Quds and the West Bank could drag Gaza and its resistance movement into the conflict zone, which would lead to a new Israeli war on the Strip. It would also expose the Israeli interior to new waves of Palestinian rocket fire and perhaps even kamikaze drone attacks. Such a development would be interpreted by Netanyahu's opponents as triggering an 'unnecessary war' to save his own skin and pass the reform package under the thick smoke of mutual bombing.

An uncontrolled escalation could create additional problems for the "Abraham Accords" normalization process, potentially ending Netanyahu's hopes of Saudi Arabia normalizing relations with "Israel". It would also complicate Washington's efforts to establish normalization channels between "Israel" and the Arab and Muslim worlds.

"Israel" is making avid preparations in most occupied West Bank cities and towns, without the need for a re-occupation scenario, as it was the case during the second Intifada. Although "Israel" faces obstacles and fierce resistance when conducting raids in cities and camps, its reach extends throughout the occupied territories. Therefore, any Israeli attempt to escalate the situation would likely undermine the government's ability to divert local opponents' attention from their ongoing battle against Netanyahu and his coalition.

The Palestinian question in general, and the situation in the occupied West Bank in particular, do not hold a significant place in internal Israeli discourse. Even as opposition groups take to the streets in the hundreds of thousands to protest against the judicial reform, they remain silent about the crimes, attacks, and aggression occurring in the West Bank. In reality, these events seem to be broadly accepted by Israeli society across all political camps, with no difference between them apart from their tone and manner of speech.

When it comes to the Lebanese front, specifically the potential escalation with Hezbollah, it has become evident after the Megiddo operation that "Tel Aviv" is cautious of officially accusing the party of being behind it. This is despite reports and analyses by state-linked media that assert the party's involvement.

The reason behind this caution lies in the fact that "Israel" is certain that any action targeting Lebanon and its resistance movement, regardless of its form, magnitude, or limits, would be met with a proportional reaction from Hezbollah. This is confirmed by "Israel's" press, reporters, and politicians, and "Israel" has no doubt about it. "Israel" understands that any altercation with Hezbollah would not be a simple matter, and it is cautious about entering into a situation that could have unpredictable consequences.

Israeli sources suggest that "Tel Aviv" has decided to retaliate against the Megiddo operation in Syria, considering that a confrontation with Hezbollah on Syrian territory could be contained and would not be viewed as crossing any mutual red lines.

While an open battle with Hezbollah in Lebanon may avert the internal conflict in "Israel" for some time, it might also bring the end of Netanyahu’s government and inflict damages that would be difficult for the state and society to overcome. This is particularly true given the current state of "Israel's" military and security institutions, which are not at their best, not to mention the weaknesses on the home front that Israeli leaders have repeatedly warned about.

This leaves the Iranian front as a potential area for escalation and exporting crisis. It is important to distinguish between two forms and levels of Israeli escalation on this front. The first is strategic involving comprehensive and destructive strikes on Iran's nuclear program, while the second is tactical, involving the obstruction of the nuclear project and the slowing down of certain activities through shadow warfare waged by the Israeli occupation against Iranian targets.

The strategic option appears impossible without a green light from the US, accompanied by their involvement in providing all manner of support and backing, including potential participation in military operations. This scenario is unlikely due to several factors, one of which is that Washington is currently involved in global conflicts with Russia and China and has suffered defeats in regional wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Therefore, it has no interest in opening a third front and certainly does not want to risk losing another war.

The information coming from Washington suggests that it continues to pursue diplomacy and sanctions as options in dealing with the Iranian nuclear file. There is no indication that it is preparing for a major military operation against Iran, especially since the consequences and repercussions of such an operation are not guaranteed.

As for the tactical option, "Israel" has been pursuing it for years with no success. It continues to carry out assassinations and bombing operations against Iranian targets, engage in cyber warfare, and launch air and missile strikes against Iranian targets in Syria, Iraq, and at sea as part of its shadow war.

It would not be surprising, and in fact, it is quite likely, that "Israel" will continue with its current approach and level of escalation in the coming days. However, the question remains whether this approach is capable of exporting the country's internal crisis abroad. Even if the Israeli escalation intensifies, it will not be enough to divert attention from or extinguish the flames of its internal crisis.

This means, among other things, that there are limits and boundaries to escalation that "Israel" is unable to cross for fear of unforeseen consequences. As a result, "Israel" is faced with a scenario that, so far, has been free of serious consequences, which involves the continued violation of Syrian airspace and launching attacks from there, as it has done for years with minimal losses, mostly in the form of missile strikes, while its fighter jets fire from outside Syrian airspace. Meanwhile, Arab and international reactions to "Israel's" repeated violations and attacks are virtually non-existent, and it incurs no political, military, or human damage from violating Syrian airspace and striking targets throughout the country.

The past few days have witnessed an unprecedented development in terms of the magnitude and quality of air and missile strikes as well as the nature of the targets, specifically targeting the Damascus and Aleppo airports. Those airports serve as conduits for humanitarian and earthquake relief efforts, reinforcing the idea that "Israel" is not afraid of sanctions and is deliberately engaging in such behavior.

Nevertheless, it appears that this situation will not persist indefinitely. The recent drone launch across the Syrian border into Palestinian airspace sends a pointed message that aligns with the recent change in tone in Syrian statements. These statements convey that remaining silent about "Israel's" arrogant actions is no longer an option and is not possible. However, we may need more time to understand Damascus' mindset and the extent to which Syria may go in its reactions.